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Antipater and the Lamian War:
A study in 4th Century Macedonian Counterinsurgency Doctrine

John Walsh

In the first years of the 21st century the issue of counterinsurgency has again become topical. In 2006, a war on two fronts against determined insurgents forced the US military to reappraise its counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy after a hiatus of a quarter of a century. The Army and Marine Corps had not confronted a major insurgency movement since the Vietnam War, and the experience combatting insurgencies in both Iraq and Afghanistan, to varying degrees of failure, demanded that both military doctrine and approach be completely updated. To this end, the Department of Defense undertook an instructive review of modern insurgencies, and Generals David Petraeus (United States Army) and James Amos (United States Marine Corps) produced the Counterinsurgency Field Manual No. 3–24 (FM 3–24) to fill the self-acknowledged “doctrinal gap” that had emerged in the years following Vietnam. The generals set their analysis in an historical context, looking as far back as the British experience of the late 19th century in Afghanistan and Lawrence’s fabled Arabian campaign—which was sufficient presumably for their purposes, and perhaps not surprising for a nation with such a comparatively short history, and one so deeply connected with an insurgency of its own against Britain.

In this paper, I draw attention to the ancient world’s experience with insurgency warfare specifically through an analysis of the Lamian War, which swept the Greek mainland after the death of Alexander the Great in 323 BC, when the Macedonian general Antipater faced a revolt of the Greek city states.

While such an historical example from antiquity may, as a by-product, shed some light upon modern experience, this exercise is best left to others; historians ought rightly to concentrate on how the modern may serve to illuminate that which has passed. Nor is it an illegitimate or unprecedented exercise to reinterpret the affairs of the ancients from a modern standpoint; after all, this aim is wholly consistent with Hecataeus’ instinct to conform his own

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1 I offer my sincere thanks to Mr Shane Hubbard for his capable editorial efforts and valuable insights during the preparation of this paper.

2 Army Counterinsurgency Field Manual No. 3–24 (FM 3–24) = Marine Corps Warfighting Publication No. 3–33.5 (MCWP 3–33.5).


interpretation of what passed as history to the attitudes and methods of his own times. History was born from the impulse to apply the most up-to-date version of what counted as rationalism to the riddle of the past. So too this paper seeks to follow that premise and to re-examine the Lamian War in the same spirit.

As a pivotal war that began the Hellenistic era of Macedonian domination of the Greek city-states, the subject of the Lamian War is long overdue for specialist study. This paper proposes a re-assessment of the Lamian War, and provides a historical study based on a modern insurgency paradigm, with its chief aim being to understand better the actions of Antipater, the chief Macedonian belligerent. Leosthenes and Antipater are the major military figures of the Lamian War. Leosthenes has traditionally been seen as a brilliant general who came close to defeating Antipater in the siege at Lamia. Antipater, by contrast, has been regarded as a passive figure in the initial stages of the war who was bested by Leosthenes and forced into a strenuous siege in Lamia. An alternative interpretation of the conflict and Leosthenes’ role in it can be obtained if we view it as a type of insurgency: once viewed in this way, we can throw new light on Antipater’s strategy by means of a counterinsurgency model. Thus, amidst the 21st century debate between the Classical and Neo-Classical schools of counterinsurgency doctrine, we may also begin a re-assessment of the Lamian War and the role of Antipater himself, whose competence and strategy in the war have been generally underestimated. This paper will proceed by a discussion of the following: (1) an overview of the Lamian War; (2) the political background at Athens; (3) Antipater’s background; (4) Antipater’s policy during Agis’ revolt; (5) Antipater and the Exiles’ Decree; (6) Antipater’s

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5 Hecataeus FGrH 1 F 1: Ἐκαταῖος Μιλήσιος ὄδε μυθεῖται τάδε γράφω, ὡς μοι δοκεὶ ἀληθέα εἶναι: οἱ γὰρ Ἑλλήνων λόγοι πολλοὶ τε καγελοῖο, ὡς ἐμοὶ φαίνονται, εἰς ἵνα (“Hecataeus of Miletus says: I write what seems to me to be true, because the stories of Greeks are, in my opinion, many and absurd”).


7 The two most influential shapers of the so-called Classical school of counterinsurgency were Robert Grainger Ker Thompson and David Galula whose theories emerged from a series of primarily colonial revolutionary conflicts in the 1950s and 1960s. Collectively, their work influenced a generation of US foreign policy-makers. The first serious Neo-Classical attempt to modernize American counterinsurgency doctrine came with Petraeus’ and Amos’ 2006 comprehensive re-examination of policies.

8 It is generally accepted that Diodorus, our chief source for the Lamian War, largely relied on Hieronymus of Cardia as his main source in Book 18. This should draw our attention to how the biases of Hieronymus—particularly against Antipater—may have entered Diodorus’ history. Hieronymus’ own views, in addition to his use of Athenian sources, combined to produce the very unflattering image of Antipater in Diodorus’ account. For Hieronymus’ use of Athenian records see Rosen (1967) 41–94, esp. 44–5, 54–60, 73–6, 86–9 and 92–3.

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strategy as described by Polyaeunus and the Suda; and (7) Antipater’s developed doctrine of warfare. My conclusions follow.

I. THE LAMIAN WAR: AN OVERVIEW

As news of Alexander’s death spread in June 323 BC, Athens seized upon this apparent opportunity to assert its freedom and reposition itself as the predominant authority in Greece. The conflict, which was fought between Macedon under Antipater and an Athenian led Greek coalition, derives its name from the Thessalian hill-city of Lamia, the siege of which formed the central action of the war during the winter of 323–2 BC. In the first phase of the war, led by the Athenian general Leosthenes—with the support of several northern Greek states—the Athenian bid for freedom appeared to enjoy limited success. Despite temporarily occupying Thermopylae and a victory in Boeotia, the Athenians were unable to force a decisive battle with Antipater, who maneuvered to a heavily fortified position at Lamia. Antipater’s decision to draw Leosthenes to Lamia and hold a fortified position while accumulating resources is consistent with modern counterinsurgency strategy. In this respect, his approach to the insurgency of 323 must be regarded as a “textbook” one. The appearance of initial success garnered the Athenians some support among the Peloponnesian states, and the possibility of a genuinely Hellenic revolt—which Agis III had envisioned in 331 BC, but

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9 For the view modern insurgencies are the product of “gaps” in security, capacity and leadership see Eizenstat, Porter and Weinstein (2005) 134–46.

10 The term “Lamian War” is itself controversial. Ashton (1984) (cf. Schmitt [1992] 163–64) has argued that the standard name for the conflict disproportionately overemphasizes the significance of Lamia, and that the siege of the Thessalian city was not the central event of the war. This view appears to be supported by epigraphic evidence from the late 4th century which indicates the conflict was known as the “Hellenic War” at Athens. But this reflects a patriotic Athenian bias, and suggests that the importance of Lamia in the whole affair may have been obscured by patriotic bluster. The significance of the expression “Lamian War” and an appreciation of its importance allow a shift in the entire perspective of the war, and the philological question of the war’s name takes on much broader historical significance, which, in turn, bears directly on Antipater’s role in the war. For the origin of the expression “Lamian War,” see now Walsh (2011).

11 In a classic battle for the “hearts and minds” of the Greek world the Athenians struggled to cast their revolt in a truly Hellenic light. As a phrase, “hearts and minds” is deeply interwoven with American Vietnam-era counterinsurgency policy, but as an approach to defeating an insurgency the practice is much older. For a thorough discussion of the origin and application of the concept through the 20th and 21st centuries see Dixon (2009). The Athenians, for example, made effective use of Persian War rhetoric against the “barbarians” to focus resistance to Macedon: see Howe 2013 and Marincola 2007. However, as the first Athenian action of the war was against fellow Greeks, it casts serious doubt on their claims to be fighting on behalf of the common safety of the Hellenic world. Political abstractions such as eleutheria and autonomia were particularly prone to misuse in the 4th century BC. In general, see Seager and Tuplin (1980) 141–54 and Seager (1981) 106–12. For the use of autonomia see Bosworth (1992) 122–52. In the period both Greeks and Macedonians laid equal claim to the same political language, a circumstance familiar to observers of the political complexity of insurgencies today. See Mendels (1984).

