The Ancient History Bulletin

VOLUME THIRTY-THREE: 2019
NUMBERS 1-2

Edited by:
Edward Anson ♡ Michael Fronda ♡ David Hollander
Timothy Howe ♡ John Vanderspoel
Pat Wheatley ♡ Sabine Müller ♡ Alex McAuley
Catalina Balmaceda ♡ Charlotte Dunn

ISSN 0835-3638
Contents of volume thirty-three

Numbers 1-2

1  Kathryn Waterfield, *Penteconters and the Fleet of Polycrates*

19  John Hyland, *The Aftermath of Aigospotamoi and the Decline of Spartan Naval Power*

42  W. P. Richardson, *Dual Leadership in the League of Corinth and Antipater’s Phantom Hegemony*

60  Andrea F. Gatzke, *Mithridates VI Eupator and Persian Kingship*
NOTES TO CONTRIBUTORS AND SUBSCRIBERS

The Ancient History Bulletin was founded in 1987 by Waldemar Heckel, Brian Lavelle, and John Vanderspoel. The board of editorial correspondents consists of Elizabeth Bayham (University of Newcastle), Hugh Bowden (Kings College, London), Franca Landucci Gattinoni (Università Cattolica, Milan), Alexander Meeus (University of Mannheim), Kurt Raaflaub (Brown University), P.J. Rhodes (Durham University), Robert Rollinger (Universität Innsbruck), Victor Alonso Troncoso (Universidade da Coruña)

AHB is currently edited by: Timothy Howe (Senior Editor: howe@stolaf.edu), Edward Anson, Catalina Balmaceda, Michael Fronda, David Hollander, Alex McAuley, Sabine Müller, John Vanderspoel, Pat Wheatley and Charlotte Dunn.

AHB promotes scholarly discussion in Ancient History and ancillary fields (such as epigraphy, papyrology, and numismatics) by publishing articles and notes on any aspect of the ancient world from the Near East to Late Antiquity. Submitted articles should normally be in English, but the journal will consider contributions in French, German, Italian or Spanish.

SUBMISSION GUIDELINES
AHB adheres to the usual North American editorial policies in the submission and acceptance of articles but imposes no House Style. Authors are, however, asked to use the abbreviations of L’Année philologique (APh) for journals, and of the Thesaurus linguae latinae (TLL) for Latin authors. Please send submissions to the editor most closely identified with your field of enquiry or, in case of doubt, to Timothy Howe (howe@stolaf.edu). Articles must be submitted in electronic format, preferably generated by MS Word. Greek font or other special characters must convert such to Unicode and should be accompanied by a PDF version. Authors will receive PDF offprints of their contributions. Copyright is retained by the author. Books for reviews and enquiries concerning book reviews should be directed to Joseph Roisman (jsroisma@colby.edu).

SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATION
The subscription rate for individual and institutional subscribers is USD 25.00. Detailed instructions about subscriptions and access to digital content can be found on the AHB website: http://ancienthistorybulletin.org

PAYMENT
Payment may be made via the subscription portal on the AHB website: http://www.ancienthistorybulletin.org/subscribed-users-area/membership-levels/

Cover image courtesy of The Nickle Arts Museum, University of Calgary
Dual Leadership in the League of Corinth and Antipater’s Phantom Hegemony

W. P. Richardson

Abstract: Philip II’s formation of the League of Corinth is a key aspect of his legacy. Upon his assassination, the structure and agreements surrounding the League allowed Alexander the Great to quickly establish control over the Greek states, and continue preparation of the campaign against the Persian Empire. This article presents two arguments regarding the positions of leadership within the League of Corinth as established by Philip. The first is that two distinct executive roles existed within the structure of the League. The current scholarly consensus is that the terms hegemon and strategos autokrator used in the sources refer to the same position. However, an examination of the ascensions of both Philip and Alexander demonstrates that both were confirmed to each role separately. The second is that during his absence from Greece, Alexander did not bestow upon Antipater the powers of a deputy hegemon of the League. While he acted as the regent of Macedon, examinations of the imposition of the Exiles Decree and the war with Agis III of Sparta show that Antipater never wielded the powers of the hegemon and, in the case of Agis III, that authority was still vested in Alexander.

Keywords: Philip II of Macedon; Antipater; League of Corinth; Hegemon; Strategos Autokrator

Upon his final victory over the Greek states at the Battle of Chaeronea in 338 B.C.E., Philip II established the League of Corinth to oversee Greece and administer the peace accords established after his conquest. Unfortunately, detailed sources regarding the structure and inner workings of the institution are relatively sparse and often fragmentary. This article examines the expressions of executive power within the structure of the League, as well as how such authority was exercised during Alexander the Great’s absence from Greece.

This article presents two arguments. The first examines the bifurcated nature of the League of Corinth’s executive. The sources use two main titles for the League’s executive—the ἡγεμών and the στρατηγὸς αὐτοκράτωρ. The general consensus is that these two titles refer to only one position within the structure of the League. This conflation likely stems

---

1 I would like to acknowledge and give thanks for the support of the University of Otago, whose Postgraduate Publishing Bursary (Doctoral) allowed the original draft of this article to be completed. I would also like to thank Pat Wheatley, Evan Pitt, and Sabine Müller for their invaluable suggestions to this document at various stages of its development.

2 For some ancient accounts and perceptions of the battle and surrounding events, see Diod. 16.84-88; Just. 9.3.4-4.10; Polyae. Strat. 4.2.2, 7; Plut. Dem. 19-21, Alex. 9.2-3; Polyb. 5.10.1-4. For recent discussions of Chaeronea, see e.g. A. B. Bosworth, (1988), 16-17; N. G. L. Hammond, (1989), 116-9; (1994), 151-4; E. I. McQueen, (1995), 161-3; J. Buckler, (2003), 500-5; I. Worthington, (2008), 147-51; S. Müller, (2010), 174-7; R. A. Gabriel, (2010), 214-22.

3 This modern tendency is discussed below.
from the fact that Philip and Alexander each held both positions concurrently. This article proposes the precise opposite, that the duties carried out by the executive were divided between two distinct roles. Examinations of the timelines of Philip’s establishment of the League and Alexander’s ascension to replace his father demonstrate that both of these men must have held the position of ἡγεμόν before also assuming the role of the στρατηγὸς αὐτοκράτωρ, thus demonstrating their separate nature.

