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Fragmented Historiography:
Sniffing out Literature in a Sharp-nosed Historian

Christopher Tuplin

The primary aspiration of Occhipinti’s book\(^1\) is to offer a literary study of the *Hellenica Oxyrhyncia* (hereafter HO\(^2\)), though Occhipinti (hereafter O.) is also concerned with evaluating it in relation to fifth and fourth century historiography and as a source for Diodorus. Part I deals directly with HO’s interactions with other authors and with location in the historiographical tradition. Part II deals with historical themes—*polypragmosunē*, land and sea, hegemony, causation and moralism (the first three are decidedly interconnected)—but still persistently focuses on where HO stands in relation to other authors. Sometimes the result is lengthy discussion of those authors with little said about HO. That is particularly true in chapter 7 (on historical authors learning ways of reading historical events from orators), from which there is little to be learned about HO that does not appear elsewhere in the book. Where HO is more fully in sight, the discussion is sometimes relatively unproblematic. Chapter 9 argues that “morality” in HO and Thucydidēs is primarily there to enhance understanding of why things happen,\(^3\) although, unlike Thucydidēs, he has no broader concern for human behaviour and psychology: there are no general truths about human *phusis*, and the primary focus is immediate contingency. By contrast Xenophon and Theopompus do want to be inspirational and uplifting (if often by being admonitory): where HO exhibits explanatory moralism, Xenophon exhibits descriptive and prescriptive as well as explanatory moralism, and Theopompus exhibits just descriptive and prescriptive moralism (p.228). (Ephorus' position remains opaque.) Generally speaking this rings true, though the contrast with Thucydidēs may owe a lot to the fact that the surviving bits of HO contain no speeches (not that we know any of it did) and it should be stressed that the number of moral flourishes in HO is rather limited.

**HO, Xenophon and Diodorus**

One of O’s major aims is to locate HO as (i) a reader of Xenophon and (ii) an object read by Diodorus. The former is an important issue because of its implications for the dating of HO, especially as O. espouses a 350s date for *Hellenica* (with which I have no quarrel). But the evidence that HO was a reader of *Hellenica* is not pressing. Nothing about HO’s comments on Athenian *polypragmosunē* (10.2) or Theban conspiracy (21) makes them conspicuously a response to Xenophon’s talk of Spartan *pleonexia* (3.5.15) or his version of Theban

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\(^2\) I use this both for the title and the work’s author. I cite the work according to the numeration of chapters in Chambers 1993 edition. O. oddly sticks with Bartoletti, and treats the Cairo papyrus (HO 1-3 in Chambers) as a free-standing item.

\(^3\) In the book’s concluding chapter we read that “explanatory moralism consists in explaining ethical conducts” which sounds disconcertingly different from moralism as a way of explaining why things happened. But perhaps the formulation is misleading.
chicanery. It is unfair to turn Xenophon into a simple proponent of the view that Timocrates’ gold caused the war (which he is not) in order to announce that HO’s rejection of this is a rejection of Xenophon. Comparison of 24.3 and *Hellenica* 4.1.1 (p.51) does not demonstrate that HO is responding to Xenophon: HO’s statement that Agesilaus did not invade the part of Phrygia he had invaded the previous summer but attacked a different area has no particular Xenophonic resonance, and, while the fact that Xenophon speaks of Agesilaus capturing cities, whereas the HO narrative is notable for his failure to do so is *prima facie* a contradiction it is not necessarily a response, and may be a sign that they are talking about different phases of the campaign. Similarly saying “Agesilaus did not go back the way he came [through Mysia], but went by another route, because he thought crossing the Sangarius would be less tiring” is not obviously a specific response to “Xenophon’s generic treatment of the topographic information pertaining to that campaign” (p.54). It is indeed notorious that Agesilaus’ activities as a whole look different in HO and *Hellenica*. But O. does not seem to have found any new and compelling reasons to show that HO is correcting Xenophon.

