Contents of volume thirty-four

Numbers 3-4

94  Thomas C. Rose, The Life and Afterlife of a Hellenistic Flagship: The “Sixteen” of Demetrius Poliorcetes Revisited

113  Marco Ferrario, Uno, nessuno, centomila. L’Asia centrale achemenide e le sue fonti: alcune note di merito e di metodo

138  Egidia Occhipinti, The treaty of alliance between Athens and Carystus: Supplements for lines 2-3 and 4-6 and further historical considerations

155  Chris Eckerman, Review Article: Richard Neer and Leslie Kurke, Pindar, Song, and Space: Towards a Lyric Archaeology
NOTES TO CONTRIBUTORS AND SUBSCRIBERS

The Ancient History Bulletin was founded in 1987 by Waldemar Heckel, Brian Lavelle, and John Vanderspoel. The board of editorial correspondents consists of Elizabeth Baynham (University of Newcastle), Hugh Bowden (Kings College, London), Franca Landucci Gattinoni (Università Cattolica, Milan), Alexander Meues (University of Mannheim), Kurt Raaflaub (Brown University), P.J. Rhodes (Durham University), Robert Rollinger (Universität Innsbruck), Victor Alonso Troncoso (Universidade da Coruña)

AHB is currently edited by Timothy Howe (howe@stolaf.edu)

AHB promotes scholarly discussion in Ancient History and ancillary fields (such as epigraphy, papyrology, and numismatics) by publishing articles and notes on any aspect of the ancient world from the Near East to Late Antiquity. Submitted articles should normally be in English, but the journal will consider contributions in French, German, Italian or Spanish.

SUBMISSION GUIDELINES
AHB adheres to the usual North American editorial policies in the submission and acceptance of articles but imposes no House Style. Authors are, however, asked to use the abbreviations of L’Année philologique (APh) for journals, and of the Thesaurus linguae latinae (TLL) for Latin authors. Please send submissions to the editor most closely identified with your field of enquiry or, in case of doubt, to Timothy Howe (howe@stolaf.edu). Articles must be submitted in electronic format, preferably generated by MS Word. Greek font or other special characters must convert such to Unicode and should be accompanied by a PDF version. Authors will receive PDF offprints of their contributions. Copyright is retained by the author. Books for reviews and enquiries concerning book reviews should be directed to Joseph Roisman (jsroisma@colby.edu).

SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATION
The subscription rate for individual and institutional subscribers is USD 25.00. Detailed instructions about subscriptions and access to digital content can be found on the AHB website: http://ancienthistorybulletin.org

PAYMENT
Payment may be made via the subscription portal on the AHB website:
http://www.ancienthistorybulletin.org/subscribed-users-area/membership-levels/

Cover image courtesy of The Nickle Arts Museum, University of Calgary
Pindar’s material worlds have served as a remarkable preoccupation for scholars over the course of the last generation, and this book follows in that vein. Time will tell whether we shall continue to see a preoccupation with materialities in Pindaric studies. At any rate, this is not a good book. As noted below, the philology is regularly weak, the argumentation is regularly not sound, and the literary criticism is not adequately supported via reference to comparanda. And the authors, while promoting their own interpretations, are occasionally dishonest with their readers. I have the impression that the materials devoted to material culture are better than the materials tethered to Pindarica, but my supposition may be based on my comparative weakness with material culture.

In the introduction, Neer and Kurke (hereafter, N & K) inform the reader that this is a book about space in Classical Greece. Pindar’s epinician odes, in certain respects, serve as focal points, but the work has a broader purview, encompassing wider literary, archaeological, and visual evidence. With regard to the goal of the project, N & K state that they “hope to carve out a new disciplinary space...a lyric archaeology...a synthesis of archaeological and epigraphic corpora with the reading habits of lyric and art history” (1). This is all that is said about ‘lyric archaeology.’ Given that the phrase has a prominent place in the subtitle of the book, one expects more engagement with it, particularly since it is through this phrase, as they suggest, that they hope to carve out a new disciplinary space. Furthermore, the authors make the claim that Pindar is not so much interested in objects as in the larger relational fields between things (2), but the authors have no way to substantiate this assertion.