The second argument looks at the League during the period of Alexander’s campaign in the East, examining the role which Antipater held in his absence. Scholars have overwhelmingly stated that, when he left Greece for his Persian campaign, Alexander appointed Antipater as both regent of Macedon and acting or deputy ἡγεμόν of the League of Corinth. This article argues against this second point—Antipater was not the ἡγεμόν during Alexander’s absence. This is demonstrated through an examination of the two main interactions between Antipater and the Greek states in this time period, those being the imposition of the Exiles Decree, and the war with Agis III of Sparta. In neither of these cases did Antipater exhibit the powers or responsibilities of the ἡγεμόν of the League. Moreover, in the case of Agis, it was still Alexander who exercised the authority of this role.5

Dual Leadership in the League of Corinth

Two titles have survived from antiquity: the ἡγεμόν and the στρατηγὸς αὐτοκράτωρ. The question is whether these two titles refer to two distinct positions or the same role. The current scholarly consensus is the latter of these options. However, an examination of the ascension of Philip and Alexander to the leadership of Greece and the surrounding events demonstrates that, while the specific titles used are not certain, multiple roles existed in the executive of the League of Corinth.

Let us first consider the explicit titles given to Philip and Alexander in the sources. There is only one example of either from a source contemporary to Philip’s League. The title given is ἡγεμόν, related by the epigraphic record of the oath taken by the members of the League upon their entry to the institution.6 Diodorus provides two examples of an explicit title, one for Philip7 and one for Alexander.8 In both of these cases, the two kings

4 With one minor exception, again discussed below.
5 The scope of this investigation is the League of Corinth as established by Philip and assumed by Alexander. This is important for several reasons. With regards to the discussion on Antipater, there is no attempt here to examine the evolution of his position in Greece after the death of Alexander in 323 B.C.E. The sole focus is upon his administration of Alexander’s hold over Greece during the king’s lifetime. This also means that this discussion will omit any comparison or conflation of the League of Philip’s time with later incarnations, particularly that of the League of Demetrius Poliorcetes from 302/1 B.C.E. There have been many such comparisons, both fleeting and in depth, looking at the similarities between these two incarnations of the League of Corinth, though little has been said recently. For those in favour of identical or near identical structures, see J. A. O. Larsen, (1925), 318; general sentiments in W. S. Ferguson, (1948), 112-136; C. C. Patsavos, (1956), 208; W. L. Adams, (1975), 173, n. 1. For arguments against, see R. H. Simpson, (1959), 396-8; R. A. Billows, (1990; 1997 rpt.), 230. Most recently, K. Harter-Uibopuu, (2003), 315-37 has argued convincingly for explicit differences between the constitutions of the two institutions. For other earlier treatments, see W. W. Tarn, (1922), 198-206; P. Roussel, (1923), 117-40; K. Rosen, (1967), 91-92.
6 IG II2 236, lines 21-22. For other texts and translations of this inscription, see SIG 260; Tod. GHI. 177; E. L. Hicks & G. F. Hill, (1901), 154; S. L. Ager, (1996), 2; P. J. Rhodes & R. Osborne, (2003), 76 [henceforth, R&O]. It may also be found in the new edition of Inscriptiones Graecae, as IG II2 1, 318.
7 Diod. 16.89.3.
were elected to the position of στρατηγὸς αὐτοκράτωρ by the συνέδριον of the Greeks at Corinth. Of these two passages, the one relating Philip’s establishment of the League is somewhat problematic, as Diodorus omits the establishment of the League from his narrative entirely. He instead has Philip addressing the already constituted League.\(^8\) This rather blatant oversight by Diodorus is discussed in more detail shortly, but this section is still highly informative for this investigation. The passage discussing Alexander’s ascension is comparatively straightforward; chapter 4 details his journey from Macedon to Corinth, culminating in the meeting at which he was elected.\(^9\) The similarity in the sequence of events from these two episodes in Diodorus is important for this discussion.

Arrian provides the greatest number of references overall, though his are also the most confusing. In the *Anabasis*, he casually refers to Alexander as ἡγεμῶν once\(^10\) and στρατηγὸς twice.\(^11\) However, these examples do not refer to any kind of official title connected with the League, but are simply descriptions of the man, and can thus be disregarded in this discussion. There are two instances of explicit titles though. In his letter to Darius, Alexander proclaims that he has been made ἡγεμῶν of the Greeks.\(^12\) He also records a speech of Alexander in which he praised Philip for being elected as ἡγεμῶν αὐτοκράτωρ over Greece and the Persian expedition.\(^13\) This is the most troublesome reference, as it is the only account we have of this mixture of the two titles, and this passage links the role of ἡγεμῶν with military control. However, the veracity of this account is somewhat questionable. First, it cannot be stated with certainty that Arrian’s version of the speech is word-for-word accurate.\(^14\) It is worth noting that Alexander delivered it off the cuff and during an episode of high emotion.\(^15\) It is therefore wise to exercise caution in using such a

---

\(^8\) Diod. 17.4.9. There are also several references to the ἡγεμονία of the Greeks at 17.3, though used in a more generic fashion than as a specific title.


\(^10\) Diod. 17.4. See L. Prandi, (2013), 8-9 for discussion.

\(^11\) *Arr. Anab.* 2.7.9.

\(^12\) *Arr. Anab.* 4.11.5, 6.13.4.

\(^13\) *Arr. Anab.* 2.14.4. Here, Alexander states that he has been elected as ἡγεμῶν and he has invaded Persia. As discussed above, the στρατηγὸς αὐτοκράτωρ, not the ἡγεμῶν, led the unified army on the Persian campaign. If this passage links the ἡγεμῶν directly with such a role, then this stance is weakened. However, an alternative reading of this passage is possible: Alexander is here stating the two accomplishments of being elected ἡγεμῶν and invading Persia separately. Moreover, the motives that follow detail his reasons for the campaign. The overwhelming sense given is that the retaliatory campaign was brought about by attacks against Alexander and Macedon specifically, rather than against Greece (*Arr. Anab.* 2.14.5-6). The charges included aiding Perinthus against Philip (for which, see Diod. 16.74-76), being complicit in Philip’s assassination, and fostering resentment against Alexander amongst the Greek states. The divides between the ἡγεμῶν of the Greeks, the act of the invasion, and the motives for the campaign remove this as an issue for the present argument. It is also worth noting that there is some discussion over the authenticity of this correspondence, see L. Pearson, (1955); J. Hamilton, (1961); G. T. Griffith, (1968); A. B. Bosworth, (1980), 1.227-33; A. B. Bosworth, (1988), 299; E. Baynham (1995), 71, n. 56. Assuming its authenticity, though, this interpretation is too speculative to fully support an argument. Therefore, this paper argues for the separation of the roles without reliance upon this reading.

