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Contents of volume twenty-eight
Numbers 3-4

82 Lara O’Sullivan, Fighting with the Gods: Divine Narratives and the Siege of Rhodes
99 Michael Champion, The Siege of Rhodes and the Ethics of War
112 Alexander K. Nefedkin, Once More on the Origin of Scythed Chariot
119 David Lunt, The Thrill of Victory and the Avoidance of Defeat:
    Alexander as a Sponsor of Athletic Contests
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The Siege of Rhodes and the Ethics of War

Michael Champion

Of Rome’s destruction of Carthage Polybius writes that ‘when towns are taken by the Romans, one may often see not only the corpses of human beings, but also dogs cut in half, and the dismembered limbs of other animals’ (Polyb. 10.15.5). Elsewhere, now referring to intra-Greek conflict, he writes that the ‘laws of war’ (τούς τοῦ πολέμου νόμους) allow the survivors of a vanquished city to be sold into slavery, with no distinction made between soldiers, women and children (Polyb. 2.58.9–11). Hecuba’s final lament – ‘Woe, alas! Trembling, trembling limbs, support my steps! Go now to the day that begins your life of slavery’ – was the real experience of many caught up in the violence of war in the ancient world (Eur. Τρ. 1328–1330). In such a context, there is a touch of the absurd in talking about the ethics of ancient warfare.

There is certainly a sense in which war’s formless, violent chaos, the lust for domination so often at its core or its sheer unexplainable evil, breaks through all cultural attempts to moderate or contain it. Yet culturally constructed moral norms and expectations about how war should be waged can and do have an effect on decisions about going to war and how to fight once a conflict has begun. This article is an attempt to listen to ethical discourses about war that emerged from the particular and rapidly changing political and social events of the early Hellenistic period, focusing on the Siege of Rhodes (305/4 BCE). The events of the Siege point to ways in which moral norms of war governed action and could be constructed and strengthened in war narratives. In the main extant account of the Siege, that recorded in Diodorus Siculus’ Bibliotheca, emotional characterisation is used to limit violence against civilians, to explain events and to encourage readers to make moral decisions. In the context of assaults on the autonomy of city states, the narrative also seeks to strengthen norms around communal independence, liberty and solidarity, and the state’s monopoly on violence in the context of the social and economic realities of piracy. The account is framed by reports of other events in Italy and elsewhere in Greece. These framing sections also contribute to the construction of moral norms and expectations about mercenaries who act at the margins of state control, as will be argued below.

1 διὸ καὶ πολλάκις ἱδεῖν ἔστιν ἐν ταῖς τῶν Ῥωμαίων καταλήψει τῶν πόλεων ὡς μόνον τοὺς ἀνθρώπων περιορισμένος, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς κύκων δεδιχοτομημένους καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζώων μέλη παρακεκομένα (Büttner–Wobst).
2 ἵω «ἰῶ», τρομερὰ τρομερὰ μέλεα, φερετ’ ἐμὸν ἱχνος ἓπι δούλειον ἀμέραν βίου (Diggle).
3 Sarah Percy, Mercenaries: The History of a Norm in International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) argues that moral norms have real force in the case of the use of mercenaries. Her claim that a moral norm against mercenaries emerges in the twelfth century, while a helpful revision of the consensus that such a norm solidifies in the nineteenth century or later, may be questioned. A tension is already evident in Greek thought, where there is suspicion about mercenaries who act at the margins of state control, as will be argued below.

4 Diodorus’ narrative of the Siege is supplemented by brief accounts in Plut. Vit. Demetr. 21–22 (Ziegler). For BNJ 533 F 2, see the discussion below at n. 6. Diodorus’ text, revised from that of Bekker and Dindorf, is found in Kurt T. Fischer and Friedrich Vogel (eds), Diodori bibliotheca historica, 5 vols, 3rd edn, vol. 5 ed. Fischer (Leipzig: Teubner, 1906 [repr. Stuttgart 1964]). I have consulted the Loeb Classical Library edition for translations.
norms concerning warfare in key ways. The narrative provides evidence for Diodorus’ attempts (and those of his historiographical sources) to set war within a moral framework and to construct or support moral norms, albeit norms challenged and sometimes overturned in the power-politics of a rapidly changing geo-political context. The Siege of Rhodes has long fascinated military historians for what it reveals about developments in military technology, and political historians have drawn on it to construct a picture of power politics among the successors to Alexander, to sketch changing relationships between dynasts and cities, and to begin to chart changes and continuities in civic identity in this new political landscape. I aim to show that such military and political changes are bound up in and generate ethical schemes, at least as narrated by Diodorus and his sources. The Siege of Rhodes, then, yields insight into ethical discourses, and how those ethical discourses can affect decisions about war.

Others have demonstrated Diodorus’ dependence on pro-Rhodian source material. P. Berol. 11632 (= FGrH 533 F 2 = BNJ 533 F 2) overlaps to a significant degree with Diod. Sic. 20.94–5, suggesting a common source shared by Diodorus and the writer of the fragment. Alongside other differences from Diodorus, the Berlin papyrus correctly records the language of Rhodian decrees, suggesting that it is at least dependent on a ‘Rhodes-oriented’ source. Whether or not one associates P. Berol. 11632 with Zeno of Rhodes (and I know of no definitive grounds for that claim), he is the one source for Rhodian material explicitly mentioned in the Bibliotheca (Diod. Sic. 5.56.7) and the local detail preserved in Diodorus’ account is best explained by a Rhodian source. Such a suggestion does not preclude the possibility, as Wiemer has argued, that Zeno himself may have drawn on Hieronymus of Cardia, especially for sections of material focused on the Macedonian side of the conflict, although Diodorus may well have been capable of drawing on multiple sources for his narrative and constructing his narrative more independently than often assumed.