One problem that runs throughout the book is the authors’ lack of care concerning agency. We find this already in the introduction. For example, we are told that Greek poetry thematizes its own rule-bound nature (3). It has become popular in contemporary scholarship to grant agency to inanimate objects, but if N & K are seeking to work within this vein, a section noting why they find this approach useful would be appropriate. As it stands, their

---

1 Scholars of lyric have recently urged a move away from such preoccupations in favor of a move toward a more ‘literary’ criticism of lyric poetry. See e.g. F. Budelmann and T. Phillips “Introduction: Textual Events: Performance and the Lyric in Early Greece” in F. Budelmann and T. Phillip (eds.) Textual Events: Performance and the Lyric in Early Greece (Oxford, 2018) 1-27.
disregard for correctly identifying human agency creates muddled argument throughout the book.²

N & K note that the work of Michel Foucault, particularly that of The Order of Things, subtends much of their methodological approach. They say, “all the preserved data on which we focus here constitute a common category...What unites a map, a statue, a poem, an altar, a temple, a road, a sanctuary? All of them, we contend, function as tools or gadgets—technologies for the organization of space and time” (5). My response to this declaration is to feel that this project seems reductive, and that the authors’ introduction of ‘tools or gadgets’ is a move toward vagueness rather than toward clarity in criticism. After all, why should we want to unite such discrete phenomena that are better understood when not lumped together? And N & K’s lack of concern for agency, as noted above, creates a problem that should be addressed. For example, did sculptors know that the statues that they were making functioned as tools or gadgets for the organization of space and time? Knife makers know that they are making knives, tools, that will be used for cutting, but would it be fair to say that knife makers are also making tools to be used for the organization of space and time? If all the things that N & K assert to be tools or gadgets for the organization of space and time are tools or gadgets for the organization of space and time, what is not a tool or gadget for the organization of space and time? Such questions need to be addressed so that the reader knows where the authors stand on agency, intention, reader response, and the limits of their literary and material corpora.

After a subsection on the materials addressed in the following chapters, N & K close the introduction with a manifesto, asserting that scholars need a new disciplinary wholism. In essence, N & K suggest that they want others to do what they are attempting to do. This is rather patronizing, and, given the deep history of interdisciplinary study within Classics, their discourse is rather surprising; and it is uncharitable toward those who have already united archaeological, philological, epigraphical, and art-historical archives in their own work, within the field of Classical Studies, before N & K. The authors further assert, “in an era of hyperspecialization and shrinking departments, this imperative [i.e. to do what N & K seek to do] is both practical and principled” (8). No argument is developed in support of this declaration.

In the first half of chapter 1, N & K focus on maps and measurement. One soon realizes how little care will be given to competent criticism of epinician poetry, for, on the second page of the first chapter, the authors assert that Iamos, in O. 6, “extricated himself from the weeds and waded into the Alpheios stream” (12). One familiar with O. 6 will know that Iamos never extricated himself from weeds. N & K provide an overview of periodic mapping and of Herodotus’ critique of the periodic mapping of his predecessors. And the reader becomes acquainted with N & K’s practice of constructing analogic polarities that do more harm than good. For example, N & K assert that the periodos map may symbolize art history and that Herodotus’ narrative may symbolize philology (19) (N & K seem to fashion such polarities to allow themselves the opportunity to dismantle them [see e.g. 30]). In discussing Aristagoras of

² e.g. “Early classical sculpture exploits narrative” (77); “Greek sculpture and poetry worked in tandem to articulate space” (90). Pythian 5 is “the single Pindaric poem most obsessed with topography and the mapping out of civic space” (162). “Pythian 5 is centrally concerned to materialize its own spatial thematics” (189).
Miletos’ map, as narrated by Herodotus, N & K assert, “because Aristagoras’ map encoded distances in the Persian Empire, it will have had to start from Persian units of measure: stathmoi and parasangs” (20). But this does not follow, for King Kleomenes of Sparta as well as Herodotus’ intended Greek reader could imagine the space in Greek units of measure. Thereafter, N & K provide a helpful overview with regard to the elasticity of Greek units of measure (particularly stadia) and their convertibility into Persian units of measure. A brief excursus on Greek mathematics in relation to the ‘problem’ of commensurability follows.