\(^14\) *Arr. Anab.* 7.9.5.

\(^15\) N. G. L. Hammond (1999, 238-53) has argued that Arrian made use of the Royal Journals in the writing of his history (see his conclusions at 251-3; see also his brief discussion of this speech at 249-50). But for caution on this, see also E. Baynham, (2010), 330. For further discussion, see F. R. Wüst, (1953), 177-88; P. A. Brunt, (1976, 1983), 2.532-3; A. B. Bosworth, (1988a), 133-4.

\(^16\) The preceding section (*Arr. Anab.* 7.8) includes examples of open dissent against Alexander from his troops, culminating in the king ordering a number of summary executions before the delivery of the
speech as an accurate representation of an intricacy of constitutional law. Griffith provides a further potential explanation of this unique title, having proposed that the term στρατηγός αὐτοκράτωρ was never contemporaneously used, but rather, the authority represented by its use in the later sources could be conferred upon an individual.\(^\text{17}\) Under this interpretation, Philip is described as ἥγεμων of the League of Corinth, who later had been granted additional autocratic powers over the military forces. This delineation still leads to two distinct roles—a formal role of ἥγεμων and a separate and more informal στρατηγός. Griffith’s option is speculative, but somewhat attractive. However, for the purpose of clarity, this article uses the terms of ἥγεμων and στρατηγός αὐτοκράτωρ to differentiate between the role in regards to overseeing the accords between the Greeks and the role commanding the united Greek military.

It is more difficult to perform the same level of analysis for our Latin sources, given the extra layer added by the translation of the Greek terms. However, it is worth acknowledging where and how the Latin sources refer to this role. Justin refers to the executive of the League solely with the term dux. He claims that Philip wished to be referred to as such immediately after the Battle of Chaeronea.\(^\text{18}\) This is, of course, too early in the narrative for a position within the League of Corinth, and is perhaps indicative of the typical brevity and compression of Justin’s style.\(^\text{19}\) He employed the same term with Philip in specific connection with a possible campaign against Persia.\(^\text{20}\) Regarding Alexander, dux is used twice, once in connection to his relationship with Thessaly,\(^\text{21}\) and again in relation to the League, stating that he was replacing Philip.\(^\text{22}\) In the extant books of his work, Curtius is silent on the matter of the roles of Philip and Alexander.\(^\text{23}\)

The current interpretation of the existence of multiple titles in the sources is that they referred to a single role within the structure of the League of Corinth. This notion came to prominence in the 1980’s, with several scholars arguing in its favour. Most prominently, Bosworth claimed several times that there was no need for two distinct positions within the League of Corinth.\(^\text{24}\) Hammond and Walbank likewise conflate the sources’ discussion of
two positions into one, as does Poddighe. Since Bosworth’s arguments, this interpretation has been widely accepted, to the extent that it is often presented tacitly, with no requirement for discussion, reasoning, or even mention of his claims. However, it is important to acknowledge there is occasional dissent. Heckel, for example, notes the existence of two distinct titles, though with no analysis or discussion on the matter, as does Dixon. Broadly speaking, Bosworth’s original view has either been explicitly accepted or tacitly acknowledged in the scholarship.

However, the evidence lends itself to the opposite conclusion. This interpretation is based upon the premise that Philip must necessarily have already been ἡγεμών by the time he was appointed στρατηγὸς αὐτοκράτωρ and leader of the Persian expedition. When discussing Philip’s ascension in Greece, the timeline of events has previously been established, primarily by Ryder. Hammond also suggests a similar series of events, and other scholars tend to follow Ryder’s general statements. The application of this timeline demonstrates the existence of the dual roles of executive power.

The first thing to note from Ryder’s timeline is the compression of events in Diodorus. As mentioned above, Diodorus omits the actual establishment of the League from his history—his account simply has the League existing, and Philip appealing to it to wage a joint war upon the Persian Empire. This has, rightfully, been seen as a major oversight within Diodorus’ narrative. As part of this, Ryder proposed that there must have been a series of meetings and negotiations during the establishment of the League—the initial proposals, time for the delegates to discuss matters with their home states, and a secondary meeting where the agreements were affirmed through oath. To this, Ryder also claimed that Justin’s account of the establishment, though more taciturn than Diodorus’, actually contains each key point. The sequence of events includes a convention of the various states (9.5.1), Philip putting his proposal to the Greeks (9.5.2), the establishment of the League’s council (also 9.5.2), and later construction of a united Greek army (9.5.4). The result of this, though, is the conclusion that Diodorus’ account is not, in fact, relating the negotiation phase of the League’s establishment; it is an account of the first, or at least a very early, formal meeting of the League’s συνέδριον.

---

26 E. Poddighe, (2009), 103 & n. 17.
32 Diod. 16.89.
33 T. T. B. Ryder, (1965), 154; E. I. McQueen, (1995), 169. Ryder here notes an early discussion over whether or not there is a section missing from Diodorus’ narrative, see U. Wilcken, (1917), 4-14; A. Heuß, (1938), 178.
34 T. T. B. Ryder, (1965), 153-4; N. G. L. Hammond, (1994), 158-60; E. I. McQueen, (1995), 169. The series of meetings and practical arrangements establishing the League, during which Philip would have been installed to the positions of leadership, appear to have taken place throughout 337, see G. T. Griffith, (1979), 624-5; W. L. Adams, (1999), 18-19.
Before considering the significance of this, we must examine the Athenian epigraphic record of the oath taken by the Greeks upon their entrance to the League,37 which provides one other crucial piece of information. Before the inscription breaks off, there is a clause of the oath that binds member states to wage war on any participant who attacks another, in violation of the common peace central to the accords.38 The power to approve this was shared between two named institutions of the League, the συνέδριον and the ἡγεμόν.39 Given that this is a contemporaneous account of the League’s construction, this reference demonstrates that the ἡγεμόν was an established institution within whatever constitutional structure existed for the League, a role which administered the accords between the states in consort with the συνέδριον. Taking this alongside the conclusions regarding Diodorus’ account, we see the significance of Ryder’s timeline.40 In Diodorus, Philip was addressing a meeting of the established League of Corinth. Given that the League was a functioning entity, it is a simple conclusion to make that the offices, including the ἡγεμόν, as established in the oath, had been filled. Thus, the role of ἡγεμόν was established before the election of the στρατηγός αὐτοκράτωρ, as this did not occur until after the formal declaration of a Persian campaign at an early meeting of the League proper.

