

The Macedonian Patriot: The Diadoch Craterus

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Much has been written concerning the man whom Alexander “honored most” (Plut. *Alex.* 47. 10) who was described as the king’s “most loyal follower” (Arr. *Anab.* 7. 12. 3), generally recognized as his closest companion after Hephaestion (Diod. 17. 114. 1-2), and among Alexander’s commanders “arguably the best” (Heckel 1992: 107), but who in the final analysis failed to become one of the major players in the aftermath of Alexander’s death. He has been termed “the right man, in the wrong place, at the wrong time” (Ashton 1993: 131); proclaimed that he “lacked that fine edge of ruthlessness necessary for supreme power” (Green 1990: 8). This paper will suggest that Craterus was not the victim of being in the wrong place at the critical time, caught between Macedonia and Babylon, nor did he lack the ability to be ruthless, but was in the final analysis a Macedonian patriot (as noted by Heckel 1992: 107), who was content to serve the royal family and his kingdom. As Plutarch (*Alex.* 47. 10) comments, Craterus was “king loving.” It was in defense of his king and country that Craterus could be quite ruthless.

While Waldemar Heckel’s claim that the oft termed “Philotas Plot” against the life of Alexander was in reality a plot against the life of Philotas orchestrated by Craterus and others in part due to their personal ambitions (Heckel 1977: 9-21; 1992: 115-118; 2006: 27-33, 218-19), this is too strong an indictment of Craterus’ personal ruthlessness, but it is a clear example that the friend and *Somaphylax* was capable of savagery in defense of the crown. As Heckel points out, the Conspiracy of Dimnus was not “an invented conspiracy,” but a real one, that Philotas inexplicably chose to ignore (see also Bosworth 1980: 360). When taken together with the reports from Antigone, Philotas’ mistress, of his disparaging remarks concerning the king (Plut. *Alex.* 48. 4-6; *Mor.* 339D-F; cf. Curt. 6. 10. 26-27), and claimed earlier conspiracies back in Macedonia (Curt. 6. 9. 17-18; cf. Plut. *Alex.* 48. 4; Curt. 6. 10. 24-25), or in Egypt (Arr. *Anab.* 3. 26. 1; Curt. 6. 11. 22-29; cf. Plut. *Alex.* 48. 4), whether these last were true or not,¹ Craterus’ actions certainly displayed loyalty towards the crown; the claim that his actions were also the result of his own personal ambition is certainly possible (Curt. 6. 8. 2-4),² but may be no more than pure speculation on the part of Curtius or his source. A plot against the king, especially given Macedonia’s long history of royal assassinations, had to be taken seriously. Only two Macedonian kings in the fourth century prior to Alexander had not been assassinated: Philip’s father Amyntas III and Philip’s brother Perdiccas III, the latter

¹ Elizabeth Baynham (1998: 178) points out that this may be no more than guilt by association. Amyntas Perdicca is the conspirator and Philotas was his friend.

² While Curtius is the most complete source for this episode, the other so-called Vulgate sources mention Craterus hardly at all, but place the enthusiasm for the demise of Philotas at the feet of Alexander himself (Plut. *Alex.* 48; Just. 12. 5. 1-3; Diod. 17. 79. 5-6).

died fighting against the Illyrians. Personal slights were most often the cause of a Macedonian king's death. To ignore any intimation of a plot calls into question the motives of the reticent individual. Bosworth (1988: 101-4; 1980: 360-1) is likely correct that Philotas was not one of the conspirators, but was rather sympathetic to the plot and consequently did not reveal it.

The belief that there were warring factions at court appears to be much overblown. Heckel (2003: 197-8) correctly has reminded us that a king does not rule alone, and that those under his sovereign authority often do form factions and personally contend for power and influence. His delineation of factions, the Antipatrid-Antigonid, Parmenionid, Alexanderid, however, in the upper tier of Alexander's companions suggests far more solidarity than appears in the actual rivalries that existed at court (Heckel 2003: 200-5).³ When analyzed there were few alliances or hostilities that held for long periods during Alexander's lifetime. Of those not involving direct genetic ties, the animosity between Eumenes and Antipater, the hostility between Hephaestion and Craterus, less clearly the "friendship" of Antigonos and Antipater, or Antigonos and Eumenes, are the only such relationships clearly of long duration. Of these, it should be noted that three out of four involved individuals who were separated during the entire or almost the entire duration of Alexander's campaign. Friends would betray "friends" and family members their kinsmen. Fathers and sons tended to remain loyal to one another, but not fathers-in-law and sons-in-law, or the reverse. These *Principes*, a term found in Curtius' account of the leaders after Alexander's death, were by-and-large mercurial figures who tended to pursue personal objectives, not factional ones. It is a testimony of Alexander's leadership abilities, his charisma, military competence, and political acumen, that he was able to maintain control of what was an exceptional collection of ambitious and extremely capable leaders in their own right. In any case, Craterus was clearly capable of ruthlessness, but, perhaps, only in defense of his king or on the battlefield.