12 See JP 3–24 xxv–xxvi: “Commanders use the combined action approach to hold and build while providing a persistent counterinsurgent presence among the populace. This approach attempts to first achieve security and stability in a local area, followed by offensive operations against insurgent forces now denied access or support.”
which Athenian abstention had undermined—seemed to be tantalizingly within reach. However, a combination of two significant defeats at sea, and the increasing futility of the Lamian siege strained the Greek coalition. Confronted with prosecuting a prolonged siege amidst mounting casualties, Leosthenes was unable to preserve the unity of the Greek cause. As taking the city by force no longer seemed possible, Leosthenes attempted to blockade Antipater. The Macedonians frustrated the Greek attempts at circumvallation by mounting counter-raids, and Leosthenes was killed in one of these skirmishes. The results of his death, even in circumstances only serendipitous in nature, are reminiscent of what would today be called a “targeted killing.”

On today’s insurgency battlefield, a commander might achieve the same effect—the removal of a high-value enemy command asset—by means of a sniper-team or Predator drone strike, a 21st century application of a counterinsurgency tactic already skilfully exploited by Antipater in the 4th century BC. It was surely more than the loss of Leosthenes himself, but probably what this represented, that broke the Greek alliance. It served as dramatic confirmation that Antipater remained a potent threat and that the Greek forces had been tricked into wintering before Lamia while Macedonian reinforcements steadily approached. Not the loss of Leosthenes, but the loss of illusion must certainly have come as a devastating blow to the weary Greek forces. As would remain the case today, this precision strike against the leadership of the insurgent Greeks had a disproportionately significant impact upon the outcome of the war. In this way, it is typical of the recognised value force-multipliers (such as snipers) represent to the suppression of insurgencies. And although remembered as a heroic, albeit tragic figure, Leosthenes’ reputation may ultimately owe more to the quality of his funeral oration than to his own achievements. He was unable to conclude the siege and draw Antipater into the critical battle that would have allowed the Greeks to exploit whatever advantage they may have held in 323 BC. This failure left Athens isolated and vulnerable in the spring of the following year.

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13 By forcing the Athenians to concentrate their efforts at Lamia and inflicting unsustainable losses to personnel Antipater’s approach conforms to the commonly held attrition model of counterinsurgency. On attrition and counterinsurgency from a combined British and US standpoint see Mackinlay and Al-Baddawy (2008) 43–51.

14 Diod. 18.13.5; cf. Justin 13.5.12. Antipater attacked Leosthenes and his men while they were digging the trench in an attempt to cut off his supplies (Diod. 18.13.5). Unlike Justin’s account (13.5.12–13) which states a missile was hurled from the walls: “telo a maris in transeuntem iacto occiditur,” from Diodorus we must assume Leosthenes was killed in a battle some distance from Lamia.

15 Leosthenes’ death is emblematic of Antipater’s masterful strategy, and conspicuously bears all the hallmarks of, whether by Predator drone or sniper, a targeted killing. On targeted killing see Goppel (2013). For leadership decapitation strikes and the Iraq War see Johnson (2005) esp. 72–75. Snipers train to identify and eliminate high value targets, such as Leosthenes would have represented on the battlefield. See Mast and Halberstadt (2007) 74. Predator drones and their capabilities against leadership targets play an increased role in wars against insurgents, see Jones (2008) 97 and fn. 21 where he cites Bentsten and Pezullo (2006). For recent criticism of their perceived efficacy see Sluka (2011) 24–33.

16 Murray and Scales (2009) 149 corroborate this view. Quoting a certain Maj. Farrell, they note that the operations of sniper elements from 1st Battalion, Royal Irish Guards against insurgent forces in Basra during March 2003 were particularly effective: “Our snipers are working in pairs, infiltrating the enemy’s territory, to give us very good observation of what is going on inside Basra and to shoot the enemy as well when the opportunity arises ... They don’t kill large numbers, but the psychological effect and the denial of freedom of movement of the enemy is vast.” In this way, we may presume the ancient and modern experiences are again alike.
II. POLITICS AT ATHENS: THOSE FOR WHOM WAR WAS PEACE AND PEACE WAS WAR

It could be argued that insurgencies, the Lamian War not excluded, are inherently political acts of war, and the US experience of the 21st century seems to confirm as much. We may assume that this axiom applied in the 4th century BC, and conclude that Athenian strategy, based on the fatal assumption that Antipater would be unable to respond decisively to the revolt, was aimed at forcing a political, rather than a purely military, settlement through an act of aggressive posturing. The Athenian expectation seems to have been that the highly symbolic, yet militarily irrelevant, seizure of Thermopylae would bloodlessly deliver the freedom of the Greeks: a short term strategy. Let us examine the political situation at Athens at the outbreak of the uprising against Antipater.

As in other periods of Athenian political history, there was a lack of Athenian political consensus in 323 BC. Between Chaeronea and the Lamian War, a definite rift emerged in the Athenian political elite. What we might term the “nationalist faction”—which included at

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17Diod. at 18.10.1–2 refers to those Athenians who made their living through military service and who were eager for war against Antipater: they were the men for whom Philip once said “that war was peace and peace was war for them.” This chiastic statement appears in the Letter of Philip to Athens which is preserved in the corpus of Demosthenes’ speeches (Dem. Or. 12.19.2–5). However, Didymus (De Demosthenes commenta 11.7 = FGrH 72 F 41.19) in his commentary on Demosthenes’ speeches reports that the eleventh speech in the corpus of Demosthenes was generally regarded as an oration composed by Anaximenes of Lampsacus in his Philippica and put in the mouth of Demosthenes (Pearson [1960] 245, with n. 11). The Letter of Philip (Dem. Or. 12) is also thought to derive from Anaximenes of Lampsacus’ Philippica, even though it is perfectly possible that Anaximenes may have rewritten an actual letter of Philip II. See also Natoli (2004) 61.


The paradoxical notion that the desire for peace may necessitate war is usually rendered by the Latin axiom si vis pacem para bellum (Cf. Veg. Mil. 3 Prologue: igitur qui desiderat pacem, praeparet bellum). In the same way, the 1982 Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas) may, in part, shed some light upon the Lamian War itself. In 1982 the newly installed military junta of General Galtieri attempted to exploit the invasion to incite nationalism and secure its own domestic legitimacy, relying on a show of strength, but at the same time miscalculating the response of its adversary (Great Britain and Margaret Thatcher). On the role Argentine miscalculation played see Welch (1995) 28. See especially then US Secretary of State Haig (1984) 262: “There was a widespread impression that the junta was creating a foreign distraction to give itself a respite from domestic economic problems, including severe inflation.” See again Haig (1984) 267: “In short, the junta, displaying a pattern of behavior typical of many militarized, authoritarian regimes, thought it could get away with it [i.e., the invasion of the Falklands because Britain was weak and the United States corrupt].”

19For background, see Ferguson (1911); Mossé (trans. Stewart 1973); Will (1983); Dreyer (1999) 30–42.