In addition, there is a distinction between the purviews of these roles. While the ἡγεμόν appears to have overseen and enforced the agreements of the League, the στρατηγός αὐτοκράτωρ was the commander for a military campaign. This may be seen through two aspects. First, Justin tells us that during the establishment of the League, there was no explicitly stated aim of an invasion of Persia; it was assumed that it would be, but it was an unknown.41 This agrees with the interpretation of Diodorus 16.89—the invasion of Persia was not formally raised with the Greeks until after the establishment of the League. Moreover, a close examination of Diodorus confirms the limited scope of powers for the στρατηγός αὐτοκράτωρ. Philip raised the issue of Persia with the Greeks, and was elected to the role as a result of this, at which time he began making preparations for the campaign.42

37 IG ii2 236. For other records of this inscription, see above, n. 6. Two fragments survive. Fragment a preserves the first half of the first twenty or so lines, while Fragment b contains a list of several member states followed by a numeral. The precise meaning of these numerals is somewhat uncertain, though interpretations generally centre upon options such as the number of voting members each state received in the council or some record of the amount of military force each state was to provide, see, e.g., J. R. Ellis, (1976), 205-6; N. G. L. Hammond, (1994), 161; P. J. Rhodes & R. Osborne, (2003), 378; I. Worthington, (2008), 163. See also W. Schwahn, (1929), 188-98, who attempted a reconstruction of a second column of this text, claiming it to be the concurrent oath that Philip took. Given that on this second column, four letters survived from each line at most, this reconstruction is very speculative. Doubts have been raised regarding the veracity of this inscription as a record of the accords accounted to all of the participating states, see I. Worthington, (2009), 213-23. This view, though, has not gained widespread acceptance, see the notes for the new edition, IG II1 1, 318.

38 IG ii2 236, lines 19-22.
39 IG ii2 236, lines 21-22.
41 Just. 9.5.5: ‘Neque enim dubium erat imperium Persarum his apparatibus peti.’ Latin from O. Seel, (1972): ‘Nor was there any doubt that the Persian Empire would be assaulted with these preparations.’ This passage implies that it was commonly expected amongst the Greeks that they thought the League of Corinth would be turned against Persia, but does not state that Philip had made such a policy official and public knowledge.
42 Diod. 16.89.3: ‘τέλος δὲ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐλομένων αὐτῶν στρατηγῶν αὐτοκράτωρ τῆς Ἑλλάδος μεγάλας παρασκευὰς ἐποιεῖτο πρὸς τὴν ἐπὶ τοὺς Πέρσας στρατεύειν.’ Greek from C. Th. Fischer, (1964): ‘Finally, when the Greeks elected him as commander-in-chief of Greece, he made great preparations for the campaign against Persia.’
The role of στρατηγός αὐτοκράτωρ is then linked specifically with this military campaign, as opposed to the purview of the ήγεμόνων, prescribed by IG ii² 236, which was the oversight of the League within Greece; the ήγεμόνων had no authority to carry a war into Persia. Through this separation of powers, as well as the interpretation that Philip would have been ήγεμόνων before raising the issue of Persia and becoming στρατηγός αὐτοκράτωρ, we can begin to conclude that the two roles were distinct.

However, basing this claim on such a compressed narrative is risky. Fortunately, we see an identical progression in Alexander’s ascension to the leadership of Greece as well. He was also confirmed in the role as ήγεμόνων before he received the role of στρατηγός αὐτοκράτωρ. For this, we turn to the historical accounts of his rise to power after the assassination of Philip. Arrian’s account says simply that he was granted leadership of the Persian expedition in the same manner as Philip. Justin’s account, which continues his typically compressed style, concurs. The most detailed of our sources is Diodorus. He notes that, soon after Philip’s death, Alexander marched south through the Greek states, receiving confirmations of his position as leader of Greece from various groups, including the Thessalians, the Amphictyonic Council, and Athens. IG ii² 236 records clauses of the oath which specified the continued loyalty of the Greek states to the agreements struck with Philip and the preservation of his descendants in Macedon. As a speculative tangent, given this and Philip’s position as overseer of the peace, it is not unreasonable to assume that the position of ήγεμόνων was tied to the Macedonian throne and envisioned to be, in practice, a title that was passed along with the monarchy. These passages, then, show the role being confirmed in Alexander’s hands by the three named groups.

However, as with Philip, when Alexander was being confirmed as leader, he had not yet been given leadership of the Persian expedition. According to Diodorus’ account, it was not until he reached Corinth that the campaign was raised. Again, this election appears to have been for a military role for the purpose of leading a campaign into Persia, as opposed to the oversight role of the ήγεμόνων suggested in the inscription of the oath. By the time that he had reached Corinth and been elected as στρατηγός αὐτοκράτωρ, Alexander had already been confirmed in a role of leadership by several states. This role for which these

---

43 Arr. Anab. 1.1.2. We must note that the word used by Arrian here is ήγεμονία. However, this does not present any issue to the current argument. While it is a cognate of ήγεμόνων, the term which appears in IG ii² 236, it conveys a different sense (the general concept of leadership as opposed to a specific leadership role) and Arrian does not use it here as a title for a specific position. We also see a similar usage of ήγεμονία in a tangential reference from Aeschines (3.132), in which the leadership of the Persian expedition is bestowed upon select individuals. Again, though, this is kept abstract, and he includes no direct mention of Philip, Alexander, or even the League in general. For similar thought, see R. S. Bagnall, (1976), 41-2.