At Opis in 324, Craterus' long campaign in Asia beside his king ended, for he was sent to Macedonia with roughly 10000 veterans being retired from service.⁴ There, he was to replace Antipater, with the latter proceeding to Asia to join Alexander with new recruits. Yet, despite this order from Alexander, even though he had left with the veterans in the summer of 324, he was still in Cilicia at the time of Alexander's death almost a year later. Travel time to Cilicia would have taken at most three months of this time (see Engels 1978: 154-5; Anson 1986: 214). It has been suggested that Craterus remained so long in Cilicia because he did not

³ J. P. V. D. Balsdon (1950: 373) claims to see a division between the senior and junior *hetairoi*.

⁴ Arr. *Anab.* 7. 12. 1-4; Just. 12. 11. 4-12. 9; Diod. 17. 109. 1; 18. 4. 1, 12. 1, 16. 4; cf. Plut. *Alex.* 71. 1-5; Curt. 10. 2. 8.

wish to confront Antipater (Badian 1961: 37). The best evidence, however, is that this was not the result of insubordination. Alexander would have known of the delay, and our sources present no hint of his displeasure (Ashton 1993: 127-8). There are many possible reasons for slow progress or his remaining in Cilicia instead of proceeding to Macedonia: illness (cf. Heckel 2006: 95, 99), securing the satrapy of Cilicia which had recently lost its satrap (Diod. 18. 22. 1); awaiting the departure of Antipater and the Macedonian replacements before proceeding (Griffith 1965: 12-15); there was growing unrest in Greece exacerbated by the flight of Harpalus⁵ and the growing dissatisfaction with Alexander's Exiles' Decree,⁶ perhaps, then Craterus may have been ordered by Alexander to outfit a fleet to meet any threat of a Greek revolt (Ashton 1993: 128-9). It is also possible that Craterus was laying the groundwork in Cilicia for a future campaign that Alexander planned in the West all the way to Iberia (so Ashton: 1993: 128-9; Bosworth 1988: 208-10; 2002: 31). Cilicia contained a major, formerly Persian, treasury whose resources likely would be used to amass the vast armada and army proposed for this new expedition of conquest (Diod. 18. 4. 4; Arr. *Anab.* 7. 1. 2; Curt. 10. 1. 17).

What is of significance in understanding Craterus' character are his actions, or rather the lack thereof, after Alexander's death. He showed a definite reluctance to involve himself in the events unfolding in Babylon. Although order was restored in six days (Curt. 10. 10. 9),⁷ as Bosworth (2002: 31-3) notes, Craterus had the resources, 10000 Macedonian veterans and access to the Cilician treasury, to march to Babylon and attempt to impose his own settlement.⁸ Craterus for all of his resources did not physically contest or apparently even voice objections to the resolutions reached in the East. This is especially curious since his name was bandied about freely in the discussions of the regency that would need to be put in place for whoever would become Alexander's heir. According to Justin (13. 13-14), the leaders in Babylon had in private agreed to await the birth of Alexander's Sogdianian (or

⁵ Diod. 17. 108. 6-8; Curt. 10. 2. 1-3; Arr. *Succ.* 16; Plut. *Dem.* 1-2; *Mor.* 531A; cf. Just. 13. 5. 7.

⁶ In August, 324, Alexander ordered the return of tens of thousands of Greek exiles to their home cities (Diod. 17. 109. 1; 18. 8. 2-5; Curt. 10. 2. 4-7; Just. 13. 5. 2-5). Only those guilty of sacrilege, murder (Diod. 17. 109. 1), or those who had been exiled by Alexander or Antipater, were to be excluded from the returnees (Diod. 18. 8. 4).