It is also interesting how often O. does not claim to detect a specific response. There is nothing about the two authors’ different identification of the Locrians who were in dispute with Phocis. At pp.33-34 O. perhaps means to say (but does not) that HO on Spartan diplomacy contradicts Xenophon’s claim that the “Spartans were delighted to have excuse to attack Thebes” (3.5.5). Xenophon (3.5.5) and HO (20.3) make a different connection between Decelea and the outbreak of the war (a matter of interest to O: see below), but there is no overt suggestion of an intertextual link. (Rather it is simply a reason for pitting *Hellenica* and HO against Thucydides.) The treatment of the three way interaction between HO, Xenophon and Diodorus in chapter 4 yields no new claims about HO’s reading of Xenophon; and O. does not consider how her assessment of HO’s view of Conon (see below) might sit in relation to Xenophon: perhaps she thinks they are too close for there to be any interesting tension, but some comment seems called for. The same goes for contrasting or complementary uses of the “Cyrus-topic” (see below). If we knew what order the texts came in we could have a field-day decoding the interconnections, but we do not know and probably can never prove an answer by this sort of approach. But, if we were going to be able to do so, it would require a painstaking and systematic discussion of a sort that O. does not provide.

As for Diodorus, O. provides discussion both in chapter 4 and elsewhere. It is worth asking why we need a discussion of the relationship between Diodorus and HO in a book about the latter. One possible answer is that we have to decide what sort of evidence Diodorus can provide about HO at points at which HO is lost or fragmentary. Another is that a demonstration that Diodorus was reading HO would say something about the continuing status of the text in first century BC Rome. These are distinct answers leading to distinct enterprises and in each case the discussion needs to be clearly framed in the appropriate terms and conducted systematically. But this does not really happen. Instead we get a series of case studies which investigate the inter-relationship between HO, Diodorus and Xenophon in detail but from a general perspective. And neither here nor elsewhere do we get something required by both enterprises, that is an explicit treatment of the Ephorus problem: we need to know whether there is sufficient engagement between genuine Ephoran fragments and HO to give any direction on how to conduct a comparison of Diodorus and HO that might allow us to distinguish between Diodorus consuming HO direct and consuming it *via* Ephorus. I do not think it is good enough just to say that modern scholarship is more open to the idea that Diodorus read and combined a variety of
sources rather than simply epitomising a single source, in the present context Ephorus. O. needs to display the evidence that this can be true in the particular case she is interested in. I am not sure such evidence can be produced, but we need to see a conscious attempt to find it. Meanwhile, so far as the first question goes (can Diodorus be a substitute for a fragmentary or absent HO?), the impression created by the case studies is negative: the discrepancies where parallel text survives are sufficiently numerous to problematize Diodorus as a reliable source about HO, at least at any interestingly detailed level. In fact the discrepancies are more numerous than they were before, since O. produces a new supplement of HO’s battered account of the battle of Notium that provides a further disagreement between HO and Diodorus. (Rather curiously p.243 makes this new supplement a reason in favour of supposing that Diodorus used HO without mediation.)

**Literary features**

O. aspires to produce a literary and narratological study of HO, and in chapter 2 argues that the mixture of excursus, annalistic narrative, synchronism and ring composition in HO is “inspired by the Herodotean narrative model”. HO turns Herodotean because of the need to connect and associate different areas of the Afro-Eurasian oikoumene (p.29) and the extension of Hellas (and ta hellenika) to any deed performed by Greek people (p.16) -- “a sort of ethnical concept applied to space” (p.22). HO was thus a pioneer of a new historical tendency.

I think we can do without talk of ta hellenika: p.17 already virtually concedes that it is an over-broad concept, and one not specially helpful for distinguishing between fourth century narrative historians and Herodotus/Thucydides. As for the “ethnical concept” (i.e. the treatment of Hellas as anywhere where things happen that involve or matter to Greeks), it is a little unfortunate that the crucial words kata tēn Hellada in 12.1 are a restoration, not something in the papyrus; and Hellada is anyway surely drawing a distinction between Hellas in a fairly ordinary sense and the fleet- and Persian-related events along the shores of Anatolia and the East Mediterranean which are what seem to follow in the rest of 9. (It is the same use we find at e.g. Xenophon Hellenica 3.5.25.)