In the second half of chapter 1, N & K provide an introduction to the epinician genre, professing their positionality in relation to epinician studies. N & K immediately assert that Pindar’s odes were performed by choruses. This will be a problem throughout the book since we do not know that Pindar’s odes were performed by choruses. Perhaps some were composed for performance by chorus, while others were composed for performance by soloist; and some very well may have been composed for dialogue between chorus and soloist. I do not know why the authors chose to be so dogmatic on such a contentious topic; it can only do them harm. After all, space is no less an important construct whether enacted through the bodies of a chorus or through the body of an individual. And consideration of less restrictive performance contexts could open their preoccupations in interesting ways. A section on the performance contexts of choral poetry within Greek society follows, and thereafter N & K assert that an epinician ode was paid for by a successful athlete (33). But we have no evidence for this as a universal practice. I note that Pindar’s discourse suggests that Pindar views himself as having an obligation to praise outstanding human accomplishment, irrespective of payment, and the odes themselves occasionally suggest that someone other than the victor has commissioned an ode on the victor’s behalf (e.g. P. 4. 298-299, P. 10.64-66). Furthermore, it is hard to imagine Pindar charging a wealthy and powerful individual, such as Hieron of Syracuse, for an epinician ode. I think that it is more likely that Pindar would want to ingratiate himself with powerful leaders, such as Hieron, by providing them with song, without a payment obligation articulated. At any rate, presumably some odes were offered to successful victors without payment. And I am hard pressed to understand why N & K, again, would want to press a dogmatic position in this regard: nothing is lost for them if we consider epinician transactions through metaphysical and social frames, rather than through a mercenary frame. N & K also suggest that “Epinikion adopts the resources of religious poetry...for the glorification of a single individual” (33), but this is to pay too little attention to the odes themselves. Poems do not only glorify victors: they offer recompense to gods for the athletes’ victories, for example (and to declare that offering thanks to a god glorifies a victor would be reductive and would exhibit little appreciation for the Greeks’ religious impulse). At any rate, it is also clear that Pindar composed odes, or sections of odes, for multiple individuals (cf. I. 6. 57-58); thus, a conceptual frame that views individual odes as having individual victors as the fulcrum of composition, as a rule, is incorrect.

Much of N & K’s interpretation of kharis in this book, I contend, is unsound. N & K baldly assert that kharis means ‘grace’ (34) while making a programmatic statement regarding the
athlete’s accomplishment and the community’s response to said accomplishment. But they should say something about kharis as ‘grace’—What does the word mean for them in English? Do N & K use grace as an aesthetic term, such as we are wont to do when we refer to graceful dancers? Do they use grace as a theological term, such as we are wont to do when we speak of the grace of God within a Christian context? (Such divine grace may not be present within the Greek religious context). In fact, as G. Nagy and I have suggested, kharis generally seems to mean ‘requital’ in Pindaric discourse, referencing the counter-gift within various systems of reciprocity. N & K do not seem to be aware of our work. In N & K’s defense, kharis seems to be a broadly misunderstood concept within epinician criticism, and I think that it will take some time before a widespread reinterpretation of kharis develops within the specialist literature.

The authors are overly sanguine that we have good evidence for the performance of epinician poetry at Panhellenic sanctuaries (34). The fact that there is little evidence for the performance of epinician song at Panhellenic sanctuaries should have been noted in N & K’s main text, so that readers will be aware of this. N & K will argue later in the book for the performance of some epinician odes at Panhellenic sanctuaries, and I have the impression that they do not inform their readers, in the introduction, of how little evidence there is for the performance of epinician odes at Panhellenic sanctuaries precisely because they do not want to put their readers into a position of informed skepticism when they will have the opportunity to evaluate N & K’s related argument later in the book. Of course, this is a problem. If the reader makes the time to consider the subject matter of O. 1, for example, the reader will recognize that N & K’s suggestion (35) that O. 1 provides good evidence for the ode’s performance at Olympia is weak. And N & K are wrong, I contend, to suggest that O. 8 provides evidence for performance at Olympia. My time spent with Pindar suggests that Pindar’s odes provide little evidence for the performative ‘ambiguous deixis’ that N & K assert is present in the odes (37), and N & K do not seem to be aware of our work. I want to stress that, in this chapter, the authors make valuable observations regarding Pindaric geography as a “capacious and systematic spatial system” (37) and note valuable discursive parallels in the Theognidea (39).