⁷ Aelian (*VH* 12. 64) suggests a considerably longer period, and Bosworth (2002: 55) may be correct that Curtius' reference to six days from the initial conflict through to the end of the entire crisis may be in error, and, perhaps, only refers to the period ending with the reconciliation, and does not include the final actions that led to the deaths of the mutineers and Meleager. Our source is, however, clear that these last events are to be included in the six-day period.

⁸ It could be argued that these Macedonians were destined for Europe. That was the destination that Alexander intended, and they might have been reluctant to return to battle against their fellow Macedonians. Moreover, the argyraspids were later noted for their insubordination, and it needs to be noted that when Craterus did return to Macedonia, he left the argyraspids behind in Cilicia (Anson 1981: 117-20).

Persian?) wife Roxane's child. If the child was male, then Perdiccas, Leonnatus, Craterus, and Antipater would be the infant's guardians. Later, after the meeting set to confirm formally any decision concerning the regency had degenerated into "discord and sedition" (see Anson 2013, forthcoming), a compromise agreement was proposed in which Alexander's mentally handicapped half-brother Arrhidaeus would rule as King Philip III,⁹ and, if Roxane was delivered of a male child, that infant would also become king, ruling as Alexander IV. The non-present Craterus would become "*Prostates* of Arrhidaeus' kingdom" (Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 3; 1b. 4), or regent for the king(s). The *prostates* was the traditional title for the regent of the kingdom of Macedonia (Anson 1992: 38-43; 2009: 280-5). Since the king's authority was theoretically absolute in all areas of rule (see Anson 2004: 40-1; Anson 2013: 19-21), the *prostates* would have corresponding powers. However, in the final Babylonian settlement Perdiccas emerged as the *Prostates* of the Kingdom for Philip III, and after his birth, of that of Alexander IV as well (cf. Diod. 18. 2. 4, 3. 1, 23. 2). While Diodorus 18. 23. 2 could be taken to mean that Perdiccas had seized the *prostasia* of the kings from the absent Craterus (Rosen 1967A: 104; Heckel 2006: 98-9), this passage clearly refers back to those confusing days in Babylon before the final settlement was reached (see Anson 2004: 57-61; Meeus 2008: 74). Additionally, Craterus never accused Perdiccas of usurping his *prostasia*. Diodorus (18. 2. 4, and 18. 3. 1) is very clear that Perdiccas from the time of the final Babylon settlement held the regency alone. As *prostates* he combined the offices of regent and guardian (Anson 2009: 284; Meeus 2009: 296-7). Neither a shared overall command of the royal army, nor a share in the *prostasia* in the final analysis is mentioned for Craterus, instead that commander was to share power in Europe with Antipater (Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 7), as had been originally proposed by Pithon during the initial stages of the meeting in Babylon (Curt. 10. 7. 9). Perdiccas with the consent of the army had revoked Alexander's command that Craterus replace Antipater in Macedonia (Diod. 18. 4. 1-6), and substituted the more amorphous sharing of power between the two (Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 7). Justin (13. 4. 5), perhaps reflecting the reality of the situation, as opposed to the final settlement's official position, states that Craterus was given control of finance, perhaps, reflecting his current access to that treasury in Cyinda. The satrapy of Cilicia was, however, given to Philotas (Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 5, 24. 2; Curt. 10. 10. 2; Diod. 18. 3. 1; Just. 13. 6. 16). Even though this Philotas is later described as a "friend" of Craterus (Arr. *Succ.* 24. 2), it is clear that the *principes* intended for Craterus to move to Europe. That this was accepted by Craterus certainly does not reflect any lack of courage. The *Suda* (s. v. *Craterus*) proclaims him "the most daring of commanders," and this is borne out by his

⁹ On Arrhidaeus' mental deficiency, see Plut. *Alex.* 10. 2; *Mor.* 337D; Diod. 18. 2. 2; Just. 13. 2. 11; 14. 5. 2. For an attempt to minimize the seriousness of this disorder, see Greenwalt 1984: 69-77; Carney 2001: 63-89.

career with Alexander (see Heckel 2006: 95-99). Nor is this the result of any lack of confidence or self-worth. Craterus commissioned a great bronze hunting group at Delphi, depicting Alexander and Craterus fighting a lion. This monumental statue group was to commemorate Craterus saving Alexander's life during just such a hunt (Plut. *Alex.* 40. 4-50; cf. Plin. *NH.* 63-64). While the structure was not completed until after Craterus' death, it does show his attempt to associate him with the Conqueror in a most favorable light, as does the description of his attire in the *Suda* (s.v. *Craterus*), "in all his dress was attired in the manner of Alexander, except for the diadem."