But, leaving that technical matter aside, there might still be an issue about scope: p.18 declares that Thucydides has tighter chronological and spatial boundaries than fourth century historical works, HO included. But one might say his boundaries were precisely as wide as he considered right for what he judged to be the components of his war. Can we really tell that HO represented anything fundamentally different in principle—or even much different in practice? He goes where the story of interactions between competing powers takes him. It is hard to feel sure the digressions on show in what survives of HO are on a par with Theopompos XII (or indeed Herodotus). And as for other fourth century historians, the very limited spatial scope that Xenophon’s Hellenica came to have in VII by comparison with Thucydides or HO or the opening books of Hellenica itself is doubtless a Xenophontic eccentricity—but an eccentricity that enjoins wariness about generalisations about fourth century historiography. That there is a certain Herodotean character in HO is

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\(^4\) For the most recent example of this trend see J. Stronk, *Semiramis’ Legacy* (Edinburgh 2016).

\(^5\) So was the interpolator of Xenophon’s *Hellenica* I-II, an interesting accolade for an individual of uncertain date who—perhaps rightly—rarely attracts that sort of attention.
just about an understandable claim at first sight, but O. herself rightly says (pp.27-28) that the components of the ring-composed bits of text in 10-11 and 19-21 (carefully analysed at pp.21-27) arise from an explanatory imperative, not from what she apparently sees as a Herodotean desire to produce narrative delay—and that univocal explanatory imperative is sufficiently Thucydidean to make the means that HO uses not particularly Herodotean. Readers of HO tend to think of him primarily as a Thucydidean author (or aspiring to be one) and O. has not really convinced me that this is not true.

While on matters to do with narrative style, I note that, having identified ring composition, O. does not go on to explain or even comment on the strange way in which the pre-Timocrates hostility to Sparta of Athenians, Argives, Boeotians and Corinthians is asserted as a Chinese-box-like footnote to the Athenian war party’s retreat from its normal position at the time of Demaenetus’ mission. That is, she does not really get to grips with the narrative habits of an author who can do something like this. Similarly, there is no comment on the fact that the narrative’s move from central Greece to the Aegean at 22.1 and from Rhodes to Anatolia at 24.1 is abrupt and marked simply by de. This is neither explicit synchronism nor yet Herodotean. In 19.1 there is a reference to “this summer”, but it does not stand first in the sentence (and is not to “the same summer”), so the case is still not quite Thucydidean, even if the allusion to the season does soften the bluntness of a de transition. (Of course, 12.1 does indicate the use of a winters-and-summers framework.) Note incidentally that most of the temporal phrases listed at pp.21-22 are not structural ones or markers of synchronisms between significantly different contexts. Of course, while (as things stand) it is probably true that “HO’s annalistic framework is not perspicuous” (p.22), this may simply be because we lack a sufficiently long piece of perfectly preserved text to figure out how the switches of location not marked with a seasonal phrase are supposed to be understood chronologically. (Not that the actual presence of a seasonal phrase guarantees perspicuity either.) Still, a more systematic identification of features of narrative structure and an explicit demonstration that there are some that we simply cannot assess properly would be preferable to a treatment that can seem as though it does not really recognize the problem. Meanwhile, it should also be observed that O.’s literary study of HO includes virtually no commentary on the lexical and syntactical aspects of the author’s style. HO is sometimes perceived as a rather clumsy writer, something that has enhanced his standing as serious writer of history—a gruber of facts, not a spinner of elegant rhetorical webs. On this O. has nothing to contribute.