44 Just. 11.2.5-6.

45 Diod. 17.4. For recognition from the Thessalians, see 4.1, from the Amphictyony, see 4.2, and from Athens, see 4.6.

46 IG ii² 236, lines 11-12

47 E. Poddighe (2009, 100-1) has previously discussed the concept of Alexander’s inherited authority, though, keeping with the interpretation of the ήγεμόνων and στρατηγός αὐτοκράτωρ being interchangeable, more in regards to the Persian expedition than command in Greece.

48 Diod. 17.4.9. L. Prandi (2013, 5-6) notes that Diodorus places Alexander’s ascension to the Macedonian throne after Philip’s assassination in 335, when it was actually mid-late 336. Arrian (Anab. 1.1.1-4) notes that by the following spring, in which Alexander began his short campaign in Thrace, he had already been confirmed to the positions of leadership in the League, meaning that he had re-established control no later than early 335, and likely by the end of 336. See also G. Dobesch, (1975), 78-80.

49 Cf. Diod.17.4.9 with IG ii² 236, lines 19-22.
states gave their support must also have been broader than any local office, as both the Thessalians and the Amphictyony are explicitly said to have confirmed their support of Alexander to a position of power over the Greeks as a whole.\(^50\) It hardly makes sense that those states would have confirmed their support for him in a role to which he was not already entitled, and so it follows that the accounts of Diod. 17.4.1-8 reveal his establishment as ἡγεμόν and overseer of the peace accords governing the League of Corinth. 17.4.9 then refers to his election to στρατηγὸς αὐτοκράτωρ and authorisation of the continuing effort to invade Persia, following Ryder’s timeline.\(^51\) Because of this double confirmation, we again see the series of events demonstrating the existence of a separation of roles within the League of Corinth.

The ultimate difficulty with a study such as this is our dependence on the literary sources for any account of the titles of these offices. The philological approach focussing on the sources’ usage of specific titles is one that has in the past received significant criticism.\(^52\) The most reliable account for an explicit title is IG ii\(^2\) 236, with its contemporaneous mention of a ἡγεμόν,\(^53\) while later literary sources should be viewed with some caution. However, the central point of this argument is not what the titles were, as those will always remain somewhat uncertain, but rather how the roles functioned. The key question is whether we accept the arguments focussing on the uncertainty of the terminology in the sources, or we return to Ryder’s timeline of this period, which suggests multiple roles within the League of Corinth. In this case, the critique of the philological approach cannot explain why the sources depict both Philip and Alexander as being selected to fill multiple roles, regardless of what those roles were called. The focus on chronology demonstrates that Philip and Alexander were both confirmed to some form of leadership role within the League, and that it was only after that when they were granted the authority to lead a unified Greek army. Precisely what titles were used may be uncertain. However, the distinct usage of ἡγεμόν and στρατηγὸς αὐτοκράτωρ helps clarify our discussions of Philip and Alexander and their interactions with the League of Corinth, denoting whether they acted as the overseer of the agreements governing the League or as military commander.

If the ancient authors had demonstrated this election to two leadership positions in only one of these instances, then it would be easier to dismiss this notion as a quirk of the source tradition. However, both Philip and Alexander were confirmed into positions of leadership twice. Formal discussions about an invasion of the Persian Empire did not begin until after Philip’s establishment of the League of Corinth. The constitutionally defined role of the ἡγεμόν would have already existed before his election as στρατηγὸς αὐτοκράτωρ. Alexander, upon Philip’s death, received assertions of loyalty in his leadership over the Greeks from several prominent sources, despite not being elected as στρατηγὸς αὐτοκράτωρ until his arrival at Corinth. The implication is that those earlier confirmations were for a different role, the ἡγεμόν. Thus, both cases demonstrate the dual nature of the executive positions of the League of Corinth.

---

\(^{50}\) Diod. 17.4.1-2.


\(^{52}\) See W. Heckel, (2009), 107; A. Meeus, (2009), 289, n. 9. Meeus’ note also provides extensive bibliography on other expressions of this same concept, see, e.g., R. S. Bagnall, (1976), 41-2, 214, n. 1; R. D. Milns, (1982); N. G. L. Hammond & F. W. Walbank, (1988), 192, n. 3.

\(^{53}\) Lines 20-22. None of the sources who ascribe a specific title to either Philip or Alexander are contemporary. The closest we get is Aesch. 3.132 using ἡγεμονία (see above, n. 43).
Conventional thinking is that when Alexander marched into Persia, he appointed Antipater, general, statesman, and long-time ally of Philip II, as regent of Macedon and acting ήγεμων of the League of Corinth. While his position as regent is incontestable, the claim that Antipater held the powers and responsibilities of the ήγεμων is based on nothing more than assumption. An examination of the two main events of interaction between Antipater and the Greek states during Alexander’s absence, the imposition of the Exiles Decree and the war with Agis III, demonstrates that Antipater held no such position.

Multiple scholars over the past several decades have explicitly stated that Antipater’s role was acting ήγεμων. In addition to these, there is a long list of scholars who give vague or semi-official sounding titles or descriptions of Antipater’s relationship with the League of Corinth. Jouguet said that Antipater was left to watch over Greece; Milns called him a Viceroy; Heckel and Romm said that he was left to ‘oversee Europe’; previously, Heckel had stated that Antipater was ‘firmly in charge of European affairs’, as well as employing the other executive title elsewhere, labelling him the ‘strategos autokrator of Europe’; Poddighe called him a ‘deputy for Greek affairs’; Hornblower invoked a Persian title by labelling him a Satrap; Dmitriev stated that Antipater had been ‘in charge of Macedonia, Thrace, and Thessaly, and the “freedom of the Greeks.”’ There has been only one explicit statement against this assumption. Blackwell claimed that he had no position within the League of Corinth, describing the situation as ‘Antipater had de facto responsibilities for securing Macedonia’s European hegemony, but with little ex officio authority that we can see.’ However, in the broader discussion of this concept, Blackwell provided no discussion of detail or the reasoning surrounding this conclusion. While this was little more than an in-passing statement from Blackwell, this article argues that this assertion was correct.