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8 See for example Hans-Ulrich Wiemer, Rhodische Traditionen in der hellenistischen Historiographie, Frankfurter althistorische Beiträge, 7 (Frankfurt am Main: M. Clauss, 2001), 222–50.

Nevertheless, several elements of Diodorus’ narrative conform to patterns seen in Zeno’s history, at least as it can be constructed from sections preserved in Polybius. From Polybius, it emerges that Zeno, like Diodorus, presents his fellow Rhodians as patriotic, courageous and virtuous defenders of pan-Hellenic liberty. Using a Rhodian source leads Diodorus to include patriotic fictions, such as the claim that Alexander deposited his testament in Rhodes and honoured the city above all others (Diod. Sic. 20.81.3). Zeno’s historical context in the immediate aftermath of the Third Macedonian War (171–167 BCE) also plausibly shaped his perspective. In that regard, we may recall the emphasis in Diodorus’ narrative on the wisdom of the Rhodians in seeking to maintain diplomatic neutrality (e.g. Diod. Sic. 20.82.1–3, 20.84.1) and set it against a backdrop of the policy of independence that antagonised Rome and inflicted both military reversals and economic hardship on Rhodes during and after the Third Macedonian War. It may also explain the positive authorial evaluation of the ‘magnanimity and soundness’ (μεγαλοψυχία καὶ τὸ βέβαιον) of the Rhodians who acted ‘prudently’ (συνετὰς) and apparently won over even the besiegers (who nevertheless maintain their attacks) by preserving public monuments to Antigonus and Demetrius (Diod. Sic. 20.93.6–7). Zeno’s voice, or one very like it, can clearly be heard from the pages of the Bibliotheca and this Rhodian perspective helped to shape Diodorus’ narrative.

However, the Siege of Rhodes also offered a late-Republican historian much scope for reflection on his own world. For example, the strongly-marked contrast, discussed further below, between civic action and the unpredictable and immoral behaviour of uniquely powerful individuals, resonates with the cultural plots and historical events of the late Republic, and also with the related themes of individual and communal morality that characterise the Bibliotheca as a whole. There are occasions where it can be shown that Diodorus modifies the moralising messages of his sources. Hau has noted the way Diodorus’ narrative can function as a moral exemplum, with ethical lessons often apparent even when not explicit, and has focused on the topos of the human (in)capacity to act moderately in the face of good fortune. This theme is bound up with questions of justice conceptualised as vengeance or the restoration of balance which are pertinent to defining just warfare. She also notes the ways in which themes such as the value of generosity and

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11 For this claim and further supporting argument, see Wiemer, ‘Zenon of Rhodes’, 300. Cf. Hans Hauben, ‘Rhodes, Alexander and the Diadochi from 333/332 to 304 B.C.’, Historia 26.3 (1977): 307–339, who argues that while some anachronism is clear, especially in relation to a passage about Alexander at Diod. Sic. 20.81, much of the account seems faithful to fourth-century realities, and so contamination ‘by the situation in Zenon’s (?) own day...cannot be proved’ (320).


The Siege of Rhodes and the Ethics of War

The moral dangers of luxury run through the Bibliotheca; such themes emerge in depictions of Demetrius’ wealth and the importance of friendship in the Siege account.15

One may ask, then, if using Diodorus’ account to reconstruct Hellenistic moral norms around the time of the Siege is doomed to failure at the outset, since the norms it records are a complex of different cultural settings, potentially including later traces from the early-to-mid third-century (Hieronymus of Cardia), around the 160–150s (Zeno) to late Republican Rome (Diodorus). Yet through Hau’s study of moralising narratives in the Bibliotheca, it seems clear that while Diodorus can accentuate moralising themes in his source material, and on occasions selects source material on the basis of its moralising tendency, there is no evidence that he adds a moralising narrative to his sources where they were silent.16 His moralising is contemporary inasmuch as it is traditional, and often captures long-standing themes of Greek historiography. Two other factors give grounds for optimism in the case of studying war ethics in the Siege of Rhodes narrative. First, the local colour of the account which points to Zeno as a source, and the overlaps between P. Berol. 11632 and Diod. Sic. 20.94–5, are evidence for traces of earlier Rhodian traditions.17 The account we have in Diodorus thus allows us to reconstruct some elements of early Hellenistic norms and practices, a suggestion strengthened if we see Hieronymus of Cardia at work in the text. Second, similar norms about justice in war can be drawn out from earlier sources, as we will see in the case of the Rhetorica ad Alexandrum, which suggests at least continuity in relevant moral norms from the late Classical and early Hellenistic period onwards, and again grants access to relevant early Hellenistic cultural assumptions.