**Persian perspective**

It is certainly true that there was a larger amount of detail about activities by Persian individuals than in the corresponding parts of Xenophon’s Hellenica, not least in chapters of HO that survive in very damaged form such as 12.2-3, 16.1-2, and O. is inclined to presume Persian sources. Something like the actual execution of Tissaphernes has to have come ultimately from a Persian source because it happened in private and well away from Greek view; and it is possible HO had a wider information stream coming from the Persian side, though patterns of focalisation in the well-preserved bits of text do not strike me as demanding such a view.⁶ In any case, specific claims need careful assessment. For example,

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⁶ Whether O. rightly envisages Persian written sources, speaking on p.115 of Persian letters, reports and official documents, is another matter.
I do not see that the Mysian narrative is particularly moulded by “Greek and Persian perceptions” (p.39: my emphasis)—the only reference to Persians being a statement that Mysians were not subject to the king (24.2). It is only after the march through Mysia that Persian connections resume (via Spithradates and operations against Rhathanes at Gordium) and the question of Persian sources arises again.

One specific Persian theme that O. evokes more than once is the so-called “Cyrus-topic”. By this she means the role of the career of the younger Cyrus as a historical point of reference, something encountered in e.g. Isocrates, Xenophon’s Hellenica and Polybius. HO 22 certainly brings Conon and Cyrus together: indeed analysis of the text rather neatly discloses a piece of ring composition with Cyrus at its heart, so the suggestion that Conon resembled the pre-404 Cyrus in his concern for financially underpinned naval efficiency is underlined by literary rhetoric. But it is much more debatable that a reference to Cyrus (as démotikōtatos) should be discovered in 17.2 (pp.44, 59): O. says that the passage pictures Cyrus and his army “very close to the Greek side, or even as Greeks themselves”. Readers of Xenophon’s Anabasis (1.7.3) might recall Cyrus’ praise of Greek liberty—though O. does not mention the passage, perhaps because she is taking démotikōtatos as synonymous with philostratōtēs (from a different part of Anabasis: 7.6.4) or because freedom is a different thing from populism. But in any case I cannot see any strong reason why HO 17 should be about a Persian at all. The presence of the word dunasteuontes does not require such an idea, for, as O. points out, it actually belongs in a Greek political environment quite easily. The reason this matters is that O. wants to claim that in HO the Cyrus-topic was applied to Agesilaus as well as Conon and had some bearing on Agesilaus’ plans for military incursions into the interior of Anatolia. Quite what bearing—and how it resembles or differs from Xenophon’s allusions to the story of the Ten Thousand in Hellenica—remains a little elusive. But I am not convinced that there is any actual evidence of Agesilaus as deutero-Cyrus in the first place.

Hegemony

Talk of Conon takes us to the theme of hegemony. O. argues that HO dissents from the view that Conon was responsible for a renaissance of Athenian naval power. On a wider front she also argues that both HO and Xenophon distance themselves from Thucydides’ reading of Athenian empire and Athenian hegemonic aspirations. Symbolically a Thucydidean Decelea-Sicily pattern (reflecting the centrality of maritime aspirations) is replaced by a Decelea-Thebes pattern: this reflects an unprecedented attention to “continental scenarios”, i.e. privileging the importance of federations (hence the famous description of the Boeotian federal constitution) and other forms of continental power, and seeing the sea as a barrier and a means of isolation—and therefore a weaker basis for hegemony than control of land. “There is a common interest in land scenarios and land hegemony that makes the Oxyrhyncus historian’s view very close to Xenophon’s” (p.141); and “the idea that it is better for a state to hold hegemony of land, because as a consequence this gives to that state also sea control, comes up in their narrative pretty often, directly or indirectly” (p.242).