Craterus was a good general, but his ambition was not that of many of his contemporaries. By comparison, the other apparent loser in the final round of negotiations in Babylon, Leonnatus, who, unlike Craterus, did attempt to seize the Macedonian throne (Plut. *Eum.* 3. 8-9; *Suda* s. v. *Leonnatus*). Like Craterus, Leonnatus had been part of one suggested solution to the regency issue (Curt. 10. 7. 8-9; cf. Just. 13. 13-14), and was one of the stated leaders of the cavalry (Curt. 10. 7. 20), but in the settlement following the army's reconciliation, Leonnatus became, not a force in the central administration of the royal army, but rather the satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia (Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 6; 1b. 2; Curt. 10. 10. 2; Diod. 18. 3. 1; Just. 13. 5. 16), an intrinsically important province, controlling the Asian side of the Hellespont, but of much less importance as long as peaceful relations amongst the *principes* reigned in the empire, which in 323 they did.

Soon after the outbreak of the Lamian War, Antipater requested aid from at least Leonnatus and Craterus (Diod. 18. 12. 1). Too much emphasis has been put by modern scholars on Craterus' supposed delay in responding to Antipater's request for assistance.¹⁰ The likelihood in what is seen as delay is simply the effect of waiting for a clearer picture of events both in Babylon and in Greece to emerge, the distance between Cilicia and the Hellespont (approximately 800-900 miles depending on route, or 50-60 days), and time for preparation (securing Cilicia and the Hellespont). By late 323, a fleet numbering 240 vessels (Diod. 18. 15. 8) was operating in the Hellespont under the command of Cleitus, who had accompanied Craterus from Babylon (Just. 12. 12. 8). Its mobilization, as noted earlier, was likely well underway before the beginning of the war in Greece. With Alexander's death and the Babylonian settlement occurring in June, the full knowledge of these events would not have arrived in Cilicia before July. The famous Persian dispatch riders, if still functioning, would have taken at least ten days to travel from Babylon to Cilicia (Casson 1994: 53). Craterus' departure from Cilicia under the best of circumstances would have been delayed until the following spring. That Leonnatus reacted first to Antipater's invitation was due to

¹⁰ Including myself (Anson 2004: 74).

his proximity to Europe, his ambition to use Antipater's misfortunes as his springboard to the throne,¹¹ and a victory by the newly arrived Macedonian fleet under the command of Cleitus thus securing the safe passage across the Hellespont. Antipater had a fleet of 110 triremes, but this was no match for the Athenian navy.¹² However, when combined with the main Macedonian fleet, which had departed for the Hellespont in response to Antipater's initial request to Craterus for assistance from its base in Cilicia in preparation for Craterus' departure the following year, was more than a match for the Athenians. Diodorus (18. 15. 8-9) ambiguously refers to two or three naval defeats suffered by the Athenians at the hands of Cleitus, the Macedonian admiral, in the archon year 323/2. Two inscriptions (*IG II²* 398 and 493), while dated to later years (320/19; 303/2), do make reference to a naval battle near Abydus and are to be associated with the Lamian War (Ashton 1977: 7 n. 52). Such a battle was the logical result of the Athenians attempting to block any crossing of additional Macedonian troops from Asia to relieve Antipater. In the early stages of the war, things had gone very well for the Greek coalition, primarily the Athenians and the Aetolians. Antipater had suffered an initial defeat and was being besieged in the city of Lamia (Plut. *Eum.* 3. 6; Diod. 18. 14. 4-5; Just. 13. 5. 14). An Athenian fleet in the Hellespont also indicates that the Athenians must either have held on to territories in the region or had excellent relations with certain of the cities on the European side of the strait, perhaps, Sestus (Cargill 1995: 29-30). Early in the war such a possibility was more likely than in its later phase. Even though the Macedonian commander Lysimachus had been awarded the Chersonese along with Thrace in the Babylon settlement (Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 7), it, like Thrace itself, had to be acquired by force (Lund 1992: 24-6). This battle in the Hellespont would have occurred in the winter of 323/22, before any resolution of affairs in Thrace. The first battle between Lysimachus and Seuthes had resulted in a stalemate (Diod. 18. 14. 2-3) and afterwards the Thracian king maintained a high degree of independence (Lund 1992: 26-7). There may even have been Athenian cleruchs still present in the area (Cargill 1995: 30). Given the nature of naval warfare in this period, it was impossible to blockade a coast by setting ships in the sea off that coast. A nearby base from which to launch interceptive attacks was necessary (see Anson 1989: 47-9). Ancient warships, with their large crews and cramped quarters, could