An initial way to gauge moral norms in the period is to identify their violation. On Diodorus’ account, the war is declared despite the Rhodians acting in ways which should have avoided conflict. Rhodes had honoured treaties with Antigonus and had always acted in accordance with the expectations of friendship between states, even acting in the interests of all Greek peoples in the fight against piracy in the Mediterranean (Diod. Sic. 20.81.3). Diodorus explains that the Rhodians inclined towards Ptolemy on economic grounds, without giving other kings ‘legitimate grounds for complaint’ (Diod. Sic. 20.81.4). He sees Antigonus’ attempt to weaken the trading relationship between Rhodes and Ptolemaic Egypt, and thus to weaken Ptolemy by striking at a major source of his economic power, as one cause of the Siege (Diod. Sic. 20.82.1).18 While arguing in this way that the Siege was clearly initiated by Demetrius Poliorcetes solely to extend his power and that of his father Antigonus in their struggle with Ptolemy and other Successors, Diodorus is emphatic that the mere extension of state power is insufficient to justify war. This moral norm is observed even as it is broken, as Antigonus goes to elaborate lengths to construct a spurious offence so that he can dubiously claim that besieging the city would be an act of

17 Eduard Schwartz, RE 5, 663–704, advances a strong case that Diodorus sticks closely to his sources.
18 My argument here is about representations of events; note, however, that anachronism colours some of the description of the historical realities of the situation in 305. See Hauben, ‘Rhodes, Alexander and the Diadochi’, 318–321, who perhaps optimistically concludes that while some traces of later situations may colour the narrative, and ‘caution is still required, mistrust is certainly out of place’ (320).
just punishment, and so constitute a just war.\(^{19}\) Even rulers governed by realpolitik need to mount a case that their cause is just.\(^{20}\) The clear injustice of the Siege is underscored when it is continued despite the Rhodians voting great honours on Antigonus and sending envoys to beg him ‘not to force the city to rush into the war against Ptolemy contrary to their treaties’ (Diod. Sic. 20.82.2.8–9).\(^{21}\) In sum, the Siege of Rhodes is depicted as a paradigmatically unjust war, since Demetrius and Antigonus are not acting in self defense or the punishment of a wrong, are in breach of treaties of friendship and are not acting under the Aristotelian assumption that since peace is the norm between Greeks, war must be a last resort (Arist. *Eth. Nic.* X, 1172a17).

Arguments for the justice of the aggressive action undertaken by the Antigonids are harder to glean from Diodorus’ account, largely because of the pro-Rhodian nature of much of his source material. Diodorus does, as we have seen, report a spurious pretext for the Siege that casts it as an act of just punishment. It may be possible to infer that there was a stronger argument for the just punishment of a negligent ally. We may suspect, with Berthold, that the alliance between Rhodes and the Antigonids required that Rhodes assist the Antigonids in their effort to liberate Greek cities.\(^{22}\) It is clear, both from Diodorus’ later narrative, and from Plutarch, that the Antigonids had sought to frame their campaigns against Ptolemy as wars of liberation (Diod. Sic. 20.100–103; Plut. *Demetr.* 15.1.5; 15.3.6).\(^{23}\) So it is possible that the Siege was thought of by the Antigonids as the just punishment of a negligent ally.

Many of the moral norms which the Rhodians and Antigonids call upon (and which the Rhodians argue are violated by Antigonus and Demetrius) are similar to those associated with the modern just war tradition. This tradition sets out rules to govern decisions about going to war (*ius ad bellum* criteria) and proper conduct in war (*ius in bello* criteria). I will focus on ancient connections to the former set of prescriptions, which state that a war must be waged by a legitimate authority, in self-defense, as a proportionate response, as a last resort, for a just cause and with a high probability of success.\(^{24}\) Lest one may think,

\(^{19}\) Antigonus claims that the Rhodians are ‘authors of an unjust war’ (ἀδίκου...πολέμου) (Diod. Sic. 20.81.2). This term (dikaios polemos) is found rarely in Greek literature, and then only in texts that can be shown to be influenced by the much more common Roman concept of the bellum iustum, for which see William V. Harris, *War and Imperialism in Republican Rome*, 327–70 BC (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), 166–175; Albert Sigrid, *Bellum iustum: Die Theorie des gerechten Krieges und ihre praktische Bedeutung für die auswärtigen Auseinandersetzungen Roms in republikanischer Zeit*, Frankfurter althistorische Studien, 10 (Kallmünz: Lassleben, 1980). Diodorus’ other uses of the term are clearly influenced by this Roman tradition, e.g. Fragment VIII.36,3 (Cohen-Skalli) = 8.25.3,3–4 (Vogel); Fr. XXVIII.3,1; Fr. XXXII.5,1 (Cohen-Skalli). Versions of this account are found in Cic. Rep II, 17,31 (Hubbell), Livy *Ab urbe condita* I, 22, 1–23,2 (Conway and Walters) and Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* III,2–3 (Jacoby). The latter’s account of the *ius fetiales* at II.72,5,8 supports Diodorus’. See the discussion in Diodore de Sicile, *Bibliothèque historique*. Fragments Tome I, *Livre VI–X. Texte établi, traduit et commenté par Aude Cohen-Skalli*, (Paris: Les belles lettres, 2012), 313–316.

\(^{20}\) On this episode, see the brief comments of Angelos Chaniotis, *War in the Hellenistic World: A Social and Cultural History* (Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, 2005), 179.

\(^{21}\) ...μὴ βιάσασθαι τὴν πόλιν προπειζείν παρὰ τὰς συνόχικας εἰς τὸν πόλεμον πρὸς Πτολεμαῖον.


\(^{23}\) See further below, pp. 110–111. I am indebted to an anonymous reviewer for this point.