In the light of this it perhaps hardly matters much whether or not Conon re-empowered Athens as a maritime power. But the truth of the matter is not easy to establish. In what survives of HO’s text Conon is very much the servant of Persia, and the
association with Cyrus underlines that fact. O. pictures HO’s Conon as unconnected with the politics of Athens. The fact that pro-war Athenians had been sending help to him even before the Demeaenetus affair certainly does not prove anything about the nature of the link; but one has to wonder whether they would have been as willing or able to assist a Persian force that did not have the advantage of being led by a fellow Athenian. One of the likely benefits were one ever to have a full text of HO, would precisely be further hints about the relations between Conon and his home city before he returned there in 393. Would not a detailed historical narrative surely be less black-and-white than fourth century oratory, whether the sort that saw Cnidus as a Persian victory or the sort that ascribed Athens’ renaissance to Conon? Well, perhaps O. would answer in the negative, since she sees historians as vulnerable to the simplifications of orators, particularly when it comes to reducing the real complexities of individual political positioning to binary oppositions of the sort found in HO 10.2. (The resemblance between that passage and Diod. 13.53.1 is well known, and the theme is one to which O. returns several times, even postulating along the way that Diodorus’ use of such political modelling may be influenced by its Roman equivalent.) But, since (a) we already learn unparalleled details about Conon and Athens from HO, (b) HO is generally assumed to have been consistently in the business of providing a historical narrative rich with circumstantial details, and (c) he is also an author with a taste for back- and cross-references, no amount of orator-like simplification of political analysis precludes the revelation of further data complicating Conon’s status as deutero-Cyrus. Indeed, if we take the Cyrus-topic seriously, we might affirm that a deutero-Cyrus should precisely be a “Persian” grandee with strong mainland Greek political links.

As for larger questions about the nature of hegemony, O’s downplaying of the sea in HO’s vision of history seems prima facie odd. There is certainly plenty of sea-related activity in the surviving narrative, and no obvious reason to think a complete text would have been strongly biased against it, just because the outbreak of fighting in central Greece and Agesilaus’ Anatolian campaign happen to be well preserved in our fragments. (The solemn listing of toponyms and demonstration that most come from land-based operations in pp.126, 139-140 really proves nothing about HO as a whole.) So far as Xenophon’s Hellenica goes, the separate treatment of land- and sea-narrative in the Corinthian War is not a downplaying of the maritime perspective; if anything, it stresses that that is the perspective that produces a conclusion of the war in Sparta’s favour; and, if Sparta asserts her new hegemonic status with operations in mainland Greece, the challenges to it after Hellenica 5.4.1 do involve the sea as well as the land. The very real removal of the maritime perspective in Hellenica VII is quite startling in terms of earlier parts of the work (never mind of the total politico-military story of the time), and reflects a Xenophontic historiographical choice that is rather personal. It is true that Xenophon’s Thebans do offer Athens a prospect of sea and land hegemony in 395 (3.5.13), Jason does assert the advantage of land-based hegemony (more resources are available from mainland ethnē than from islets), and the debate in Hellenica VI/VII about the sharing of land and sea hegemony seems (and is meant to seem) outmoded and unproductive. There is an issue here in fourth century political ideas and actuality: this was an era in which hegemony was claimed by non-maritime states. Of course, Sparta twice got hegemony by buying naval power from the Persians and her subsequent weakness at sea did her no favours, some Thebans saw their own non-maritime character as a liability (but failed to cure it) and Philip’s eventual success depended on effective Athenian naval power being thwarted by lack of resources and political constraints. But the world that Thucydides took for granted had indeed gone. All the same, it is not obvious that O. has proved HO to have had a distinctive or particular stake in this historical issue. The search for maritime hegemony was unpopular in some
Athenian circles in 350s/340s, but, even if this led HO to articulate the politics of 390s Athenian anachronistically (which is far from certain: see below), neither that or nor any other features of the surviving text drives us to the conclusion that he had consciously bought into a new historical overview of the period.

One such other feature is the supposed distinctive role of Decelea. The claim is that Thucydides associates Decelea with Sicily (a major naval expedition), whereas HO (10.4, 20.3, 22.1) and Xenophon connect Decelea with Thebes (a land power), and that Decelea is brought up in HO 20.3 because HO realized that the last phase of the PW changed the balance of power and made it possible for a continental power to hold hegemony in the Aegean and mainland Greece (pp.116-119). This is not especially persuasive.