The first thing to examine is the nature of the sources’ depiction of Antipater’s position. Antipater is never referred to as ήγεμων in the sources. From the Latin sources, Justin names him praepositus Macedoniae, which already raises several questions. We should note the differing description of Antipater’s role in comparison with the term Justin used in relation to Philip and Alexander—dux. Additionally, in this passage, Justin only established his role in relation to Macedon, not Greece. Finally, Justin’s terminology of
Antipater’s role differs from that preserved in the prologues to the epitomised work of Trogus, who names him as praefectus.66 Curtius also provides a combination of these two suggestions, stating that he was the praefectus Macedoniarum.67 He provides the same title as Trogus, but like Justin, establishes Antipater’s role in relation to Macedon, not Greece. In regards to authors writing in Greek, Arrian simply states that Macedonian and Greek affairs were entrusted to Antipater.68 Diodorus, however, notes that Alexander appointed Antipater as strategos of Europe.69 It is also worth noting that, in these passages, Diodorus avoids the title of strategos autokratōr, which he gave to both Philip and Alexander.70 This is every reference made by the sources to Antipater’s role in Greece under Alexander.

The lack of an explicit labelling of Antipater as the ἡγεμόν in the sources is, of course, no definitive proof that he did not hold the role. Rather, it is his interactions with the Greek states during the period of Alexander’s campaign which suggest this. Several times, he is shown as having little, if any, authority over the Greeks or the compacts governing the League of Corinth. The first of these that we shall examine is the imposition of the Exile Decree in 324 B.C.E.71 In general, our main sources for this particular event agree. Justin,72 Diodorus,73 and Curtius74 inform us that Alexander sent word to the Greek states, ordering that all exiles must be returned to their home cities, save those who were charged with murder.75 Diodorus, however, provides one extra piece of information which the others omit. He quotes the letter which Alexander sent with Nicanor to the Greeks, and the final sentence of this letter reveals something interesting. In it, Alexander clearly and explicitly states that he was granting Antipater the authority to enforce his decree: ‘γεγράφαμεν δὲ Ἀντιπάτρῳ περὶ τούτων, ὅπως τὰς μὴ βουλομένας τῶν πόλεων κατάγειν ἀναγκάσῃ.’76 This extra piece of information is particularly illuminating to Antipater’s situation in Greece. If Alexander was bestowing the authority to enforce the Decree on the Greeks, it follows that Antipater did not have that authority prior to the letter. Moreover, authority over exiles

---

66 Trog. Pro|. 12.
67 Curt. 4.1.39. He also calls him simply a praefectus at 10.10.14.
68 Arρ. Anab. 1.11.3: ἁμα δὲ τῷ ἥπι ἄρχομεν ἐξελαύνει ἐρʹ Ἑλληνασάντου τά μὲν κατὰ Μακεδονιάν τε καὶ τοὺς Ἑλλήνας Ἀντιπάτρῳ ἐπιτρέψας.’ Greek from A. G. Roos, (1967): ‘At the start of Spring, he left for the Hellespont, having turned both Macedonian and Greek business over to Antipater.’
69 Diod. 17.118.1, 18.12.1. It is also worth noting that Diod. 17.17.5 mentions Antipater’s role in terms of the military strength which he had at his command, on which, see L. Prandi (2013), 22-3. The term used here is ἡγεμονία, but the same principle applies to Diodorus as applies to Arrian, see above, n. 43.
70 Diod. 16.89.3: for Greek, see above, n. 42; 17.4.9: διαλεξεθεὶς ὁ βασιλεὺς καὶ λόγοις ἐπεικείσο χρησάμενος ἐπείπες τοὺς Ἑλλήνας ὑψίσασθαι στρατηγὸν ἀυτοκράτορα τῆς Ἑλλάδος εἰναι τον Ἀλέξανδρον.’ Greek from C. Th. Fischer, (1964): ‘The king addressed [the council] and, speaking with fitting words, he prevailed upon the Greeks to elect Alexander as commander-in-chief of Greece.’
72 Just. 13.5.1-4.
73 Diod. 17.109.1, 18.8.3-5.
74 Curt. 10.2.4-5.
75 R&O 908 [+SIG 312] mentions a practical result of this decree, as it records the return of exiles to Samos. See also N. G. L. Hammond, (1989), 233.
76 Diod. 18.8.4. Greek from C. Th. Fischer, (1964): ‘We have written to Antipater concerning this, so that he may compel those cities unwilling to recall you.’ The letter is worded relatively precisely, making it clear that Antipater’s new authority was confined solely to the enforcement of the Decree. For more discussion on this section, see F. Landucci Gattinoni, (2008), 60.
was covered in the accords governing the League; Ps.-Demosthenes tells us of two clauses which gave the League some level of jurisdiction over the exile process within the member states. The first gave them the powers to ensure that no punishment, including exile, would take place within a member state that was contrary to the laws of that state. Secondly, he notes a clause prohibiting cities from setting out exiles with hostile intent against other members. These clauses demonstrate that the accords gave some level of jurisdiction over exiles to the League, and thus, to the συνεδριον and ἠγεμόνων. If Antipater had been acting as the ἠγεμόνων, then there would have been no need for Alexander to bestow this authority—he would have already had it. This extra information from Diodorus suggests that Antipater did not hold this position.

There is another episode, though, that more clearly demonstrates Antipater’s lack of authority and position within the League of Corinth. That is the war with Agis III of Sparta. Around 331 B.C.E., while Antipater was campaigning in Thrace, Agis, likely with Persian backing, convinced several of the League’s members to rebel and join him in an attack on the remaining Greek states. Antipater quickly marched south with the Macedonian army, mustering support from loyalist Greeks on the way, and defeated Agis and his allies in battle. There are several aspects of this narrative that must be unpacked before continuing. The first is how we should classify the antagonistic states. During Philip’s establishment of the League of Corinth, Sparta was the one state to resist joining the accords. The Greek states who joined Agis’ campaign were then members of the