\(^{24}\) That a war must be waged with a right intention is often listed as a *ius ad bellum* criterion, but is more controversial than the others. For discussion, see Jeff McMahan, *Killing in War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press); Brian Orend, ‘War’, *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Fall 2008 Edition), Edward N.
The Siege of Rhodes and the Ethics of War

despite the reference to Aristotle, and with the mainline of historiography about the just war tradition, that such just war principles may only anachronistically be imputed to Greece (and any society before St Augustine, or perhaps the medieval jurists),\textsuperscript{25} we may briefly turn to the \textit{Rhetorica ad Alexandrum}, a rhetorical handbook of advice probably written by Anaximenes of Lampscus within a generation of the Siege, to help to construct a picture of standard views about the ethics of war around the time of the Siege.\textsuperscript{26} The \textit{Rhetorica} sets out arguments which can be expected to be rhetorically effective in debates about going to war (\textit{Rh. Al.} 1425a–1425b). Since they are designed to appeal to a diverse range of people in citizen assemblies, these arguments can be taken as indicative of moral norms in Hellenistic Greece, or at least of live Hellenistic debates about moral norms in war ethics against a backdrop of conflicts between Macedonian potentates and polis communities over what constitute acceptable justifications for war. The similarities in moral norms assumed in the \textit{Rhetorica} and Diodorus’ texts provide some justification for treating Diodorus’ account as preserving traces of Hellenistic debates and practices.

Going to war is just, the author of the \textit{Rhetorica} claims, if acting defensively in response to an assault on oneself or one’s allies, kinsmen or benefactors. Going to war may also be just in the case of punishing a hitherto unavenged wrong. A state is ethically obliged to consider factors such as the favour of the gods, manpower, financial resources, generalship, strength of allies and geography, which is to say that the war must have a high likelihood of success. Finally, a war must be a response to a major wrong, since peace as the natural state of affairs between Greeks may only be broken over grievances that are neither small nor negligible (μικρὰς καὶ ταπεινὰς) (\textit{Rh. Al.} 1425a30–31).\textsuperscript{27} The \textit{ius ad bellum} criteria for

\textsuperscript{25} The consensus position is largely the result of the excellent work of James Turner Johnson, who recognises the deep classical roots of the just war tradition but argues that it comes into being properly in the middle ages. See for example \textit{Ethics and the Use of Force: Just War in Historical Perspective} (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011), 13 which builds on the earlier arguments in \textit{The Quest for Peace: Three Moral Traditions in Western Cultural History} (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), 15–16, 58–59 and \textit{Just War Tradition and the Restraint of War: a Moral and Historical Inquiry} (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), 121. Classicists and ancient historians, of course, have been more aware than colleagues focusing on later periods of the significance of just war thinking, though, perhaps because of the lack of Greek terminology (see n. 19 above), there have been fewer studies of just war in Greek culture.

\textsuperscript{26} See Michael Weißenberger, ‘Rhetorica ad Alexandrum’ in \textit{Der neue Pauly}, edited by Hubert Cancik, Helmuth Schneider and Manfred Landfester (Leiden: Brill, 2006) and K. Barwick, ‘Die Rhetorik ad Alexandrum und Anaximenes, Isokrates, Aristoteles, und die Theodektia’, \textit{Philologus} 110 (1966), 212–245. Quintillian’s evidence used to support the attribution (\textit{Inst.} 3.4.9 [Winterbottom]) is not conclusive. Weißenberger notes that the text is not influenced by Aristotelian rhetoric, which might support an early date (340–330 BCE); it cannot be later than 290 BCE.

\textsuperscript{27} Since the \textit{Rhetorica} gives advice about how to persuade a political community, orators are advised also to make a case for how war will augment factors such as the glory, wealth and power (εὐδοξίαν, εὐπορίαν, δύναμιν) of the state (\textit{Rh. Al.} 1425a16–17). Such questions of expediency are contrasted with matters of justice.
warfare presented in the *Rhetorica* thus overlap with the modern criteria of just cause, last resort, high probability of success, and defensive and proportionate response.\(^{28}\)

The Siege of Rhodes breaks all these moral prescriptions, at least as recounted by Diodorus and his pro-Rhodian sources. Demetrius’ assault on Rhodes is waged on a spurious pretense, is offensive rather than defensive, and is disproportionate. Since he refuses diplomatic overtures from the Rhodians, it is not war waged as a last resort. The Rhodians’ reference to treaties freely entered into with Ptolemy may be seen as countering the Antigonid claim that Ptolemy was unjustly taking liberty away from Greek cities, removing both a cause for war against Ptolemy (his alleged unjust aggression) and against Rhodes (its alleged failure to honour treaty obligations to the Antigonids to help preserve Greek freedom). Finally, the Rhodians’ past military victories, together with their wealth and strong links to Ptolemy, mean that on any reasonable analysis, the probability of success should have been seen to hang in the balance. Many of the moral norms relating to the ethics of warfare in Diodorus’ generally pro-Rhodian account thus cohere broadly with the modern just war tradition.