20Taking Athenian politics to be polarized to this degree may, in most cases, be overly simplistic. Finley (1974) 1–26 has established that Athenian politics were especially fluid and complex. The shifting policy scene renders, generally, analyses based strictly on factional politics obsolete. He, nonetheless, notes that Athenian politics were not without moments of harsh division, bordering on stasis (Finley [1974] 9). Harding (1976) 199 points to the example of Androtion, and argues that his career demonstrates the limitations of a factional model of Athenian politics. See in general Anastasiadis (1999) 313–35. Strauss (1986) 25–27 argues similarly. He also [(1999) 31 and n. 15, following Whibley [1889] 38–9, 121] presents the thesis that a strictly bi-partisan view of Athenian politics is the result of 19th century scholars incorrectly ascribing to ancient Athens a political
The Lamian War appears to have been an attempt by a small faction of Athenians to pursue their own domestic political agenda by means of foreign adventurism. The war, prosecuted against the advice of Phocion, who predicted that Athens was suited only to short-term success, was designed to restore an individual political faction to a position of dominance at Athens—and to a lesser extent establish Athenian hegemony and influence throughout Greece (Diod. 18.9.1). There was never a unified Athenian approach to the war. The military strategy that was implemented was at odds with the stated ambition of the war: to remove Macedonian garrisons from Greek cities and liberate Greece (Diod. 18.10.2). Leosthenes occupied Thermopylae—the holiest battlefield in Greek history, and a virtual shrine to Greek nationalism and heroism—in what appears to be an application of a politically motivated military strategy (Diod. 18.11.5). The intent seems to have been to force Antipater into a stalemate that would result in a negotiated peace with the belligerent faction at Athens.

The divided nature of Athenian politics is confirmed by the Suda (see Suda s.v. “Antipatros,” A, 2703: “[It is said] that when the Athenians surrendered Athens to Antipater the Macedonian, the demagogues, having urged the Athenians to revolt, were afraid that they would lay the blame upon them and fled.” See also Diod. 18.10.1–5. Diodorus notes the group who stood to profit from military endeavors outnumbered those who opposed the war. Diod. (18.11.1–3) demonstrates that enthusiasm for another war against Antipater was by no means truly pan-Hellenic. Mossé (1973) 86–96 and Faraguna (1992) 251 shed further light on the subject.

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24In Phocion’s objection it is tempting to see a comparison to Colin Powell. On Powell’s opposition within the US government to the invasion of Iraq see Mirza (2007) 446. Like Phocion, Powell’s opposition should be viewed within the framework of a larger political struggle, in the latter’s case against the hawkish neo-conservative wing of the Republican Party. With this internal schism serving as the backdrop for US involvement in a foreign war that would produce an insurgency we see yet another interesting analogy to events of the 4th century BC.

25The Athenians made a concerted effort to portray the war as a pan-Hellenic crusade and cast the motive for the war beyond their own purpose. Thus, the Lamian War was known alternatively as the ‘Hellenic
III. ANTIPATER BEFORE THE LAMIAN UPRISING

Ultimately, the speed and determination with which Antipater retaliated against the insurgency surprised the Athenians. As a result, they were forced to fight a war for which they were neither prepared, nor to which they were wholly committed. As we have seen, the Athenian response to the power vacuum after Alexander’s death conforms to one modern model of insurgency—and we can now turn to an explication of this model.

First, we can examine Antipater and his experience as a general and politician prior to 323 BC. Where, as we have noted, Antipater is often portrayed as the involuntary antagonist of Leosthenes in the Lamian War, this quiescent role seems at odds with the character of the man who played such a powerful role in Macedonian affairs before the war. Antipater was man of vast experience, both military and political. Antipater had a long history of military service to Macedon and Philip II. Born in 399/8 BC, his role in the court certainly extended back to the time of Philip’s brother Perdiccas III. Antipater was equally adept in the political field: he, along with Parmenion, played a significant role in negotiating the peace settlement between Athens and Macedonia in 346. During this period, he may have forged personal political relationships, and gained insight into the divisive nature of the Athenian politics that were exploited to great effect during the Lamian War. In 342, Antipater assumed the first of what

War’ in antiquity, and this was the favoured term of reference for the Athenians, for obvious propagandistic reasons. There is ample epigraphic evidence for the use of the term ‘Hellenic War’, which certainly reflects the Athenian rhetoric during the war. E.g., IG II ² 448.43-44 dates to the archonship of Archippus (318/17) and almost certainly relates to the Lamian War (Ashton [1984] 153). The text has been restored to read [καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ πολέμου-υ τοῦ Ἑλληνικοῦ]. A decree dating to the archonship of Cephisodorus (323/2) provides a contemporary reference which attests to the use of ‘Hellenic War’. IG II ² 448.8-15 records the participation of Euphron of Sicyon in the Athenian alliance. See Ashton (1984) 153 and n. 10. IG II ² 505.17, from an Athenian decree dating to the archonship of Nicocles (302/1), honours Nicander of Ilium and Polyzexes of Ephesus for their participation in a naval campaign and reads ἐπὶ τοῦ Ἑλληνικοῦ πολέμου. This is almost certainly a reference to the Lamian War (Ashton [1984] 153 and nn. 11-12), whereas IG II ² 506.9-10 provides a less certain reference to the Lamian War. The heavily restored reading is τοῦ πολέμου[ν γενομένου τοῦ Ἑλληνικοῦ]-κοῦ can only refer to the Lamian War if we accept the reading—which seems reasonable in this case—of the name Cleitus at line 12 (Ashton [1984] 153 nn. 13-14). The restored reading of IG II ² 467.6-8 (306/5) reveals obvious Athenian propaganda, akin to Diod. 18.9.1, boasting the war had been: [πρὸς Ἀντίπατρον ὑπὲρ τῆς ἐλληνικῆς ἐλευθερίας τῶν Ἑλλήνων]. Ashton (1984) 154 n.25 accepts Wilhelm’s (1974) 145 restoration of IG II ² 467.16 to read Ἀντίπατρος and takes it as evidence in support of the supplement [πρὸς Ἀντίπατρον] here. The restored IG II ² 448.43-45 (318/17) [καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ πολέμου-υ τοῦ Ἑλληνικοῦ, ὃν ἔννοια ὁ δήμος ἡ Ἀθηναίων ὑπὲρ τῶν Ἑλλήνων captures the same patriotic sentiment.

Antipater’s influential position amongst Philip’s companions, second only perhaps to Parmenion, certainly attests prior military and political experience under Perdiccas (Plut. Mor. 179b; Ath. 10.435d).

The Western powers have struggled in the last decade towards a clearer understanding of their insurgent opponents; in this respect Antipater was far better informed. Whether Antipater’s friendship with Phocion (Plut. Phoc. 26.4–6; Plut. Mor. 142c–d; cf. 64c; 188f; 533d; Plut. Agis 2.2) dates from this episode or from after 338 (when he received a proxeny and Athenian citizenship: Just. 9.4.5) the relationship proved useful during the Lamian War and the subsequent peace negotiations with Athens. See Heckel (1992) 35. Antipater negotiated the peace treaty with Athens following Chaeronea and was given the title proxenos (Just. 9.4.5; Harp. s.v. “Alkimachos,” = Hyp. Frag. 19.2). It is also likely that Antipater’s close relationship with Isocrates dates to the settlement of 342, attested by the intimate tone of the latter’s letter, written in spite of renewed war between
would be several roles acting as a royal representative in various capacities. He represented Philip at the Pythian games in the role of religious state ambassador (théōros), and was also appointed as regent of Macedonia (Isoc. Ep. 4) before Alexander’s coming of age. It should come as no surprise to us that Antipater might apply the principles of COIN warfare long before the term itself came into use.