77 [Dem.] 17.15: ‘ἐστι γὰρ ἐν ταῖς συνθήκαις ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τοὺς συνεδρεύοντας καὶ τοὺς ἐπὶ τῇ κοινῇ φυλακῇ τετεγμένους δικαίως ἐν ταῖς κοινωνοῦσας πόλεως τῆς εἰρήνης μὴ γίγνυνται θάνατοι καὶ φωναὶ παρὰ τοὺς κειμένους ταῖς πόλεωι νόμους, μηδὲ χρήματα δημεύσεις, μηδὲ γῆς ἀναδιομημεν, μηδὲ χρεών ἀποκοπαί, μηδὲ δοῦλων ἀπελευθερώσεως ἐπὶ νεωτερισμῷ.’ Greek from M. R. Dilts, (2002): For it is in the agreements that the councillors and those appointed to the common guardianship shall ensure that in those cities holding to the peace, neither executions, nor exiles, nor confiscation of goods, nor redistribution of land, nor cancelling of debt, nor the liberation of slaves for revolution shall occur in contravention of the laws set forth in those cities. While he provides no detail on any mechanism, the clause that he refers to names the council and the section, this charge is a non sequitur. The clause as it stands and as it is paraphrased here interpreted this passage as referring to an enforced return of exiles and both I. Worthington (2004, 178) and J. E. Atkinson (2009, 116) claimed that this act was in conflict with the League’s stated guarantee of the autonomy of the member states. While Ps.-Demosthenes does try to connect this to the restoration of exiles at the very end of the section, this charge is a non sequitur. The clause as it stands as and as is paraphrased here says nothing regarding the return of exiles. All that it prohibits is arming exiles with grievances against another state.

78 [Dem.] 17.16: ‘ἐστι γὰρ γεγραμμένον, ἐκ τῶν πόλεων τῶν κοινωνοῦσῶν τῆς εἰρήνης μὴ ἔξεινα φυγαδᾶς ὁμολαμπτὰς ὁπλα ἐπιφέρειν ἐπὶ πολέμω ἐπὶ μηβεμένα πόλιν τῶν μετεχουσῶν τῆς εἰρήνης.’ Greek from M. R. Dilts, (2002): ‘For it has been stipulated that exiles shall not depart from the cities agreeing to the peace, eager to bring arms against any city of those holding to the peace.’ A. B. Bosworth (1988, 220) interpreted this passage as referring to an enforced return of exiles and both I. Worthington (2004, 178) and J. E. Atkinson (2009, 116) claimed that this act was in conflict with the League’s stated guarantee of the autonomy of the member states. While Ps.-Demosthenes does try to connect this to the restoration of exiles at the very end of the section, this charge is a non sequitur. The clause as it stands as and as is paraphrased here says nothing regarding the return of exiles. All that it prohibits is arming exiles with grievances against another state.


80 Diod. 17.62; Just. 12.1.4; Arr. Anab. 2.13.5-6.

81 Diod. 17.63; Just. 12.1.8-11; Curt. 6.1.1-16. This defeat included the death of Agis himself.

82 Just. 9.5.3.
League. Because of this, we can consider those states to be rebels or insurgents against the order established by Philip. The same cannot be said of Sparta, though. They had never sworn to the accords, and so, from a legal point of view, can be considered as a foreign state to the League, inciting a rebellion and launching an invasion against the unified Greeks.\textsuperscript{83}

The next point is Antipater’s apparent ability to raise and lead a Greek army, a potential discrepancy if he did not hold a leadership role. However, there are some important aspects to remember. The Greeks were already constitutionally required to undertake these actions, and the responsibility for this was not placed solely upon the ἡγεμῶν; it was split between the ἡγεμῶν and the συνέδριον.\textsuperscript{84} The sedition of those states who had joined Agis had to be punished by the Greeks. Antipater’s participation in this action can be ascribed to protecting Macedon’s status in his role as regent. To speculate further, if we were to trust Diodorus’ above-mentioned note that Antipater’s role was simply as some form of στρατηγός,\textsuperscript{85} then we could theorize that he perhaps held a level of military command in Greece, but without the powers of the ἡγεμῶν to otherwise oversee the accords. He need not have been ἡγεμῶν to take part in the military action.

Ultimately, it is the aftermath of the war that most clearly precludes Antipater holding the position of ἡγεμῶν. After their defeat in battle, the Spartans and their allies promptly surrendered to Antipater, who referred their petitions to the συνέδριον of the Greeks for judgement, rather than dealing with them himself.\textsuperscript{86} Curtius here claims that Antipater refused to arbitrate out of fear that Alexander would see this as overstepping the boundaries of his role and even a potential threat to his authority, especially in the wake of such a decisive military victory.\textsuperscript{87} Hammond, though, correctly dismissed this as a fabrication of Curtius; the states had rebelled against the compacts of the peace in Greece, and so the Greeks, the wronged party, had the authority and the right to determine sanctions.\textsuperscript{88} To speculate momentarily, Curtius’ statement could have been foreshadowing the alleged deterioration of Antipater’s relationship with Alexander, which culminated in the accusation that he was complicit in the plan to assassinate the king.\textsuperscript{89} Antipater, in fact, employed the correct mechanism for dealing with this issue.

However, this is only how the Greeks dealt with those rebellious states, not how they dealt with Sparta. Sparta was not a member of the League of Corinth, and thus, did not fall under the authority of the συνέδριον. Therefore, they declined to pass judgement, instead, instructing them to send envoys to negotiate terms with Alexander.\textsuperscript{90} They were sent

\textsuperscript{83} This point is briefly touched upon by A. B. Bosworth, (1988), 203.
\textsuperscript{84} IG ii\textsuperscript{2} 236, lines 17-22.
\textsuperscript{85} As at 17.118.1 and 18.12.1.
\textsuperscript{86} Diod. 17.73.5; Curt. 6.1.19.
\textsuperscript{87} Curt. 6.1.17: ‘Quamquam fortuna rerum placebat, invidiam tamen, quia maiores res errant, quam quas praefecti modus caperet, metuebat.’ Latin from C. M. Lucarini, (2009): ‘Although the fate of the battle was pleasing, he still feared jealousy, because the achievement was greater than that which the reach of an overseer should attain.’
\textsuperscript{88} N. G. L. Hammond, (1983), 134.
\textsuperscript{89} Curt. 10.10.14-19. See J. E. Atkinson, (2009), 235-42 for commentary on these passages. Note, though, that the extent of this discontent between king and regent which is presented in the sources can be doubted, see E. M. Pitt & W. P. Richardson, (2017), 80-82. For accusations against Antipater from other sources, see Arr. Anab. 2.27.1-2; Just. 12.14; Diod. 17.118.1-2; Plut. Alex. 77.1-5.
\textsuperscript{90} Diod. 17.73.5: ‘οἱ μὲν σύνεδροι συνήχθησαν εἰς Κόρινθον καὶ πολλῶν ἑρήμων λόγων πρὸς ἑκάτερον μέρος ἔδοξεν αὐτοῖς ἀκέραιον τὴν κρίσιν ἐπὶ τὸν Ἀλέξανδρον ἀναπέμψαι.’ Greek from C. Th. Fischer, (1964): ‘The representatives were convened in Corinth, and when many speeches were made for both views, it seemed proper to them to refer the judgement to Alexander undecided.’; Curt. 6.1.20: ‘Α quo Lacedaemonii nihil
directly to Alexander. They were not sent to the regent, but forwarded on to the king directly. Antipater and whatever office he held were simply passed over. Both historical sources for this, Diodorus and Curtius, provide precisely the same series of events. All that Antipater did, according to Diodorus, was take hostages to ensure Spartan cooperation. If Antipater had been left as acting ἡγεμόν, then this is the type of situation in which it would be expected that he would exercise his powers. Given that he did not, we must consider the possibility that he held no such position within the constitutional structure of the League of Corinth.