Diodorus’ account of the Siege constructs and works to strengthen these norms through a range of narrative techniques. Repeatedly, short emotion-laden *ekphrasis*es are inserted into Diodorus’ narrative to draw attention to the effect of war on civilians and to the suffering caused by the Siege. While Demetrius’ troops shout the battle cry and encourage their comrades who have captured a region of the city near the Theatre of Dionysus, we hear that

\[\text{in the city the throng of children and women were in fear and tears, thinking that their native land was being taken by storm (Diod. Sic. 20.98.8.5–7).}\]

Earlier, Diodorus provides a vivid description of Demetrius’ fleet arrayed ready for a naval battle ‘so as to inspire panic’ (καταπληκτικῶς) (Diod. Sic. 20.83.1.2). Detailed description of his naval warships, catapults, transports, cargo ships, pirates, mercenaries and mercantile scavengers follow. But the reader’s attention is directed to the ‘fear and panic of those who were watching from the city’ (Diod. Sic. 20.83.1 cf. 20.82.3)\(^{30}\) in a narrative that calls to mind Thucydides’ description of the emotional distress of those watching the sea battle at Syracuse (Thuc. 7.71) and which stands in the rhetorical tradition of the Homeric *teichoscopia* (see for example Hom. *Il.* 3.121-244). We see the action from the perspective of the terrified defenders, and thereby come to sympathise with them. We join

\[\ldots\text{the old men and women [who] were looking on from their homes, since the city is shaped like a theatre; and all, being terror-stricken at the magnitude of the fleet and}\]

\[\text{make the best of their situation.}\]

\[^{28}\] The only criteria from the modern list missing in the *Rhetorica* is that the war must be waged by a legitimate authority, but since the text is framed as advice to legitimate decision makers, this may reasonably be left implicit.

\[^{29}\] ὁ δὲ κατὰ τὴν πόλιν ὄχλος παῖδων καὶ γυναικῶν ἐν φόβῳ ἦν καὶ δάκρυσιν, ὡς τῆς πατρίδος κατὰ κράτος ἄλησκομένης.

\[^{30}\] καὶ πολύν φόβον καὶ κατάπληξιν παρέχεσθαι τοῖς ἀπὸ τῆς πόλεως θεωροῦσιν.

The Theatre of Dionysus features in both episodes: the action of the final battle is in a theatre within a theatre, since the city is figured as a theatrical space. As others have argued, the theatre dominated Hellenistic civic life as a central space for assemblies, announcements, political trials and public speeches; Hellenistic politics and law were characterised by display.\footnote{See Angelos Chaniotis, ‘Emotional Language in Hellenistic Decrees and Hellenistic Histories’ in Parole in movimento. Linguaggio politico e lessico storiografico nel mondo ellenistico, edited by Manuela Mari and John Thornton, Studi ellenistici, 27 (Pisa and Rome: Fabrizio Serra, 2013), 339–352.} The new Hellenistic kings took this aspect of politics as theatre (with its deep roots in the Classical period) and expanded it, crafting elaborate public displays of their political power. Such a contest between the theatrical display of civic and kingly power is performed in Diodorus’ narrative, for while the city is narrated as a theatre on which the demos is the star performer, Demetrius himself is no less an actor, elsewhere compared to Dionysus himself (Diod. Sic. 20.92.4).

The metaphor of polis as theatre also codes war as a display or performance. This may be read as a distancing mechanism, with the action of war understood and thereby controlled as dramatic and so less than real. Such a literary mechanism is certainly one way in which the violence of war can be domesticated. But it may also, perhaps more plausibly, be read as a further means of emphasising the power and violence of the emotions inflicted upon the civilian populace by Demetrius’ aggressively unjust assault on the city. Such emotional depictions, coloured by the rhetoric of performance, are congruent with wider trends in Hellenistic historiography and political language.\footnote{IOSPE I’ 32 A II. 82–96; IOSPE I’ 32 B II. 22–27. See Chaniotis, ‘Emotional Language’, 14–15 for further discussion. On the former decree, see also idem, ‘Paradoxon, Enargeia, Empathy: Hellenistic Decrees and Hellenistic Oratory’ in Hellenistic Oratory: Continuity and Change, edited by Christos Kremmydas and Kathryn Tempest (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 201–216.} Chaniotis has elsewhere pointed to increasingly emotional language in Hellenistic decrees, which emphasise, for example, the ‘terror’ of citizens when faced with imminent war, or the ‘deep despair’ caused in the ekklesia by prospective military ‘terrors’.\footnote{IOSPE I 32 All. 82–96; IOSPE I’ 32 B II. 22–27. See Chaniotis, ‘Emotional Language’, 14–15 for further discussion. On the former decree, see also idem, ‘Paradoxon, Enargeia, Empathy: Hellenistic Decrees and Hellenistic Oratory’ in Hellenistic Oratory: Continuity and Change, edited by Christos Kremmydas and Kathryn Tempest (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 201–216.} In such decrees, as in the use of emotional descriptions in Greek historiography more generally, emotions motivate and explain action. In Diodorus, the emotional ekphraseis primarily function to narrate the action in moral terms, highlighting the injustice of Demetrius’ Siege by emphasising the violence it does to the innocent non-combatants – women, children and old men.

The ability of emotions to motivate action is also used in Diodorus’ narrative to shape moral norms by implicitly defining virtuous and non-virtuous actions in war. Emotions frequently cause action. The Rhodians, distressed in their souls (κάμνοντες τοῦ κόσμου τοῦ κόσμου τοῦ κόσμου τοῦ κόσμου), after a long period of conflict, regain their courage (ἀνεθάρρησαν) on receiving new supplies from Ptolemy (20.96.3). They then proceed to deliberate rationally about their...
situation, act decisively and cause significant damage to Demetrius’ siege engines (Diod. Sic. 20.96.3–4). In this case, their original emotional state of distress had led them to inaction, but once their spirits are revived, decisive action follows. Demetrius’ response to the attack follows a similar pattern. He sees the Rhodians’ blazing missiles threatening to damage his machinery, experiences an emotional anxiety (δυσω κύναγος) and quickly acts to put out the spreading fire (Diod. Sic. 20.96.7). In this case, fear leads to and explains his swift action.