IV. ANTIPATER AND AGIS

It should not be overlooked that Leosthenes’ revolt after Alexander’s death was not the first time Antipater had been confronted with a military crisis in Greece. When Alexander left on his Asian expedition, Antipater remained at Macedonia to maintain the peace established after the sack of Thebes. Alexander left Antipater as regent of Macedon, with a force of 12,000 infantry and 1,500 cavalry. Antipater’s experience in dealing with Agis in 331 enabled him to refine a doctrine of warfare that he would later implement to great effect in 323 when the Athenians led their insurgency against Macedonian control. Antipater was operating, as we know was often the case, on limited resources even before the war with Agis. Although Alexander provided Antipater with money to attempt to defuse rising tensions with Memnon in Thrace (Curt. 3.1.20) he siphoned valuable resources from Macedonia in order to meet the growing needs of his Asian campaign, putting Antipater in what appeared to be a weak position militarily. Agis’ war was precipitated in large measure by the perception of Macedonian weakness. As in the case of the Lamian War, Greek miscalculation of Antipater’s

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28 Dem. Philippic 3.32; cf. Lib. 23.311.
29 Alexander assumed control of Macedonia (Plut. Alex. 9.1) during his father’s campaign against Byzantium in 340 (Diod. 16.76.3; Frontin. 1.4.13), while Antipater subdued the Tetrachoritae of Thrace (Theopomp. FGrH 115 F 217; Polyaen. 4.4.1).
31 Arr.1.11.3; Curt.4.1.39; Just. 11.7.1; Diod. 18.12.1; cf. 17.118.1. Heckel (2006) 36 also points out that, in this instance, the notoriously inaccurate Itinerarium Alexandri corroborates this evidence. For translation see Davies (1998) 1–54.
32 This refinement is well demonstrated by casualty rates. In the single battle at Megalopolis the Macedonian casualty rate was 8.8%. In 322 at Crennon the Macedonians suffered a 0.3% casualty rate. Dayton (2003 [2007]) 82 demonstrates that in battles between Greek armies from 357 to 197 this was the lowest recorded sustained casualty rate.
34 Antipater dispatched troops to Alexander in 331: 6,000 Macedonian infantry and 500 cavalry (Curt. 5.1.40). He was to continue to play a vital role maintaining Alexander’s strength. Antipater sent another 3,000 men from Illyricum in 330 (Curt. 6.6.35). He later sent 8,000 Greeks in 329 (Curt.7.10.12).
ability and resolve to maintain control of the Greek peninsula resulted in defeat.\(^{35}\) While the Lamian War was ignited by the opportunity Athens perceived to be available at the time of Alexander’s death, so too the Spartans—provoked by the news from Gaugamela—chose the moment of Memnon’s revolt to engineer a similar opportunity (Diod. 17.62.4–6).\(^{36}\) The Spartans concluded that Alexander was unable to divide his force and intervene in Greece. The opportunity seemed even more favorable as Antipater was occupied in Thrace dealing with the rebellious Memnon. However, Antipater quickly made peace with Memnon in order to focus his attention towards Agis (Diod. 17.62.7).\(^{37}\) Thus, those at Athens who favored a hostile policy against Antipater in 323 may have expected Antipater to deal with them in the same fashion—to negotiate a peace with them before proceeding to join the power struggle which was almost certain to emerge among Alexander’s generals.

This pattern for conducting a war was to be repeated by the Greeks in 323. In both cases, an individual Greek polis perceived an opportunity to advance its own interests at a moment of Macedonian weakness. In the case of Agis, it is evident that diplomatic efforts prior to the war were responsible for preventing the creation of a truly pan-Hellenic alliance (Diod. 17.62.6). Antipater successfully managed the scope of the insurgency, isolating the Spartans from the broader Greek community, a basic tenet of modern counterinsurgency doctrine.\(^{38}\) Although proof of his military ability, the war with Agis also attests to Antipater’s diplomatic sophistication.\(^{39}\) We can also safely assume that Antipater had used his diplomatic skills to good effect before the Lamian War. At the outbreak of hostilities, he had secured the allegiance of key cities, which allowed him to effectively neutralize the weight of numbers of the Greek states that allied themselves with the Athenians: to effectively starve them of material and moral support. Antipater’s appreciation of the relationship between politics and the battlefield would suit him well to today’s insurgency campaigns. We see evidence of this awareness in his exploitation of the Exiles’ Decree.

\(^{35}\) In light of the outcome of the Lamian War, Demades’ characterization of Antipater as the “rotten old rope” (Arrian FGrH 156 F 9.14; Plut. Demosth. 31.5; Phoc. 30.9) that held Greece bound to Macedon appears unjustified.

\(^{36}\) In this case the synchronism of events proves problematic. For synchronism as an influence on Sicilian historical writing see Feeney (2007) 43–58. See CAH² 6. 852–55 where it is noted that the chronology presents serious difficulties. Reading Aeschines 3.133 suggests the most reasonable date for the end of the war is spring 330. See also Cawkwell (1969) 170–73; Bosworth (1975) 27; Badian (1985) 446–47. Although the battle at Megalopolis likely occurred prior to Gaugamela (Curt. 6.1.21) the relationship between the events is firmly established in Diodorus’ account, and for the purpose of this argument his aetiology must suffice.


\(^{38}\) This precept underpins US counterinsurgency precepts today, see Kienscherf (2010) 130.

\(^{39}\) As in the case of Lamia the siege of a fortified city (Megalopolis) which remained loyal proved to be a decisive event (Aesch. 3.165; Dein. 1.34; Curt. 6.1.20; Paus. 7.27.7).
V. ANTIPATER AND THE EXILES’ DECREE\textsuperscript{40}

The full significance of the introductory lines of the Exiles’ Decree has been, to a great extent, overlooked by modern scholars. Its aggravating effect as \textit{casus belli} is well established, but its value to Antipater in establishing his moral legitimacy, or at a stretch, the legality of combating an Athenian led insurgent movement has not been fully recognized. Diodorus includes a version of this decree, issued in the summer of 324 at the Olympic games, in which Alexander’s order commanding the restoration of all exiles in the Greek cities was announced:

\begin{quote}

Βασιλεὺς Ἀλέξανδρος τοῖς ἐκ τῶν Ἑλληνίδων πόλεων φυγάσι. τοῦ μὲν φεύγειν ύμᾶς ὑπὸ ἡμεῖς αἴτιον γεγόναμεν, τοῦ δὲ καταλθεῖν εἰς τὰς ἱδίας πατρίδας ἡμεῖς ἐσώμεθα πλὴν τῶν ἐναγών. γεγράμεν δὲ Ἀντιπάτρῳ περὶ τούτων, ὅπως τὰς μὴ βουλομένας τῶν πόλεων κατάγειν ἀναγκάσῃ. (Diod. 18.8.4–6)

King Alexander to those who have fled from Greek cities: We did not create the causes for you to flee, but We will be the reason you return to your homelands, with the exception of those who are cursed. We have written to Antipater about these matters so that he may use force against those of the cities unwilling to accept you back.

The decree, as it is preserved here, contains two significant ideas: the first orders the exiles to be returned home, and the second, an addendum of great importance to our purpose, gives royal assent to Antipater’s right to use force in the Greek peninsula to implement the edict. Although it has been argued that the decree represents an effort by Alexander to limit Antipater’s power in Greece, the endorsement of Antipater as the physical means by which the decree was to be implemented in effect ratifies his position.\textsuperscript{41} To the modern strategist, and no doubt to the savvy Antipater alike, as a means to combatting an insurgency, the legitimization of authority would be deemed essential.\textsuperscript{42} Today, rather than the Olympic games Antipater would, no doubt, choose the United Nations as the stage for his decree.

\begin{flushright}

\textsuperscript{41} Following the seminal work of Galula (1964) see also Petraeus and Amos (2006) 1–113: “The primary objective of any COIN [counterinsurgency] operation is to foster development of effective governance by a legitimate government. Counterinsurgents achieve this objective by the balanced application of both military and non-military means.”
\end{flushright}
To the extent that Diodorus’ analysis concludes that the decree was the primary cause of the war, he is partly correct. This is not only the cause but also in fact the first aggressive act of the war. It constitutes a diplomatic first strike which, at the same time, secured the favor of nearly the entire Greek peninsula. With the exception of Aetolia and Athens, both in a position where they were forced to violate Alexander’s order, Antipater could be fairly certain that the majority of Greece would remain unwilling to join any impending conflict. Just as the treatment of Athens had ensured its neutrality during Agis’ war (Diod. 17.62.7), the Exiles’ Decree was designed to prevent a unified Greek response to any action Antipater may later have taken against Athens. Compliance with the decree would have meant the forfeiture of cities taken from the Oeniadae and the Samians. Antipater used the decree to separate his targets from the general “herd” of Greek cities. This is the classic “divide and conquer” strategy. The course of events after the dissemination of the decree suggests that there was a premeditated attempt by Antipater to confine and contain the Lamian War to a conflict with Athens and Aetolia, so that he could limit the spread of the insurgency and prevent an outright revolt of the Greek states.