Thereafter, N and K discuss the term kōmos, and here I think that they are incorrect to interpret the kōmos either as the chorus or as Pindar’s song (39). Such interpretations were prominent in the past, but I have the impression that epinician critics are now largely in agreement that references to kōmōi within the odes are references to the victory celebrations at which Pindar’s odes would have first been performed. Furthermore, N & K’s understanding

---


of, or at least their description of, Pindar’s Greek is regularly incorrect, as will be noted on occasion below. One gets a glimpse of this in chapter 1, when N & K reference I. 8.1-4 and suggest that the passage provides evidence for celebration “adjacent to the physical house of the victor” (40). Such performance need not be the case. The chapter ends with comments on ring composition, word placement, music, and dance. These materials will be helpful for readers who are new to such phenomena in relation to the structure and performance of epinician song.

In chapter 2, N & K address the dialectic of objects and their environments. They begin by asserting that archaic statuary stands in a negative relation to its surroundings (47), but they do not explain what they mean by negative relation, and given that they do not define their key term, the reader is not given the wherewithal to evaluate their assertion. Their argument soon becomes tendentious, moreover. They suggest that archaic kouroi and korai do not interact with mortals but “smile at nobody in particular” (47). This seems to me unfair. Alternatively, the Tyrannicides monument, we are told, interacts with the viewer. And N & K suggest that viewers should interpret the ‘great light’ referenced in the epigram attributed to Simonides of Keos, on the base of the Tyrannicides monument, as a metaphor for the figures themselves. But that is not obvious. In fact, the temporal clause, “when Aristogeiton killed Hiparchos with Harmodios,” provides evidence against their interpretation, since ‘the great light,’ in the main clause, is separate from Harmodios and Aristogeiton in the temporal clause. The ‘great light’ may be, for example, freedom from tyranny, the outcome seemingly made possible by the action of the killers. Yet, N & K further assert that to rush at the beholder is to be a great light (51), thereby linking the light imagery, the sculptures, and the authors’ interest in diegetic space. The authors have moved from the sculptures themselves being a great light to their movement toward the viewer being a great light (51)—and they provide no explanation as to how their discrete interpretations may, in fact, congeal. Thereafter, N & K make straightforward suggestions: they note that the Tübingen runner ‘impinges’ (55) and that a red-figure cup by the Alkimachos Painter portrays the incipient and actual motion of a runner in armor (55); these observations are made in regard to the authors’ interest in the complexity of the space between material object and its viewer.

We turn to fire and to fire imagery. An overly compressed discussion of Iliad 22.25-32 follows, and the authors assert that “Achilles the fast runner, in short, is like a work of art: he assimilates to the wonderful handiworks that cover his body” (58). I note, however, that Homer stresses that it is Achilles’ bronze, not Achilles, that is the cause of Achilles’ brilliance (l. 32); accordingly, Homer does not seem to be assimilating Achilles to his armor. A brief excursus on wonder (thauma), developed within the framework of Raymond Prier, follows. N & K observe that attention is given to Achilles when Athena kindles flame from his head in Iliad 18 and that light imagery and radiance, associated with the lighthouse of Akeratos on Thasos, mark the presence of a departed man (66). They conclude that Achilles (on the plain of Troy) and the lighthouse of Akeratos, due to their brightness and their effect on others, orient space.

In the second half of this chapter, N & K provide a discussion of narrative statuary. This section begins with a valuable overview regarding the difference between diegetic and non-

---

10 Arrival at the home of the father and the performance of the kōmos need not be coincident, and the performance of the kōmos need not occur at the house of the father.
diegetic space (69-72). Thereafter, N & K discuss serial statuary. They suggest that repetitive figures such as the Naxian lions on Delos ‘sculpt’ space but that they do not “engage their environment by means of narrative” (72). They contend that two korai dedicated in a sanctuary at Klaros were intended to be viewed both in relation to one another and in relation to their environment. And thereafter they turn to discuss rather grand dedications at Olympia: the monument of the Apollonians and the Achaian monument. These materials are all well-handled, and the authors do a good job of showing how complex space (and time) can be when one stands amidst a sculptural group such as that of the Apollonians. The chapter ends with a discussion of the Molpoi Decree, and here the authors are interested in dialogue between sculpture, architecture, and poetry (86). They suggest, “paian is the tool that actually effects the transformation of the landscape” (89). I note, however, that this is not obviously correct. For example, sculpture and votive dedications, offered en route, may have been equally important ‘tools’ in the construction of a sacred landscape. Furthermore, it is surprising to find the authors make the claim, in their concluding remarks, that “the relation of statue to beholder is worldly not supernatural, social not theological” (90), particularly since several of the items discussed in this chapter were dedicated in sanctuaries. The effect of sacred space on the human beholder should be addressed. Or, if the authors are really intent on disregarding the sacred context of said offerings, they should explain why they feel that it is appropriate to do so. Frankly, I doubt that N & K really want to degrade the sacred, and I think that their preoccupation with the interactive zone between viewer and object has made them forget to consider what it means for the space between object and viewer to be sacred space. Indeed, discussion that takes into consideration the nature of sacred space would go some way in developing their assertions as to the complexity of space between material object and human viewer.