For Thucydides Decelea is a consequence of the Alcibiades-related fall-out from the Sicilian expedition, so is naturally located in that (maritime hegemony) context: it provides a land-based response—which is essentially nothing new but just what you expect of Sparta. (The epiteichismos element, of course, comes from Alcibiades.) Later Xenophon (Hellenica 1.1.35) reports that, looking out from Decelea, Agis saw Athenian corn-ships, concluded that land-based blockade of Athens was pointless, and ordered a maritime operation against Byzantium and Chalcedon: here Decelea is as much a symbol of the old order as the new. The other salient Xenophontic reference is Hellenica 3.5.5, where irritation about the seizure of the Apollo dekatē in Decelea is one among four grievances the Spartans have against Thebes, causing them to desire war with her. That is an interestingly different way of linking Decelea with the outbreak of the Corinthian War from HO's (see elsewhere), but is not obviously symbolic in the way O. claims. Two of HO's' references occur in the context of maritime activity. The third (20.4-5) is a passage noting that the whole Peloponnesian War, but especially the Decelean period from 414-404, had benefited Thebes demographically and economically and so empowered the pro-Spartan faction in the city. This point arises because the factional politics of Thebes becomes important for Hellenic events. This does not imply a fundamentally different historiographical outlook. At most it is an aspect of the fact (already noted) that the absolute destruction of Athenian (naval) power opened the way for non-naval states to have hegemonic aspirations. Historiographically it would be at least as pertinent and interesting to comment on the fact that HO reports on the prosperity of Thebes here rather than in the narrative of the Decelean War itself or of Theban interactions with Athens in 404-403—assuming that the absence of a back-reference proves that the matter had not been broached earlier. One might say that HO reserves it on the basis that Thebes' forcing of open war with Sparta was such an important historical watershed (and more important than her support of Athenian democratic exiles). Still, it seems a little odd to rehearse the empowerment of pro-Spartan Thebes at the moment at which anti-Spartan Thebes really comes to the fore—odd and perhaps even deliberately paradoxical. But, as usual the fragmentary state of the text, makes it impossible to see a large enough context to assess what games HO may be playing with his readers. (Perhaps it helps cast light on why the anti-Spartan faction might be afraid enough of the pro-Spartan one to bring on a war as a way of protecting them against Spartan intervention to their detriment.)

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7 Elsewhere in Hellenica Decelea is a refuge for escaped prisoners (in 1.2.14 and 1.3.22) or mentioned neutrally as the place where Agis was based.
8 10.3-4 refers to the Corinthian Timolaus' naval activities during Decelean War; and the war is mentioned at 22.2 in re the King's poor financing of anti-Athenian fleet.
Causation

O’s conclusion about causation is that HO is at one with Thucydides’ way of seeing the matter (p.197). Broadly speaking, that is an understandable view, but a number of details deserve comment.

The observation in 21.2 that the Thebans cannot make war on Sparta ek phanerou (and so devise a trick to make it happen) is compared with Thucydides’ “truest cause but unclearest in logos” (pp.168-169). But what the comparison portends is not quite clear, and one rather suspects an equivocation; the openness in 21.2 is to do with political action not historical explanation, and the fact that the people being referred to at 21.2 are people who can be called malista aitioi for the hostility between Boeotians and Phocians that led to the greater war hardly alters this. The observation about visibility and absence in 18.1-2 (p.178)—the visibility of Conon’s troops is an incitement to the Rhodians to carry out a putsch but during the absence of Conon himself—is quite nice, but I am not sure it adds much: Conon was arguably finding a way of acting ouk ek phanerou (though it would require the preceding bit of the story to have survived for one to be sure about this), but we are no nearer to a historian’s judgement that a prophasis was aphanestatē logi. The extended discussion about seen and unseen in pp.178-183, taking us to miscellaneous passages involving issues of gaze and then to HO and Thucydidean ambushes, casts no obvious light on theories of historical causality. Meanwhile, having correctly observed that Thucydides’ aithēstathē prophasis entails the existence of other true, but less true, causes, O. does not stop to wonder about HO’s observation that those responsible for hostility between Boeotia and Phocis were chiefly (malista) certain Thebans: is he implying that there were other people or factors that also played a part (e.g. the history of good relations between Boeotia and Locris: 21.4) or is malista just an empty verbal flourish?