The Exiles’ Decree, which served as Antipater’s diplomatic opening salvo, proved its worth as can be seen in Diodorus’ account. And, as a means to achieving that vital part of defeating an insurgency—isolating the opponent—it must qualify as a masterstroke:

τῶν δ’ ἄλλων Ἐλλήνων οί μὲν πρὸς Μακεδόνας ἀπέκλινον, οί δὲ τὴν ἡσυχίαν εἴλοντο. Αἵτωλοι μὲν οὖν ἄπαντες πρῶτοι συνέθεντο τὴν συμμαχίαν, καθάπερ προείρηται, μετὰ δὲ τούτους Θετταλοὶ μὲν πάντες πλὴν Πελινναῖων, Οἶταιοὶ δὲ πλὴν Ἡρακλεωτῶν, Ἀχαιοὶ δὲ Φθιώται πλὴν Ῥηβαίων, Μηλεῖς δὲ πλὴν Λαμιέων ...

As to the other Greeks, some declared support with the Macedonians, while others took no action. Unified at the outset, the Aetolians joined the coalition, as has been noted, and after them the Thessalians, all except those from Pelinna, the Oeteans, excluding those from Heraclea, the Phthiotian Achaeans, but excluding the Thebans, the Melians but not those of Lamia ...

While the language may be ancient, the methodology is remarkably modern, and Antipater’s neutralization of this uprising is recognizably current in its approach. The exceptions mentioned on this list are vital in demonstrating premeditation on the part of Antipater. The Thessalians, Oeataeans, Achaeans of Phthiotis and the Melians all joined the

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44Diod. 18.8.6: “Now people in general welcomed the restoration of the exiles as a good thing, but the Aetolians and the Athenians took offence at this action and were angry.”

45Sofman (1973) 135–36 argues that this was a deliberate feature of Alexander’s foreign policy and was designed to undermine any concerted opposition.

46On the need to isolate opponents as part of a coercive strategy, see Byman and Waxman (2002) 123.
Greek alliance, except those from Pelinna, Heraclea, Thebes and Lamia. Antipater, it appears, took the time to ensure the allegiance of the vital strategic strong points that would be necessary for his domination of Greece, in the event Alexander should die. Given the dangers of the campaign in the east this was not an unreasonable precaution, and Antipater would have been wise to consider what opportunities the king’s death might provide. Antipater was prepared to respond to a sudden power vacuum and stabilize the peninsula, as current doctrine would indicate, through control of these strategically vital and important cities. It is either the most fortunate accidental disposition of allies imaginable, or, more reasonably, the deliberate result of Antipater’s diplomatic efforts before the Athenian revolt. Pelinna is the fulcrum of the vital east–west road that splits central Thessaly. Control of this point gave Antipater free-ranging east to west travel, dominating the central plain of Thessaly and allowing him to be able to meet any approaching spearhead of the Greeks. He appears to have coalesced his defense around this line. Pelinna was an important strategic location in the war. Antipater also maintained Heraclea and Lamia, each city blocking the vital north–south entry from southern to northern Greece. The strategic importance of these cities beyond their role in the Lamian War is further emphasized in Livy’s account of the later Roman war with Philip V, where both have a significant part to play. By possessing the two, he cut off the entrance through Thessaly, and created a lateral defensive line to fall back on at Pelinna. These may not be the classic fetters of Greece as we know them, but surely a very effective collar nonetheless.

VI. ANTIPATER AND POLYAENUS

Evidence of Antipater’s effectiveness as a general is to be found in the stratagems of Polyaenus, where he is remembered as a general whose tactics were admired. There is a dominant theme to the three separate exempla: Antipater’s use of deception and unconventional means to achieve victory while avoiding direct conflict as much as possible. He is a master of what would now be called the asymmetric battlefield, and by his flexibility and fluid adaptability well suited to the dynamic demands of counterinsurgency operations. We will see also that

[footnotes]

47 For an extremely thorough discussion of the Greek alliance see Ashton (diss. 1980) 44–78. See also Miller (1982) 103. The precise role the poleis played in the actual conflict remains unclear. Miller argues that Kleonai (previously unattested in the sources) may have participated intermittently on behalf of the Greek cause. The alliance was not as widespread, nor as robust as Diodorus’ account seems to suggest.

48 On this approach see Ucko (2009) 74: “…countrywide stability is ensured gradually by consolidating control in specific cities and regions at a time.”

49 There appears to be some confusion in the sources. [Plut.] Mor. 846d–e; Hyp. 6.12; Just. 13.5.8 record Antipater being besieged at Heraclea. This confusion may well confirm that Antipater had fortified and garrisoned both cities in advance of the Greek revolt. The fighting may well have been far more widespread than Diodorus’ account preserves. His source may well have wanted to diminish the scale of the conflict and focus upon what he thought was the least successful aspect of Antipater’s campaign.

50 Livy 27.30.1–3; 32.4.3; 35.43.9, 50.7; 36.15.3, 25.1, 25.3–8, 29.5; 37.4.8, 5.5; 39.23.9, 28.3.


52 On the sources of Polyaenus, see Melber 1885.

53 An “asymmetric battlefield” is a combat environment where one of the sides fights in a highly unconventional or non-traditional manner, causing difficulties for the other side.
Polyaenus records features of his leadership reminiscent of his conduct of the Lamian War. Antipater would be cautious to avoid an especially bloody battle, as was the case with Agis. We will discuss the relevant passages below.

i) Tetrachoritae

Ἀντίπατρος ἐν τῇ Τετραχωριτῶν στρατεύων ἔταξε τὸν χόρτον τῶν ἵππων ἐμπρήσαι τὸν περὶ τῆς σκήνης, οἱ μὲν ἐνέπρησαν, ὁ δὲ σαλπιγκτῆς ἐσήμην· οἱ δὲ Μακεδόνες περὶ τὴν σκήνην ἦθροίζοντο μετέωρα ἐχόντες τὰ δόρατα. ταῦτα ἱδόντες οἱ Τετραχωρῖται καταπλαγέντες ἐξέλιπον τὸ χωρίον ἀμαχεὶ δὲ Ἀντίπατρος ἐκράτησεν (Polyaenus, Strat. 4.4.1)

On a campaign in the territory of the Tetrachoritae Antipater gave the order to build up the supply of feed for the horses around his tent. The men then inflated the appearance of the amount of feed, and when the trumpeter signaled, the Macedonians mustered around the tent holding their spears high above the ground. Upon seeing these things, the Tetrachoritae were utterly intimidated and abandoned their position. Antipater then won without a fight.

Antipater’s success against the northern tribe of the Tetrachoritae was part of a larger effort under Philip to secure and subdue the northern frontiers of the kingdom. Antipater’s success must be measured in terms of the situation he faced. He was successful in bringing the region under control, but, as Bosworth points out, his mandate had only been to subdue the region temporarily. Antipater appears to have demonstrated himself to be particularly adept at stabilizing situations with limited means and gaining time for larger forces to be mustered to deal the decisive blow. Antipater’s real skill was his ability to manage crises and hold positions with minimal cost to the resources at hand—to win a cheap and easy victory. The Lamian strategy he was to put in motion in 323 shows all the hallmarks of his previous military successes. The Lamian War is an extension of established practices which Antipater used with success in the past. The stratagem, which notes Antipater’s triumph, appears to be characteristic of his conservative military doctrine: to avoid direct conflict as much as possible and to achieve victory with minimal sustained loss. He is a creative general, unburdened by any heroic ideal that forced him to pursue glory at the expense of victory. In his dynamic adaptive leadership we see traits highly sought after in those fighting against modern insurgent forces.