In chapter 3, the authors begin with discussion of Pindar’s poetry in relation to radiance. Turning their attention to N. 10, N & K make numerous assertions without providing evidence in support of said assertions (94-95). Furthermore, the authors suggest that “[Aphareus’] tomb monument is also, according to Pindar, bright or radiant—light reflecting from “polished stone”—and this radiance signifies its numinous power through the transaction of cult and contact” (95). I note, however, that Pindar does not suggest that the tomb is bright or radiant (and kseston [67] may mean only ‘hewn’) nor does Pindar mention any light in the relevant passage. A reading of P. 5.32-42 follows. The authors begin by noting Pindar’s description of Arkesilas’ dedication at Delphi and suggest, “Pindar’s song explicitly collaborates with the material dedication to intensify and vastly expand the reach of its radiance” (96). Here we find the authors’ characteristic problem with agency, as the authors lose track of Pindar’s goals, while granting agency to the ode. I note, moreover, that the passage excerpted has no words denoting radiance; accordingly, as with their discussion of light imagery in N. 10, their discussion of radiance here is unsound. Thereafter, they turn to lines 43-53 and suggest that Pindar’s language “doubles as or replaces the inscription we would expect to find attached to the dedicated chariot” (99). The gar (l. 49) to which they call the reader’s attention in favor of their suggestion, however, provides evidence against their suggestion, since it provides the reason for the provision of Pindar’s song and does not link it with the dedication at Delphi.

Thereafter, the authors develop a section on light imagery in Pindar’s odes and make the original claim that “the convention consists precisely in likening poetry to sculpture” (100). This seems incorrect to me. They propose, “the essence of the conceit is that a Pindaric poem
is itself a radiant *agalma* that gives out light—much like the real objects embedded in the epinikia” (100). But objects, such as sculptures, given as votive offerings, do not give out light—rather, such objects are visible due to light shone upon them—the authors do not take this nor other causes that may motivate light imagery in Pindar’s odes into consideration.

In the second half of chapter 3, the authors turn to O. 7 and suggest that “the emphasis on craft and dedication [in the ode] makes it particularly tempting to suppose that O. 7 did not just wind up as a votive inscription but was actually composed with such display in mind” (103). I prefer scholarly argument to be driven by words stronger than ‘tempting.’ Unsurprisingly, their interpretation is hypothesis, and the subject matter of O. 7 does not provide evidence for the dedication of O. 7. But this does not dissuade N & K from imagining the poem to have been “chiseled in stone and gilded.” They are developing tendentious interpretation based on a report by a scholiast, who notes that Gorgon reported that the ode was dedicated in/on/at the Temple of Athena Lindia in letters of gold (please note that the ἐν in the passage under discussion is notably ambiguous). For all we know, the ode may have been written in gilded letters on an animal skin and stored inside the temple,11 but N & K suggest that the ode was inscribed on a wall of the temple of Athena Lindia overlooking the sea (103-104). And they assert, “Pindar’s poem would have blazed in the sunlight, conspicuous from a great distance” (104). We are moving out of the realm of scholarship and into the realm of creative writing, since N and K encourage their readers to imagine the ode inscribed on the outside of the temple overlooking the sea (on multiple occasions [104, 105, 123]), when there is no evidence in favor of such installation. N & K should be more transparent with their readers, and should not package their interpretive whimsy as scholarship.