Nor does she ever explicitly work out how or whether the Thucydidean scheme of aitiai kai diaphorai plus prophasis fits the Corinthian War. In Thucydidean terms, the truest cause is presumably the hatred of Sparta shared by politicians in several states. Timocrates’ gold is certainly an enabling factor for the Theban plotters (21.1 is explicit about that), though some describe the khrēmata as aitia. It is not clear what sort of cause HO thinks is involved here, only that he rejects making the money a prime cause: O. does not seem to comment on this, but perhaps she thinks HO’s apparent neglect of the issue an example of his tendency (p.163) to simplify things. (As usual, of course, HO’s neglect may only be apparent.) But what do we make of the Locrian-Phocian-Boeotian affray? The Thucydidean aitai kai diaphorai are discrete incidents in which Athens was pitted against Corinth, which then accused the Athenians to the Spartans of crimes requiring punishment. In 395 Sparta eventually acted in defence of Phocians against Locrian-Boeotian attack. So the Phocian complaint to Sparta about Boeotia was perhaps like the Corinthian complaint to Sparta about Athens. But from HO’s perspective the cause for war is an issue about behaviour of Sparta’s enemies, not about Sparta’s behaviour: at least nothing is articulated in what survives of HO about Sparta’s motives for helping the Phocians. (In Xenophon, of course, Spartans are delighted to have a prophasis for helping Phocis because they are angry at the Thebans.) Viewing things from that angle, one asks: what are the aitiai kai diaphorai that contrast with the reason of Boeotians and others for war against Sparta? I suppose one could say that the affray in central Greece (secretly caused by Theban warmongers) acts as a pertinent aitia for other Boeotians who must be made to go to war locally so as to be engineered into a war with Sparta that they do not want—rather as the Spartans of 431
have to be engineered into a war with Athens that some might want to avoid. But the parallel is a bit awkward.

Of course, different cases have different characteristics and it is no doubt quite proper if HO does not force the events of 395 into the formula of 431. But one could expect the point to be investigated. O. is no doubt aware that aitiai (in malista aitiai) and aitia (in the denial that Timocrates’ khremata were aitia for the anti-Sparta coalition) involve a different use of aitia- from that in Thucydides’ aitiai Kai diaphorai, but the point deserves some elaboration, since it may count as an aspect of HO’s reading of Thucydides, a matter of general importance, not just in HO’s response to Thucydides’ analysis of political factions (a matter to which O. does pay attention). O. indicates at the start of the chapter that HO has a distinctive personal reading of the prophasis-aitia pattern but the discussion that follows never quite ties down what it is. Perhaps she has in mind the idea (never argued out explicitly: but cf. pp.173-4) that HO is more prone than Thucydides to assign responsibility for major events to individuals—though Alcibiades’ personal responsibility in the Argive alliance affair (to which O does refer, albeit in a different context: p.176) or the occupation of Decelea might seem to count against this.