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54 Antipater participated in Philip’s campaign to pacify Thrace and the northern frontier in 346. The campaign was particularly savage and conducted under harsh conditions. Philip’s strategy of holding strong fortified positions before engaging in battle may have influenced Antipater’s later decision to apply similar tactics in Greece. CAH² 6. 468-70: “The events of 346 give some idea of Philip’s methods. He proceeded slowly, capturing key strategic locations and fortifying them before moving into the Thracian plain for the final onslaught.” Antipater’s deft handling of the insurgency element of the Lamian War is an extension of Philip’s own methods.

ii) Antipater at the Sperchius

Antipateros tôn Sperchión diabánei ἐξουλετο. Θετταλῶν δὲ ἅπεων κωλύοντων διαβάνει, ὦ μέν τὴν δύναμιν ἀπῆγαγεν εἰς τὴν αὐτοῦ στρατοπεδεῖαν καὶ παρήγγειλε τοῖς Μακεδόσι μένειν ἐν τοῖς ὤπλοις καὶ τὰ σκέυοφόρα μὴ λύειν. οἱ Θετταλοὶ δὲ εἶς τὴν Λαμίαν ἀφιππεύσαντες ἡσυχοποιοῦντο κατὰ τὰς οἶκιας. Ἀντίπατρος ἔπανηλθε πρὸς τὸν ποταμὸν καὶ φθάσαντες τὴν δύναμιν, πρὶν ἐκβοηθῆσαι Θετταλοὺς καὶ κατελάβετο τὴν Λαμίαν προσπεσών. (Polyaenus, Strat. 4.4.2)

Antipater wanted to conduct a river-crossing of the Sperchius, but his crossing was opposed by Thessalian cavalry. He led his force back into his camp and spread the word for the Macedonians to remain under arms and not to unharness the pack animals. The Thessalians rode away into Lamia and prepared breakfast at their homes. Antipater [returned to] the river and seized the initiative; he crossed his force before the Thessalians marched out, advanced on and seized Lamia.

The second stratagem applies directly to the Lamian War. It recounts an incident, unattested in the other sources, involving Antipater immediately before the occupation of the city. Antipater wished to cross the river Sperchius—the river immediately south of Lamia—but was prevented by Thessalian cavalry. We should note that it is said Antipater wanted to cross the river. He was not compelled or forced to cross: he enjoyed the luxury of time. As was his customary practice, he sought to control the initiative on the battlefield. He withdrew to his camp where he kept his Macedonians under arms. Antipater appeared to move freely and was under no apparent duress. He was not hurrying to Lamia, desperate for shelter with a pursuing Athenian army at his rear. He had time to deceive the Thessalians and take Lamia in his own time, avoiding direct conflict. These Thessalians who returned to Lamia demonstrate just how ineffective they would have been to Antipater, and clearly show why he would have been happy to be rid of them. They were forced to confront Antipater at the river edge and could not use the city itself to block his supposed retreat. Their inability to secure Lamia from him proves the strategic myopia that appears to have affected the entire Greek command. They failed to appreciate the larger strategy. They repeatedly and futilely attempted to bring him to a conclusive battle. He, however, as demonstrated by his experience with the Tetrachoritae and Agis, understood that victory does not always require a conventional, and often costly, battle.

In contrast to the more common perception, Polyaenus informs us that Antipater did indeed deliberately take Lamia (4.4.2–3). The stratagems attributed to Antipater represented an accepted tradition of his abilities as a general in Polyaenus’ time. As a whole they represent the value of the lesson of Antipater’s active prosecution of the Lamian War. Polyaenus does not include Antipater’s success because it teaches the valuable lesson to be fortunate in war, to hope that your chief adversary is killed in battle and that you may miraculously survive a near fatal siege. Instead the basic lesson to be learned from Antipater is to avoid direct costly battle and win by tangential or oblique means: that victory is the ultimate aim of war not glory.

iii) Antipater and the Thessalians

Ἀντίπατρος ἐν Θετταλίᾳ βουλόμενος φαντασίαν τὸῖς πολεμίοις παρασχεῖν ἅπεων πολλῶν συναγαγῶν ὄνους πολλοὺς καὶ ἡμίονους συνέταξεν εἰς ἱλας, καὶ ἀνεβίβασεν
Antipater and the Lamian War

When Antipater wanted to create the impression of many mounted assets to his enemy in Thessaly, he rounded up a large number of asses and mules and dispersed them into units and mounted men outfitted with cavalry equipment upon them. And, in front of each squad he positioned a file of genuine cavalry men. Upon seeing these front ranks, the enemy believed those in the rear to be cavalry: they panicked and fled. Agesilaus employed this particular stratagem against Aeropus in Macedonia, likewise Eumenes against Antigonus in Asia.

Polyaenus draws on the idea that Antipater’s victories are achieved in situations where he was faced with challenges of diminished resources. Polyaenus used Antipater as a model of how to be successful in battle through manipulation of circumstances to overcome material deficiency. Polyaenus’ basic veracity must be trusted on account of the audience for whom he intended his work. If he did not reflect what was at least one of the accepted traditions regarding his subject matter, the work would have been of little interest or use to his patrons. Antipater’s strategy seems to have inspired both Agesilaus and Eumenes on at least one occasion. It must be the case that by the mid-2nd century the Lamian War was perceived as a success for Antipater—a success worthy of imitation. Antipater’s real skill was his ability to manage crises and hold positions with minimal cost to the resources at hand—in short, to achieve victory with minimal sustained loss. He is conspicuous by his practicality. In his application of asymmetric strategy, he is a very modern general.

iv) The Suda

Quite apart from the accounts which portray Antipater in adversarial opposition to Leosthenes, the Suda suggests a more active role for the Macedonian, recording that Antipater succeeded to the rule of the Macedonians:

'Ἀντίπατρος οὗτος ἐπεὶ διεδέξατο τὴν ἄρχην τῶν Μακεδόνων, ἐπολιορκὴθη μὲν ἐν Λαμίᾳ τῆς Θεσσαλίας ὡρ. Ἑλλήνων ἀναχωρησάντων δὲ τῶν Αἰτωλῶν, ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ἐσώθη. νικήσας δὲ ἦτε τοὺς Ἰ’ ῥήτορας, σὺς ἐξέδοσαν ἁθηναίοι, Δημοθένη, Ὀπειρίδην, Λυκούργου, Πολύσεκτον, Ἐφιάλτην, Θρασύβουλον, Χάρητα, Χαρίδημον, Διότιμον, Πατροκλέα, Κάσσανδρον (Suda s.v. “Antipatros” A 2704)

When this Antipater succeeded to the rule of the Macedonians, though besieged in Thessalian Lamia by the Greeks, he was saved by the withdrawal of the Aetolians and then the others. Following his victory, he demanded the ten orators, whom the Athenians handed over:

Demosthenes, Hyperides, Lycurgus, Polyeuctus, Ephialtes, Thrasybulus, Chares, Charidemus, Diotimus, Patrocles, and Cassander.\textsuperscript{57}

This should not be confused with the position of regent he already occupied while Alexander was alive. The wording must indicate the assumption of a new position altogether. The \textit{Suda} records that he was indeed besieged at Lamia, but does not contain the additional accusation that he was driven into, or retreated into, the city. The withdrawal of the Aetolians and the other allies did not just save Antipater from destruction, but put him in a position where he could begin to take the offensive. Ultimately, the \textit{Suda} records the war as Antipater’s victory, not as a defeat of the Greeks or Leosthenes. The difference is not insignificant: the former attests to the deliberate action of Antipater while the latter would afford him no credit in the success of the war. Antipater is denied the credit for overcoming his numerical disadvantage and achieving victory.

\section*{VII. THE DEVELOPED DOCTRINE}

From our modern vantage, we can see the development and appreciate the effectiveness of Antipater’s doctrine of warfare. In 331 when he suppressed the revolt of Agis in the Peloponnese, he was forced to fight a bloody battle with the Spartans, a battle that costs him several thousand casualties. Curtius’ account (6.1.1–21) describes the war as particularly savage, with the Macedonians suffering considerable losses.\textsuperscript{58} This was not a luxury he enjoyed in 323 after Alexander’s death, nor was this was the time to be involved in a costly war with Greeks when a much larger intra-Macedonian conflict, played for much higher stakes, was looming. Antipater learned a valuable lesson from Agis’ revolt. He observed that the occupation of Megalopolis played a vital role in his victory. This importance is attested by the award of 120 talents after the war (Curt. 6.1.20). Denying the enemy freedom of mobility on the battlefield, dictating to the enemy the place and nature of battle is still a fundamental of military strategy. Antipater’s strategy of seizing and holding points of strength in enemy territory with the aim of fixing the enemy, of denying him the freedom to maneuver, would be a familiar stratagem to any general since Antipater.