Thereafter, the authors turn to I. 4 and to its light imagery. They raise discussion of the adjective ‘wondrous’ (*thaumaston*, 21), applied to Pindar’s hymn, and they tendentiously submit that the word references, “in part the remarkable scintillating light effects that play through the poem” (107). I think both that this is incorrect and that M.M. Willcock correctly interprets the adjective within its context, when he says, “not self praise by the poet, but additional praise for the victor; his achievement is wonderful, and gives wonder to the celebration.”12 Of course, it is praiseworthy for N & K to offer original interpretation, but a recurrent problem in this book is that they regularly propagate their own ideas without sufficient engagement with the ideas of previous scholars, and this passage, I contend, is a case in point. After a discussion of Homeric intertexts, N & K turn to discuss lines 61 to 66, and here they translate Pindar’s Greek incorrectly. They translate *stephanomata* (‘crowns’ *vel sim*) as ‘things heaped up’ and *anatellomena* as ‘rising like a planet’. They thereby misinterpret Pindar’s crown imagery13 and add a phrase ‘like a planet’ that is not included in Pindar’s Greek. Furthermore, I think that N &

---


13 I have recently argued that the reference to crowns in this passage is a reference to song being offered at altars; Pindar, I suggest, seems to reference the practice of the *kuklos khoros* dancing around altars during festivals. For discussion, see “I Weave a Variegated Headband: Metaphors for Song and Communication in Pindar’s Odes,” *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* 110 (2019) 59-95, at 82-83. It is noteworthy that N & K acknowledge Pindar’s crown imagery shortly thereafter (112).

The authors next turn to N. 3 and to its light imagery. I, again, have reservations regarding their interpretation of Pindar’s Greek. I contend that the poem is not a kōmos but performed at a kōmos (victory celebration).\footnote{Cf. fn. 8.} And I suggest that N & K misinterpret lines 12 and 13: I contend that the subject of the verb is not ‘hymn’, despite N & K’s assertion, since the hymn is the object of the verb. The subject of the verb must be Zeus, understood from line 10. And I maintain that N & K are also incorrect to suggest that kharienta ponon (12) is a ‘labor of grace’; I suggest that it is a ‘labor filled with requital,’ offered, as a counter gift, to Zeus in response to Zeus gifting the victory. Thereafter, N & K submit that Pindar’s imagery of ‘builders’ (tektones, 4) derives from bees being builders of comb (116). This is a valuable suggestion, but the interpretation is not obviously correct. Pindar regularly introduces architectural metaphor in the beginnings of his songs, and Pindar and/or his audience may interpret the ‘builders’ in relation to buildings. Thereafter, N & K offer tendentious interpretation regarding columns in relation to the Pillars of Herakles and Aegina (116-117) and tendentious interpretation regarding Pindar’s supposed likening of his song to the temple on Kolonna (118).\footnote{For valuable skepticism expressed toward reading the Aphaia temple into Pindar’s Aeginetan odes, see H.J. Hansen, “Pindar’s Isthmian 6: A Commentary and Literary Study” (PhD Diss., UNC Chapel Hill, 2016) 9-13.}