Emotions are typically understood within the Greek intellectual tradition as dangerous for reasoned judgement. So it is significant that the heightened emotions of fear and terror that the Rhodians are made to feel in general do not lead them to make bad decisions in battle. Diodorus’ narrative presents them as Aristotelian (not Stoic) heroes, acting virtuously in the face of Demetrius’ vicious injustice by experiencing emotions and putting them to good use to motivate well-thought-out actions. Despite the fear and anxiety of the citizens on seeing Demetrius’ forces, we are told that the Rhodians’ swiftly marshalled aid from Ptolemy, Lysimachus and Cassander, arranged and ordered their forces (including dealing fairly with metics and aliens) and made virtuous decrees about how the state would honour the war dead and care for their families (Diod. Sic. 20.84.2–3), displaying empathy, prudence and due respect. Examples can be multiplied, but for example the Rhodians plan with intelligent forethought, a constituent element of Aristotelian φρόνησις (Diod. Sic. 20.84). The Rhodians are characterised as intelligent, wise and sound in their decision-making (e.g. δεξιός: 20.88.7; τό βέβαιον, συνετῶς: 20.93.7). In the face of the Siege, they ‘endure bravely’ (ὑπομένειν εὐψυχῶς); the ‘brave men’ (τοὺς ἀνδρας ἀγαθῶς) among the slaves will be freed. At 20.88.6 they press on too far into danger, over-reaching themselves in their nevertheless characteristic boldness (θρασύς). The citizens’ fear does not lead to inaction or disunity. Instead, they act with the virtue of όμονα. This virtue was defined by Stoics as ‘knowledge of the common good’, a definition which associates it with theories of justice, understood as a unifying and common virtue. In Diodorus’ narrative, all Rhodian social classes of the state work together harmoniously to advance the good of the city (Diod. Sic. 20.84.4). This virtue of όμονα, together with those of courage and prudence, are commonly attributed to the Rhodians. Traditional civic values are deployed against the threat to the city posed by the new institution of kingship. In presenting the Rhodians’ as virtuous, in that they harness their emotions for rational and united civic decision-making

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36 See for example Aurius Didymus, Liber de philosophorum sectis 82.2.17–18 (Mullach); Clement of Alexandria, str 2.9.42.2 (Fruchtetel, Stählin and Treu); Chrysippus, Fragmenta moralia 292.13 (von Armin).

37 Plut. Vit. Demetr. 42 notes the irony of Demetrius’ sobriquet ‘poliorcetes’ against Zeus’ title ‘defender of cities’. Here a traditional religious discourse is similarly used to maintain support for the city-state in the context of new political institutions and structures.
and effective action, Diodorus’ narrative repeatedly if implicitly highlights the injustice of the Siege. It responds to Demetrius’ attack by seeking to support the moral norms which ought to have minimised or eliminated violence in this case.

In highlighting the Rhodians’ collective virtuous action, Diodorus’ narrative implicitly compares the justice of the Rhodians’ position and that of Demetrius. Where the Rhodians’ always act in the narrative as a collective, for the majority of the account the besiegers are subsumed into Demetrius’ identity. Demetrius does everything. ‘He’, not his army, had ample supply of everything, ‘he’ prepared weapons, ‘he’ collected ships and catapults, ‘he’ shot down the men of the city (Diod. Sic. 20.85.2–3). Coming immediately after the report of the Rhodians’ ὀμόνω, the contrast is strong, and this voice is sustained throughout the narrative. It draws ultimately on Herodotus’ identification of Persians with their leaders in his extended argument about the relative virtue and utility of democracy over monarchy. Within that tradition, it paints Demetrius as an enemy of liberty. It certainly leaves a trace of serious tensions between cities, civic identity and the new political role of the kings in the early Hellenistic period, tensions which are at the heart of the political motivation for the Siege.

A final element in this contrast between collective civic morality and individual abuse of power may be seen in elements of the narrative relating to piracy. Piracy was integral to the economy of the Classical and Hellenistic worlds; Aristotle numbers it among economic goods gained directly from nature (Arist. Pol. 1256a40–1256b8), and such goods, including slaves, obtained through piracy could quickly be sold by those who gained them, now styling themselves ‘merchants’ (ἐμπόροι) (e.g. Strabo 14.5.2). (When Diodorus mentions pirates, they are always grouped with merchants). Trade and booty based on piracy, and the economic benefits gained by states which policed piracy on behalf of other poleis, were significant contributors to the wealth of cities. As poleis developed, piracy was increasingly controlled within state power structures: private ship ownership was curtailed, profit from individual raiding was banned and all proceeds were to go into the common treasury. If the economic reality is a continuation of private profiteering, within the ideology of the Classical and Hellenistic polis, piracy figures as a threat to communal order, and as an unjust way of putting private benefit ahead of common good.

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38 Note, however, that if this account goes back to an early Hellenistic source, it may have been read by the Antigonids as presenting their champion in a positive, active, and powerful light. The Rhodian perspective of the narrative is marked, but there is little reason to see it as dangerously partisan.