¹¹ Leonnatus had initially moved west with Eumenes, to whom he was supposed to assist in occupying the latter's satrapy of Cappadocia and Paphlagonia (Plut. *Eum.* 3. 3-5; Diod. 18. 12. 1), but was diverted by an offer of marriage from Cleopatra, Alexander the Great's sister, and the chance of acquiring the kingship (Plut. *Eum.* 3. 9-11).

¹² See Ashton (1977) and Morrison (1987). The records of the Athenian naval curators, who each year presented an accounting of the ships available for service, show that in 324 there were available more than 400 warships of various sizes (*IG II²* 1629. 783-812). However, there were insufficient crews to man all of these (Bosworth 2003: 14-15).

carry food and water only for one or, at most, two days; meals needed to be prepared off ship, sleeping arrangements, as well. Too much time spent on board in cramped conditions would lead to physical problems for the rowers. The most that could be done in a blockade was to have patrol ships in the channel to search out the enemy and then alert the fleet, which would attempt to assemble quickly enough from a nearby position to intercept the enemy. With the defeat of the Athenian navy in the Hellespont (cf. Diod. 18. 15. 8), an unopposed crossing of that strait was assured. Leonnatus arrived first, later dying in battle in Thessaly, but freeing Antipater from the siege (Diod. 18. 14. 4-15. 6). Craterus arrived in the spring of 322, as, here suggested, according to plan. Cleitus' force after ensuring the successful crossing remained at Abydus, awaiting the arrival of Craterus, while Antipater's Macedonian fleet under the command of Micion returned to western Aegean waters where they raided along the coast of Attica from a base established near Rhamnous (Plut. *Phoc.* 25. 1-4).

Neither Cleitus nor Craterus would have refused to assist a fellow Macedonian. At the current moment the empire was united under the authority of its kings and regent. Craterus' concern for the empire and his loyalty to the interests of Macedonia are patent. When he did leave for Europe, he left more than sufficient forces to protect the royal treasury and the province of Cilicia (Heckel 1982: 60-2; 2006: 30, 290). These forces readily obeyed the commands of Perdiccas when he and the royal army arrived on the scene, indicating that Craterus had no interest in securing Cilicia or the treasury in Cyinda against the regent.

That summer Craterus arrived in Thessaly with 6000 Macedonian veterans, 4000 mercenaries, 1000 Persian bowmen and slingers, and 1500 cavalry (Diod. 18. 16. 4). With Craterus' arrival the balance in Europe was quickly altered. Craterus willingly placed himself under Antipater's command (Diod. 18. 16. 4-5), indicating once more the former's concern for the good of the empire as opposed to any personal ambitions of acquiring greater power at the expense of the Macedonian state. The sources clearly indicate that Craterus was very popular with the Macedonian troops and reasonably could have been expected to succeed in any attempt to overthrow the authority of Antipater. Eumenes, in 320, in his battle against the forces of Craterus and Neoptolemus, because of Craterus' popularity with the Macedonians serving the Cardian, hid the name of this opponent from these troops and arrayed against him none of his Macedonians (Plut. *Eum.* 7. 1-2), and the *Suda* (s. v. *Craterus*) relates how those Macedonians under Antipater's authority preferred Craterus' leadership. At Crannon, in August/September of 322, the combination of Antipater's and Craterus' forces defeated the Greek coalition and effectively ended the Lamian War (Diod. 18. 17. 1-5; Plut. *Dem.* 28. 1). After settling affairs in Athens and in the Peloponnesus, Antipater and Craterus returned to Macedonia in the late fall or early winter, where Craterus married Antipater's eldest daughter Phila (Diod. 18. 18. 8), and father-in-law and son-in-law now planned a spring

offensive against the Aetolians (cf. Diod. 18. 24. 1). Antipater further promised to aid his ally in returning to Asia (Diod. 18. 18. 7), a return that was to be accomplished through negotiation, not violence (Errington 1970: 61-2; Anson 2004: 63).