Thus, when Alexander died in 323, giving the Athenians what they thought was the chance to assert their freedom, our sources suggest they were not alone in putting a plan into operation. Diodorus records:

\begin{quote}
'Αντίπατρος δ’ ἀπολελειμμένος ὑπ’ Ἀλεξάνδρου στρατηγὸς τῆς Εὐρώπης ὡς ἐπόθετο τὴν τε τοῦ βασιλέως ἐν Βαβυλῶνι τελευτήν τὴν τε τῶν σατραπεῖων διαίρεσιν, πρὸς μὲν Κρατερὸν εἰς Κιλικίαν διεπέμπετο παρακαλῶν τὴν ταχίστην βοηθήσαι (οὕτως γὰρ προαπεσταλμένος εἰς Κιλικίαν ἡμέλλε κατάγειν εἰς Μακεδονίαν τοὺς ἀπολελειμμένους τῆς στρατείας Μακεδόνας, ὃντας ύπὲρ τοὺς μυρίους), πρὸς δὲ Φιλώταν τὸν εἰληφότα
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{57}The \textit{Suda} here actually records 11 names. Cf. \textit{Suda} s.v. “Antipatros” A 2703 where only Demosthenes, Hyperides and Himeraios appear.

\textsuperscript{58}Diod. 17.63.3 claims Antipater lost 3,500 men where Curt. 6.1.16 is less precise, estimating the Macedonian casualties to be in the vicinity of 1000. Nevertheless the conflict was particularly bloody. Both writers agree that the Spartan casualties numbered 5,300.
σατραπείαν τὴν Ἑλλησπόντῳ Φρυγίαν, ὡμοίως άξιων καὶ τούτον βοηθῆσαι καὶ μίαν τῶν ἑαυτοῦ υπογείας συνοικίεων ἐπαγγελέομενον (Diod. 18.12.1)

Antipater had been left in place by Alexander as general of Europe, and when he became aware of the king’s death in Babylon and of the distribution of the satrapies, he dispatched a message to Craterus in Cilicia requesting he come to his assistance immediately, because Craterus, who had been consigned to Cilicia earlier was due to return the more than 10,000 demobilized Macedonians to Macedonia. He also sent to [Leonnatus] who had seized the satrapy of Hellespontine Phrygia, requesting aid from him in the same way and promising him marriage to one of his own daughters.

It is clear that Antipater began to act rapidly upon the death of Alexander. His request for military aid from Craterus and the offer of a marriage alliance with Leonnatus precede his knowledge of the Greek uprising. Antipater had anticipated the Greek revolt, and acted precipitously to secure the aid of Craterus and Leonnatus. When he became aware of the exact movements of the Greeks, he made directly and intentionally for Thessaly (Diod. 18.12.2).

Perhaps the best way to defeat an insurgency is to prevent it from ever occurring. And, in the case of the Thessalian allies apparently deserting Antipater (Diod. 18.12.3) we may see an example of this. If Antipater made directly for Thessaly and Lamia with the intention of occupying the city fortress (and had anticipated a siege by the Athenians and their allies), then it may provide us with a better understanding of the circumstances surrounding the Thessalian cavalry. The disposition of his own forces confirms his intention, as it is recorded that he left with 13,000 infantry and 600 horsemen (Diod. 18.12.2). His was foremost an infantry army moving south with a small flanking cavalry detachment, with the sole intention of occupying a prepared and fortified position at Lamia. As he had no intention, at this point, of fighting in the open, the addition of Thessalian cavalry would only have burdened his resources and threatened his ability to survive the siege, while providing him with little force multiplying effect.

Diodorus records (17.12.4–5) the role Theban cavalry played when...

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59Diodorus appears to have mistaken Philotas for Leonnatus in this case. Cf. 18.3.1, 14.4. Wesseling proposed the emendation Leonnaton (see Diod. 18.12.1 with critical apparatus of Fischer), but perhaps another solution is possible. The fact that all the manuscripts of Diodorus have Philōtan at 18.12.1 would suggest that a scribal error is unlikely. Cf. Landucci (2008) 77; Veh, Wirth, and Rathmann (2005) 340–1. Diodorus may well have compressed the narrative of Hieronymus which originally had a larger list of people, including both Philotas and Leonnatus, from whom Antipater sought aid and information. Antipater would certainly have wanted to forge an alliance with someone at the court at this critical juncture. Someone like Philotas would have been a valuable source of information for Antipater. It stands to reason that Antipater may well have been in contact with this Philotas at the time of Alexander’s death. The possibility of a relationship dating to this time may be confirmed by their later association (Heckel [2006] 219). It is not beyond the realm of possibility that the relationship is related in some way to the rumors of the poisoning plot and the later tradition that this Philotas was a conspirator (Ps–Call. 3.31.8).

60Diod. 18.12.1. Cf. 17.109.1; 18.4.1, 16.4.


62It is generally presumed that the departure of the Thessalians prompted the withdrawal into Lamia. See W. Heckel (2006) 36.

63The siege of Thebes provided a readily available practical lesson. On the difficulties involved with the upkeep of cavalry under siege see Diod. 18.42.3–5. Eumenes is forced to take extraordinary measures to maintain the health of horses while besieged at Nora in 320. Cf. Plut. Eum. 9–11; Nep. Eum. 5.3–7; Just 14.2.1–4; Strabo, 12.2.6.
besieged by Alexander in 335 BC. His description of the chaotic retreat into the city in which the cavalry trampled and killed many of the infantry emphasizes how mounted troops were completely ill-suited to the defense of built up areas; cavalry units deployed in a city were a danger to themselves and their comrades, and represented a serious liability to any commander. Furthermore, in the case of the situation Antipater faced at Lamia the Thessalians were notorious for their treachery and would have presented him with a very dangerous element and potential enemy within the gates while under siege. The departure of the Thessalians was actually a benefit to Antipater, he may even have dismissed them himself, foreseeing only potential insurrections himself. The problem was not unique to Antipater: in Iraq the infiltration of Iraqi Security Forces by the Badr Organization and Mahdi Army has presented serious problems to security and been the source of much violence, both against coalition forces and Iraqis.

The occupation of Lamia—Antipater’s ‘bite and hold’ strategy—was the deciding moment of the war, and evidence of Antipater’s appreciation of the concepts of conducting counterinsurgency operations, even if the term had yet to be coined. While the arrival of reinforcements with Leonnatus and Craterus brought the war to a close Antipater’s occupation of Lamia made the result inevitable. The rebels could only hope to get the best terms possible. Antipater has not been defeated and driven into Lamia. That was wishful Athenian propaganda. He raced south, ignored troublesome alliances along the way with the Thessalians and occupied a formidable prearranged defensive position and rendered the Athenian defense of Thermopylae almost ridiculously quaint. What played out next must have been almost exactly as Antipater scripted it. Leosthenes was forced to come to Antipater and to spend the winter making futile and costly attacks on a well-defended city.