39 Janice J. Gabbert, ‘Piracy in the Early Hellenistic Period: A Career Open to Talents’ G&R 33.2 (1986), 156–163 at 156 points out that these categories are often blurred in Hellenistic historiography, as they have long been recognised to be in political theory (cf. Aug., De Civ. D. IV.4). There is some confusion between the categories of pirate and mercenary in Diodorus’ narrative. There is also the added difficulty of distinguishing allies (sustrateuontōn) from hired mercenaries, as Gabbert notes (158, 160–162). On piracy in general in the period, see Philip de Souza, Piracy in the Graeco-Roman World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 43–96; Yvon Garlan, ‘Signification historique de la piraterie grecque’ Dialogues d’histoire ancienne 4 (1978), 1–16.

40 For these texts and further discussion, see Vincent Gabrielsen, ‘Warfare, Statehood and Piracy in the Greek World’ in Seeraub im Mittelmeerraum: Piraterie, Korsarentum und maritime Gewalt von der Antike bis zur Neuzeit, Nikolas Jaspert and Sebastian Kolditz (eds), Mittelmeerstudien, 3 (München: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2013), 133–154 at 148–149.

41 For an important statement of this case, see Gabrielsen, ‘Warfare, Statehood and Piracy’, 147–153.

42 See the evidence collected in Gabrielsen, ‘Warfare, Statehood and Piracy’, 141–143.
Yet Demetrius is repeatedly associated with pirates and piracy. Polyaeus claims that Demetrius used pirates widely in his campaigns (Strat. 2.35 [Melber and Woelfflin]). There are good grounds to think that Antigonus’ ally Glaucaetas, who was defeated by the Athenian general Thymocharis in the Third Diodoch War, was a pirate. Similar rhetorical representations in Diodorus may capture something of how Demetrius used non-state actors in his campaigns to undermine polis power, and in this context, Diodorus’ representations of Demetrius using pirates among his forces serves to highlight again his lack of civic virtue.43 There are several references to pirates among his forces in Diodorus’ account (e.g. Diod. Sic. 20.82.4–5; 20.97.5–6). Pirates are included among those who gain private profit (ὠφελίας ἱδίας) by the misery of warfare (Diod. Sic. 20.82.5), and a pirate leader (ὁ ἀρχιπειρατής) named Timocles, who presumably commanded a large group of pirates, is numbered among a group of pirates and merchants on whom Demetrius depends (Diod. Sic. 20.97.5). By contrast, Rhodes was reputed to have acted on behalf of all Greece in ridding the Mediterranean of pirates (Diod. Sic. 20.81.30; cf. Strabo 14.2.5 [Meineke]) and the Rhodian victory over Timocles is presented as a key moment in the Siege (Diod. Sic. 20.97.6).44 We may certainly doubt how effective the Rhodians’ were in eradicating piracy: had they been successful, presumably Demetrius could not so easily have added pirates to his ranks. Yet in associating Demetrius with piracy, his assault on the city is again figured as contravening moral norms, as he unjustly acts for private gain. His attack on the city is partly unjust, we infer, because he lends support to pirates and merchants whose interest, like that of Demetrius and Antigonus, is their own private economic benefit. Rhetorically depicting Demetrius as a pirate fits into wider cultural discourses and moral norms about the priority of civic goods over private gain, and points again to ways in which tensions between states and kings in the early Hellenistic period put pressure on the established moral norms which the narrative presented in Diodorus seeks to support.

The three sections that frame Diodorus’ history of the Siege (introduction, interlude, conclusion) cast further light on how this changing political context is accounted for in Diodorus’ moral discourse. The introduction (Diod. Sic. 20.80) offers an account of Romans ravaging and destroying the Samnites’ land and buildings (Diod. Sic. 20.80.3), yet even these rampaging Romans declare war only on those who ‘were acting unjustly’ (ἀδικήματα ποιοῦν) (Diod. Sic. 20.80.3). The contrast with Antigonus’ spurious pretext for war is immediately apparent. The interlude (Diod. Sic. 20.89–90), recounts a story about the moral turpitude of Agathocles and Deinocrates, who had failed to come to just terms with each other in Sicily. Deinocrates has his own problems; internal dissent in his ranks stands in stark contrast to, and thereby illumines, the communal cohesion of the Rhodians. Against him stands Agathocles, an aggressor who comes to terms with the defeated and then slaughters them, in an inhumane breach of faith and his oaths, out of fear of his allies (Diod. Sic. 20.89.4–5). Agathocles then incongruously comes to terms with Deinocrates

44 Of course, the Antigonids could seek to present themselves as the defenders of legitimate state power against piracy: see for example Diod. Sic. 19.62.9.
45 Vincent Gabrielsen is justly sceptical of this claim on economic and political grounds: see ‘Warfare, Statehood and Piracy’, 152.
46 Diodorus’ anachronistic estimation of Rhodian power may point to his dependence on a Rhodian source for his account.
The Siege of Rhodes and the Ethics of War