There is no evidence that this return was an assault on Perdiccas' authority (as Bosworth 1993: 427). The two Macedonians were determined to reach a peaceful understanding with the regent. Antipater in response to Perdiccas' earlier request, in the spring of 321, sent another daughter Nicaea to Perdiccas, which resulted in a marriage (Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 21; Diod. 18. 23. 1; Just 13. 6. 6). Moreover, Antipater had publically indicated full support for the new regime created in Babylon. For example, in the matter of Athenian possession of Samos, he had deferred to the central government, i. e. Perdiccas (Diod. 18. 18. 6).¹³ Indeed, it was Perdiccas who was behaving suspiciously with respect to the commanders in Macedonia. The regent was in contact with the Aetolians (Diod. 18. 38. 1), and in receipt of letters from the Athenian leader Demades which invited intervention in Europe, but whose content was not revealed to Antipater or Craterus (Diod. 18. 48. 2). Moreover, there was apparently no hurry in the acquisition of this new role for Craterus in Asia. After returning to Macedonia in the winter of 322/21, as noted earlier, Antipater and Craterus had made plans for a full scale invasion of Aetolia in the following spring (Diod. 18. 24. 1-25. 2; for the date, see Anson 1986: 215-16).

What Craterus' new role in Asia was to be is unknown. There is no mention of the *prostasia*, or any demand for a share of what was now Perdiccas' authority. He may have desired no more than to become a satrap. Hellespontine Phrygia had a vacancy. Satraps were appointed by the king or his regent and were theoretically subject to reassignment at any time. It is most likely, however, that Craterus was angling for some supervisory position over Asia Minor, and, likely, Phoenicia as well. After all, Perdiccas had only come west after the failures associated with Eumenes' attempt to become satrap of Cappadocia and Paphlagonia. Events, not initial plans, may have shifted the focus of the empire to western Asia.

It was Perdiccas' subsequent desire to become king in his own right that sparked the confrontation between the commanders in Macedonia and the regent. Concurrent with Nicaea's arrival for her marriage to Perdiccas, Alexander's sister, Cleopatra, appeared also offering herself in marriage to the regent (Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 21; Diod. 18. 23. 1; Just. 13. 6. 4). While initially Perdiccas did not agree to this marriage and married Nicaea, he did over the course of the year decide to divorce Nicaea, marry Cleopatra, and return to Macedonia with the body of Alexander, and proclaim himself king (Diod. 18. 23. 3, 25. 3, 6). To arrive in Macedonia

¹³ The Samian exiles were subsequently restored and the island freed on "Perdiccas' order" (Diod. 18. 18. 9).

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conveying the dead king, in the company of the Conqueror's heirs, as Cleopatra's husband, would have made Perdiccas invincible. It was, therefore, Perdiccas who terminated the peaceful relations between the central government and Antipater and Craterus, not the other way around. Given Antipater's subsequent actions, after his successful war with Perdiccas, in which he designated Antigonus as the royal general in Asia, it is likely that had Craterus survived the war he would have enjoyed prominence in Asia as the representative of the kings and their new regent, his father-in-law, Antipater, but he died fighting Eumenes in Asia Minor (Plut. *Eum.* 7. 5-6; Arr. *Succ.* 1. 26; Nepos *Eum.* 4. 3-4; Diod. 18. 30. 5; *FGrH* 239 F B11. This was not, however, a position sought by Craterus in the negotiations with Perdiccas prior to the outbreak of the First Diadoch War.

In the final analysis, Craterus was a loyal Macedonian and royal supporter. He, more so than the claimed servant of the kings, Eumenes,¹⁴ who plotted with Perdiccas to seize the throne (Anson 2004: 85-9), along with Antipater,¹⁵ may have been the last of the true Macedonian patriots. He, of the many Successors, by his actions was the most loyal to the national interests of Macedonia and the empire it spawned.

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¹⁴ Diod. 18. 53. 7, 57. 4, 58. 2-4; 19. 44. 2; Plut. *Eum.* 1. 4, 3. 14; Nepos *Eum.* 6. 5, 13. 3.

¹⁵ Antipater served as regent for Alexander's heirs (Arr. *Succ.* 1. 33, 42-4; Diod. 18. 39. 3-4), and in a very non-dynastic move, on his deathbed, made an unrelated infantry commander his successor as regent, overlooking a number of his of age sons (Diod. 18. 49. 1-3).

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