I note three other issues connected with causes. (1) O. moots the question of a historiographical cliché about manipulative (cf. Thuc.2.1-6 or Hellenica 5.2.25-36, 5.4.20) or generally “bad” Thebans (Herodotus 7.222-223; the hubris of the war-causing Thebans in 395 as per Isocrates 14.27-29). I am not clear how close she is coming to saying that both Xenophon and HO improperly cast Thebans as warmongers in 395 in line with contemporary negative views about them and a cliché about manipulative self-interestedness. To do so would, of course, be in line with her views about the influence on HO by the (Athenian) political environment of the 350s/340s (see below). (2) O. professes to be interested in Sparta’s motives for action in general and in relation to Agesilaus’ Asiatic campaign (p.34). But we do not get a clear discussion of those motives. Nor does she discuss whether Sparta’s “activism” was the cause of the Corinthian war. It is a real historical question whether the Asiatic campaign itself frightened other Greek cities (because of the additional Spartan power that would result from its success) rather than just being a stab-in-the-back opportunity. (3) p.49 makes a disjunction between Xenophon saying Timocrates’ gold caused an interruption of the Asiatic campaign and HO revealing that the gold did not cause the Corinthian War, as though this suggests that Xenophon is simply wrong about what interrupted the Asiatic campaign. But the campaign was interrupted by the outbreak of Corinthian War and the question of the cause of that war is immaterial. O.’s argument (p.55) is that the failure of Agesilaus’ forces at Leontonecephalae, Gordium and Miletou Teichos and the breakdown of the Spithridates alliance show that a successful anabasis was unrealistic. That may well be true, and HO may have wished us to see that it was so, but it is not inconsistent with the proximate cause of termination of the campaign being events in Greece.

Partisan motivation and the date of HO

O. observes (pp.97-98) that HO’s deployment of the concept of polypragmosune in 10.2 involves the re-assignment of a Thucydidean characterisation of all Athenians to a particular partisan sub-group. That is true, though the limitation of an erstwhile general characterisation to just one part of the Athenian civic body is, of course, merely a reflection
of the harder times in which Athenians now lived compared with the glory days of the fifth century: it is a change reflecting reality, not a merely literary or historiographical trope. The slightly odd thing is that for O. the reality is not that of the 390s but of the mid-fourth century. More specifically (p.89) she claims that HO’s treatment of Corinthian War Athens is a projection into past of the Athens of the later Second Confederacy and the Social War era—or, slightly more hesitantly (pp.105-6), it is her “suspicion” that HO overdoes polypragmosunē (deliberately or ignorantly) because of its currency in the political debates of the 350s and 340s. Perhaps it is tolerable idea that HO adapted a Thucydidean trope after such a delay. But O. does do not a lot to provide solid validation for her “suspicion”: the statement (in the concluding chapter) that the expansionist policy (polypragmosunē) ascribed to 390s Athenians is “unrealistical” [sic] because it proved unsuccessful in the medium-term hardly counts: people do not only adopt policies that work. Moreover a famous sound-bite from Aristophanes’ Ecclesiazusae (197-198: not mentioned by O.) discloses a world divided (on socio-economic grounds) between those who favour war and those who do not that does not seem that far from what HO postulates. If one wants an anachronistic back projection one might as well suggest that the fear of Spartan partisan intervention, which supposedly caused hostility to Sparta in the 390s (10.2-3), was a back projection of Spartan political interventions in Mantinea, Phlius, Thebes and Olynthus after the King’s Peace. That would provide a much earlier terminus post quem for the composition of HO, but would also be unjustified: the Spartan propensity for such behaviour was well established and had recently been lavishly displayed both in the Lysander era and in the Elean War. Of course, just as people can endorse policies that do not succeed, so they can have fears that are paranoid. It is characteristic of the whole problem of dealing with HO that we cannot know whether other parts of the work would have revealed whether its author thought that they were paranoid in this case.

Envoi

It is a laudable aim to write about HO in its own right, not just as an authorship problem. Readers tend to feel that it is a work of some character, and the aspiration to define that character is a noble one. For me O.’s book does not quite hit the target. The treatment is too unsystematic and the style of argument insufficiently rigorous. But perhaps, after all, there is simply not enough surviving text to make the enterprise feasible. HO is fated to remain less than the sum of its rather battered parts, and we should acknowledge O.’s demonstration of this fact.

Christopher Tuplin
University of Liverpool