(Diod. Sic. 20.90.1). This strange partnership is explained by Deinocrates’ own faithlessness when he in turn betrays his allies (Diod. Sic. 20.90.2). In contrast, the Romans act with some charity towards those whom they have defeated but who nevertheless remain well-disposed to them (Diod. Sic. 20.90.3). This digression relates to the main narrative by highlighting the question of the moral status of treaties and oaths, as well as the proper treatment of the vanquished. It also contributes to the characterisation of the changed political landscape by reminding readers of the dangers posed by kingship, and the pressure alliances between kings can place on inter-city treaties. The concluding frame (Diod. Sic. 20.101) resumes the narrative about Agathocles, whose injustice is confirmed in that he, like Demetrius, waged war ‘despite no prior injuries’ (Diod. Sic. 20.101.1). Demetrius, however, got off lightly. Agathocles first has to deal with a disaster caused by contrary winds. The reader is reminded of the winds that thwarted Demetrius’ plans and turned the advantage to the Rhodians (Diod. Sic. 20.86.1; 20.88.7). Ultimately, unlike Demetrius, Agathocles persists in his infamy, dishonours Aeolus and Hephaestus and is burned alive on hot coals (Diod. Sic. 20.101.2–4). The Romans again bring their war against the Samnites to an honourable conclusion and are thereby implicitly compared to the Rhodians, who act piously, strategically and honourably after the Siege. As they did throughout the war, the Rhodians display proper respect and piety towards the gods, and act in accordance with divine wishes, consulting an oracle before instituting a cult for Ptolemy (Diod. Sic. 20.100.1–4). The final aspect of the concluding frame to which I want to draw attention is the depiction of Demetrius as a freedom fighter for the Greeks. In several conflicts after the Siege, Demetrius is, apparently, a liberator: he re-establishes free government and liberates cities from Cassander and Polyperchon (Diod. Sic. 20.100) and is described as liberating Sicyon from Ptolemy (Diod. Sic. 20.102–03); this theme is already present in Diodorus in the account of Demetrius’ campaigns in 307, and we have seen that this narrative could have provided the Antigonids with a rationale for the Siege of Rhodes as the just punishment of a negligent ally.48 Traces of conflict remain in the narrative. What is presented as fighting for the liberation of the Greek can easily be seen by others as a war waged to cement the power of the Antigonids, as at Rhodes. What is uncontroversial in Diodorus’ account, however, is that if a war is waged in order to re-establish free government, it should be counted as just. Depriving a city of liberty is an injustice, at least from the point of view of members of the Classical and early Hellenistic polis, which may justly be punished by war. The final frame again works to establish a moral compass for the Siege narrative: what Demetrius did at Rhodes, the concluding section suggests, was unjust because it was a war waged for domination rather than the liberation of the Greeks, and one which trampled on civic freedoms, even as Diodorus’ narrative may occlude an

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47 Pausanias links Ptolemy’s title Soter to the Siege of Rhodes (Paus. 1.8.6). For doubts, perhaps overstated, about this link, see R. A. Hazzard, ‘Did Ptolemy I Get His Surname from the Rhodians in 304?’ ZPE 93 (1992), 52–56. The festival in honour of Ptolemy I continued into the 2nd c. BCE (Gorgon FGrH 519 F9 = Ath. 15.52.696f): see Wiemer, ‘Zenon of Rhodes’, 299 and note 81.

48 Diodorus (20.45–46) puts these ‘liberations’ in 307/6. Demetrius was active in Attica and the Megarid in late 308/7 and early 307/6 (Plut. Demetr. 8; Philochorus FGrH 328 F 66).
Antigonid justification for the Siege based in part on the same principle of the priority of Hellenic freedom. The rhetoric of freedom, then as now, can be a potent motivator of war. 49

I have suggested that Diodorus’ ethical discourses are evidence for an attempt to constrain war in ethically understandable categories. Highlighting human devastation through emotional history may be read as an attempt to limit violence in war. Such emotional history also seeks to strengthen the communal bonds of virtue that may be expected to minimise conflict in the first place; cohesive cities become less open to violent attack. There is a strong element throughout the narrative of valourising civic and communal virtues over individual displays of power. The narrative seeks to support the moral norms of communal justice associated with the polis. While this narrative certainly resonates with Diodorus’ late Republican context, it is also plausibly generated by the political, social and military confusion generated by emerging political structures in the Hellenistic period. Consistent with this focus on communal ethics, we find significant emphasis on the importance of honouring treaties and maintaining established friendships. Later contexts may again play a part in constructing this discourse, especially if the aftermath of the Third Macedonian War is in the mind of Diodorus’ Rhodian source. But given the arguments in the Rhetoricum ad Alexandrum (and in much earlier Greek literature) about tying justice to treaty keeping, it also sits within Hellenistic discourses of just warfare. Religious narratives, especially of the cooperation of the gods and natural world on the side of the just, also figure, and function to strengthen moral norms of justice in the face of unjust aggression. 50 Diodorus’ narrative thus provides access to a range of moral norms about justice in warfare. In calculations of justice, it seems clear that Diodorus works with ius ad bellum principles that are very similar to modern ones, pointing to the tradition’s continuity and real antiquity. Yet the moral norms of justice which emerge from the narrative are also a function of a complex of virtues, including prudence, communal courage, religious piety, the cultivation of a common mind and concern for the common good, maintaining friendships, and moderating emotions and using them to inspire action. In these areas, Diodorus presents as normative a virtue ethics approach to making decisions about going to war and engaging in conflict once war has started. Such an approach may contribute to military ethics conceived more broadly than the modern just war principles.

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49 Wars of liberation, clearly figured as just in Diodorus’ narrative, go beyond the modern jus ad bellum principles, although they resonate with arguments which claim that recent interventions in Libya and Syria, for example, were just.

50 I have gained much from discussion with Dr Lara O’Sullivan about the religious implications of Diodorus’ narrative; see now her essay in AHB 28.3–4 (2015). This project arose from a University of Western Australia-University of Queensland Bilateral Research Collaboration Project undertaken with her and Dr Luca Asmonti. I am grateful to them for their insights and collegiality. An earlier version of this essay benefitted from discussion at the 2014 Australian Historical Association Conference and I also thank the two anonymous referees for their advice and corrections.