Let us consider why this should be. Antipater was Alexander’s representative and voice in Greece. Regardless of his official status within the League of Corinth, he had been left as regent in charge of Macedon, its administration, and defence. However, this discussion is not about the relationship that Antipater had with Alexander. It is about the relationship that he held with the Greeks and what powers he had within the constitutional limits of the League of Corinth. The Greeks were the injured party in the attack of Agis and the rebels. Demonstrably, the council felt within their rights to judge the rebellious Greek states, as that is what they did. Thus, they did not act on Sparta, because they felt they could not, instead deferring to a higher power.

The last question to consider is whether the Greeks consulted Alexander in his role as the ἡγεμόν of the League of Corinth, with constitutional ties to the institution which had been attacked, or as the king of Macedon, the head of the most powerful nation in Greece. If it were the latter, then the League would have approached Antipater first. As regent in that situation, he would have held the authority to pass judgement on the Spartans. Again, this was the purpose in appointing a deputy or a regent, to avoid the necessity of sending word into Asia for Alexander’s response for issues under the purview of the monarchy. Antipater’s regency of Macedon, though, was ignored, suggesting that the Greeks were consulting the ἡγεμόν. As the task fell to Alexander, we must conclude that the role of ἡγεμόν was not deputised to Antipater.

During Alexander’s absence from Greece, then, Antipater had two major interactions with the Greek states. Neither of these episodes gives any indication that he held a formalised role as the deputy ἡγεμόν. The decree sent to Greece by Alexander contained the stipulation that Antipater had been granted the power to enforce it. Had he been ἡγεμόν already, such a proclamation would have been redundant. The war with Agis, though, provides evidence both that Antipater did not hold these powers, and that Alexander still wielded them. In its aftermath, Antipater took no part in negotiating the terms of surrender for either the rebellious Greek states or for Sparta. Had he been ἡγεμόν, he would have had the authority and duty to assist this process. However, it was the συνέδριον which dealt with the member states, and Sparta was sent to Alexander. The purpose of appointing an acting ἡγεμόν would have been for situations like this, to prevent the necessity of referring to an authority figure half a world away. Thus, it follows that Antipater did not hold the authority necessary to deal with the Spartans, and so, was never appointed as Alexander’s deputy in the League of Corinth.

_aliud quam, ut oratores mittere ad regem liceret._ Latin from C. M. Lucarini, (2009): ‘From this, there was nothing for Sparta other than that they were permitted to send ambassadors to the king.’ See also A. B. Bosworth, (1988), 203.

91 Justin’s account of the war does not record anything of the settlement, ending his discussion with Agis’ death (12.1.10-11).

92 Diod. 17.73.6, also mentioned in passing by Aeschines at 3.133.

93 Arr. Anab. 1.11.3; Just. 11.7.1; Diod. 17.17.5, 17.118.1; Curt. 4.1.39.
Conclusions

This paper has argued against two assumptions—that the League of Corinth had only one executive position, and that Antipater was made Alexander’s deputy ήγεμών during his campaign against Persia. The timelines of the ascensions of both Philip and Alexander to the leadership of Greece demonstrates the existence of both the ήγεμών and the στρατηγὸς αὐτοκράτωρ. In both cases, the kings had already held the role of ήγεμών before the campaign against Persia was discussed and the necessitated role of στρατηγὸς αὐτοκράτωρ was filled. Antipater’s position as ήγεμών should also be dismissed. The sources never refer to him as such, he had to be separately granted the authority to enforce the Exiles Decree, and he took no formal part in the judgement on Sparta in the wake of the war with Agis III. Simply put, he never exercised the powers of the role, deferring all responsibilities to the true ήγεμών, Alexander. Such acts do not make sense if Alexander had granted him the authority of the ήγεμών prior to his departure, as dealing with these scenarios would have been the reason for appointing such a deputy.

The final result of these conclusions is a greater understanding of the constitutional structure of the League and the political connection between Antipater and the Greeks through to the death of Alexander, which can facilitate future studies of these topics. Acknowledging that two distinct roles existed within the League’s structure allows a more accurate characterisation of the acts of Philip and Alexander towards the Greek states. Accepting that Antipater was not designated as Alexander’s deputy ήγεμών greatly informs the relationship between the general and the Greeks during Alexander’s absence from Greece, and even in those first few years of turmoil directly following his death.

W. P. Richardson
University of Otago

Bibliography:

Bagnall, R. S., (1976), The Administration of the Ptolemaic Possessions outside Egypt, Leiden.
Dual Leadership in the League of Corinth


Ellis, J. R., (1976), Philip II and Macedonian Imperialism, London.


Ferguson, W. S., (1948), 'Demetrius Poliorcetes and the Hellenic League' in Hesperia 17.2, 112-36.


--- (1999), ‘The Speeches in Arrian’s *Indica* and *Anabasis*’ in CQ 49.1, 238-53.


Lock, R. A., (1972), ‘The Date of Agis III’s War in Greece’ in *Antichthon* 6, 10-27.


Wilcken, U., (1917), Beiträge zur Geschichte des korinthischen Bundes’ in Sitzungsberichte der Königlich Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften 10, 3-40.