Current US military counterinsurgency doctrine (FM 3–24/MCWP 3.33–5; 1–129,130) would support Antipater’s methods, emphasizing that insurgents must be separated from their bases of support and their ability to re-supply interrupted. Antipater accomplished both of these goals by maneuvering the Athenians into the siege. Soon Leosthenes, and not Antipater, was anxious about the arrival of the reinforcements from Asia. While Leosthenes besieged Antipater at Lamia, the Macedonian was actually laying siege to all Greece. Despite what is obviously a dominant position for Antipater, the account we have insists that the Greeks were on the verge of victory. Diodorus alleges that Antipater tried to sue for peace shortly before the death of Leosthenes (18.18.3; 18.13.4). But the allegation should be treated with suspicion. It was typical of Antipater to negotiate rather than fight costly battles. He may

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67 The question of whether the earliest historians who treated the Lamian war—such as Hieronymus of Cardia (FGrH 154), Diyllus of Athens (FGrH 73), Demochares of Athens (FGrH 75), and Duris of Samos (FGrH 76)—had a bias against Antipater is relevant here. Of these historians, it is likely that Hieronymus of Cardia, the most important source, did have a bias against Antipater: Hieronymus, a one-time client of Antigonus, who had pardoned him after his war with Eumenes, lived under the protection of Antigonus’ son Demetrius the Besieger, and finally under Antigonus Gonatas. Hieronymus managed to survive until the age of 104 under their patronage, and seems to have been particularly adept at flattering his benefactors while, at the same time, suppressing the role of the other Diadochoi.
have even tried to use any negotiations as a breathing space to wait for the arrival of Leonnatus. Moreover, Antipater may well have manipulated the reports of any negotiations to his own advantage, overstating the intransigence of the Athenians in order to justify his own peace terms at the end of the war. He was a man who realized that in war the distinction between military and political advantage can be very slight.

His advantage was soon to grow greater; reinforcements arrived shortly after Leonnatus’ death in an engagement with the Greeks, and Craterus’ immediate deferral to Antipater’s leadership increased the army to a size that could crush the Athenian army and the remaining allies; the Aetolians had long ago seen the writing on the wall and left. At the final battle of the war—fought now on Antipater’s terms—at Crammon, the army of the Greek alliance was so thoroughly worn out by Antipater’s Lamia strategy that it was defeated after only suffering a mere 500 casualties. The war for the common freedom of the Greeks was lost for 500 casualties. Antipater had robbed the insurgency of its initiative, cohesion, moral agenda and leadership: the Greeks had no will left to fight. The totality of his victory and his constraint of the costs were both admirable.

CONCLUSION

In any final analysis of the Lamian War, Antipater emerged from a conflict in which he apparently escaped by the narrowest of margins with an army three times the size of the original one. He had almost no casualties to speak of, and one of his key rivals, Leonnatus, was conveniently killed by the Greeks. Craterus, another rival, was neutralized and both their armies were under his control. The Greek states were divided, defeated, and leaderless. He had dealt with each city state on an individual basis in the peace settlement, which had severely undercut the pan-Hellenic rhetoric that had been pushed into service to justify the war.

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68 Craterus’ immediate surrender of his army would seem to confirm that Antipater’s authority and strength were intact. If Craterus had indeed been sent to replace Antipater (Just. 12.12.9; Arr. 7.12.4), or even, as Curtius records the rumor (10.10.15) to kill him, a vulnerable and weakened Antipater would have presented the perfect opportunity. We should accept Craterus’ actions as evidence that Antipater had not been significantly weakened by his time in Lamia. Antipater certainly benefitted from the timely death of many of his rivals, including even Alexander, at peculiarly convenient times. Is it possible that Craterus took this into account when turning his army over to Antipater? Craterus’ actions may hint at a belief that Leonnatus’ death was not merely a coincidence. Leonnatus, with his royal blood and pretensions made him a potentially very dangerous adversary. If Antipater was involved in the murder of Alexander (Diod. 17.118.1–2; 19.11.8; Plut. Alex. 77.2–5; [Plut.] Mor. 849c & f; Just. 12.13.6–16.1; Orosius 3.20.4; Pseudo-Callisthenes 3.31–3; Just. 12.14; Metz Epitome 87) then engineering the death of Leonnatus at the hands of his own men would not be unfeasible. Although the sources for Alexander’s death are abundant they do little to create a clear picture and a solution that satisfies all the accounts seems unlikely to emerge. There is a tradition to be found which seems to support natural causes in Arrian 7.24–26; Plut. Alex. 75.3–76.9; Diod. 17.117.1–5; Curt. 10.5.1–6; Ephippus, FGrH 126 F 3 = Athen. 10.434a–b; Nicobule, FGrH 127 F 1 & 2 = Athen. 10.434c & 12.537d; Aelian, Varia Historia 3.23; Valerius Maximus 5.1, ext. 1b.


69 Diod. 18.17.1–5; Plut. Phoc. 26; Plut. Dem. 28.1; Plut. Cam. 19.8; Paus. 10.3.4; cf. Arr. Succ. 1.12.
Antipater, for instance, had made easy terms with the Thessalians (Diod. 18.17.7; cf. Plut. Mor. 846e), and installed sympathetic oligarchies in the Peloponnese with city garrisons (Diod. 18.18.8, 55.2, 57.1, 69.3). The dispatch of Phocion and Demades from Athens to make peace with Antipater demonstrates that Antipater allowed a faction at Athens to gain prominence.70 Ironically, this was probably what the anti-Macedonian faction at Athens had envisioned for themselves: a negotiated settlement that would see them put in power by Antipater. This was why they wanted to escalate the war to involve as much of Greece as possible, since they would be able to force Antipater to turn control of Athens over to them in order to stabilize the region. Antipater, some may argue, managed this final act of defeating the insurgency of 323/2 more deftly than his 21st century American counterparts.71 With Athens settled, Antipater concentrated on pacifying the Aetolians (Diod. 18.25–5). All of these policies were characteristic of Antipater’s strategy of separating opponents and coming to peace with each one in turn. Thus Antipater quickly settled with the Aetolians when he was faced with new threats from the East.72 He himself was possibly in the strongest position of all the Diadochoi in the contest for control of Alexander’s empire. Justin (13.6.5–6) confirms that Antipater was adept at manipulating affairs after Alexander’s death to his best interest and that his political actions were often misunderstood by his opponents. Above all, the elements of Antipater’s strategy are usefully and legitimately elucidated by modern counterinsurgency theory. Antipater’s decision to fall back on Lamia was a calculated tactic to hold a fortified position and accumulate resources, and this was consistent with modern counterinsurgency strategy. The skillful use of the Exiles’ Decree allowed Antipater to divide and isolate his opponents. Antipater also showed mastery of asymmetric strategy, and was capable of managing crises and holding positions with minimal cost. His overall victory was achieved by methods familiar to modern counterinsurgency strategists.

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70 Diod. 18.18; Plut. Phoc. 26; Paus. 7.10.4; Nep. Phocion 2. Demades and Phocion were the perfect ambassadors. Demades was self-interested and notoriously corrupt (Diod. 18.18.2; cf. Plut. Phoc. 26.2; Suda s.v. “Demades”) and was probably used by Antipater to propose the motion that Demosthenes be put to death. Antipater also persecuted the anti–Macedonian faction at Athens (Arr. Succ. 1.13; Plut. Phoc. 27; Plut. DE 28–9; Plut. Mor. 849b–c; Paus. 1.8.3; 25.5). Phocion, by contrast, had credibility with the Athenians. Although he had opposed the war from the beginning his patriotism was on full display when he defeated Micion (Plut. Phoc. 25.1–4). He had remained untainted by Harpalus’ arrival (Plut. Phoc. 21.3–4). Menyllus, a Macedonian and friend of Phocion (Plut. Phoc. 18.1), was installed as the phourarchos at Munychia in the peace settlement (Diod. 18.18.5; Plut. Phoc. 28.1). This Menyllus was replaced by Nicanor after Antipater’s death in 319 (Plut. Phoc. 31.1). They were both instruments of Antipater. On the problems associated with the identity of this Nicanor see Bosworth (1994) 57-65; Heckel (2007) 401-11.

71 Beginning with the insurgency in Vietnam (Lieu [2011] 6) and continuing with the Karzai regime in Afghanistan (Kolhatkar and Ingalls [2006] 196) and the interim Iraqi government (Boyle [2008] 165), the US has installed and supported governments that have often been perceived as “puppet” regimes. Like Antipater, the US often views sympathetic governments as means to end insurgency conflicts.

72 Diod. 18.25.5; cf. Arr. Succ. 1.24; Just. 13.6.9.
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