In chapter 4, N & K suggest that Pindar fr. 75 SM was performed by a kuklos khoros around the altar of the twelve gods in Athens’ archaic agora. The chapter begins with a valuable overview concerning the manner in which statues and shrines could serve as place markers. Thereafter, the authors assert that Pindar opens fr. 75 SM invoking the Olympian gods to come to the agora (129), but this is not true. Pindar exhorts the gods to come to the chorus (l.1), and Pindar makes no mention as to the location of the chorus. Pindar’s references to the omphalos and to the agora occur within a relative clause, which, within hymnal style, notes the characteristic haunts of the gods invoked.\footnote{Cf. e.g. M.J.H. van der Weiden, The Dithyrambs of Pindar: Introduction, Text and Commentary (Amsterdam, 1991), 193.} At any rate, the reference to the omphalos and the agora need not have anything to do with the immediate performance of Pindar’s song; accordingly, the authors are wrong to claim that “a natural consequence [of the invocation] is that the poem was in fact intended for performance in the agora: the chorus summons the gods to that spot” (129). Furthermore, there is not enough evidence in Pindar’s poem to link Pindar’s omphalos with the altar of the twelve gods; and one might argue that the te in line 5 suggests that the omphalos and the agora are discrete locales. The argument of this whole chapter is unsound.\footnote{A few more notes: with regard to Diothen (l.7), it is fine for Pindar (although N & K suggest otherwise [148]) to say that the poet (or singer) ‘goes from Zeus’ because Pindar may here use the road-of-song topos, envisioning himself as travelling on the road of song. At I. 4.1-3, for example, Pindar is on the road of song and is in pursuit. In fact, I think both that Pindar uses the road of song topos in fr. 75 SM and that he is beginning ‘from Zeus’ because it is conventional hymnal practice for a poet to do so. Thus, I contend that N & K are wrong to assert that fatal objections may be made against this interpretation (148). It should be noted, however, that the}
In chapters 5 and 6, N & K turn to Cyrene and to Pindar’s odes for Cyrenaeans (P. 4, P. 5, and P. 9). And, in chapter 5, N & K, after introducing Cyrene, begin by suggesting that we should think of foundation legends of Cyrene as either historical (Battos I founded Cyrene) or mythological (Apollo founded Cyrene via the nymph Cyrene). I think that the introduction of the concepts historical and mythological does more harm than good. Of course, neither the Greeks generally nor Pindar specifically thought of Apollo and Cyrene as mythological and to introduce these categories leads one to misunderstand the metaphysics of Pindar and of the Cyrenaeans. At any rate, N & K develop these polarities in order to assert that Pindar tells different foundation narratives for ideological reasons: he supposedly tells the ‘historical’ when affirming the Battiad royal dynasty (P. 5) and he supposedly tells the ‘mythological’ when composing (P. 9) for the aristocrat, Telesikrates, who was not a member of the royal family. But N & K are not honest with their readers concerning the subject matter of P. 9 and P. 5. They declare that, in composing P. 9, Pindar “omits the Battiads entirely, excising them from history; in Pythian 9, Cyrene is a ‘Battiad-free’ zone” (166). But, at P. 9.54-55, Cheiron mentions to Apollo the colonization movement of Battos from Thera to Cyrene; thus, N & K mislead when they assert that P. 9 is a Battiad-free zone. And N & K, I think, are wrong to emphasize a ‘non-mythological’ foundation for Cyrene in P. 5 because, as Pindar himself stresses that the Trojan Antenoridai had settled Cyrene well before Battos (82-86). Pindar is more comfortable with the mixing of ‘mythical’ and ‘non-mythical’ elements in P. 5 and in P. 9, in ways that do not affirm N & K’s ideological reading, than N & K suggest; thus, their stark ideological reading is not well founded.

In the second half of the chapter, the authors turn away from Pindar and toward Cyrene itself. They suggest that the settlers of Cyrene, in laying out Cyrene, “seem to have mimicked the plan of their mother city [i.e. Thera]” (171). I leave it to scholars with competence in city planning to evaluate this suggestion. Turning to the agora, N & K develop tendentious argument regarding spatial planning. Being that the tomb of Battos is on the eastern side of the agora and the Prytaneion is on the western side, the authors suggest that the royal authority and civic magistrates ‘confronted’ one another on opposite sides of the town square (174). Thus, they read into the civic space the confrontation that they want to find in the civic space. It is important to note that they do not consider why the Battiads would allow this spatial confrontation within the agora nor do they mention that the sacred space for Apollo Archegetas (also on the western side of the agora) would, according to their logic, also confront Battos. N & K elide important discussion regarding agency and city planning that reference to Zeus may reference the poet being inspired by Zeus. I. 5.29, for example, provides evidence that the poet’s song may be inspired by Zeus. Thus, N & K are incorrect (148), I contend, to discard that possibility also. Given these points and given the observation made above regarding the authors’ misconstrual of Pindar’s relative clause (ll. 3-4), the authors provide us with no reason to follow their suggestion and to read “Diothen and deuteron as spatial deictics that operate within a dense network of topographic references to shrines and cults in the old agora of Athens” (149).

N & K double down on their categorization, stating that the tale of Apollo and Cyrene (the nymph) makes the foundation of Cyrene (the polis) ‘supernatural, mythic’ (166). I encourage us to recall that one reason that Theaioi, the laudandus of N. 10, was such a great athlete was because the Dioscuri used to come to dinner at his family’s home and the Dioscuri offer solicitous care (ll. 49-54).

Note the way that they backtrack (175) and suggest that the Battiads, as probable priests of Apollo, also serve to unify the square (being that Apollo’s space abuts the Prytaneion).
would need to be addressed in order for their argument to be compelling. Thereafter, the authors turn to discuss Cyrene’s three main sanctuaries. Herein, they express interest in Pindar referencing Apollo as the Delian stranger in P. 9 (10), and they develop tendentious argument concerning the term Delian. Apollo is always Delian, I contend, being that he was born on Delos,21 whether he is at his sanctuary at Delphi or at Cyrene, but N & K suggest that the epiclesis encourages us to interpret Apollo as an Ionian god, separate from his association with Delphi. I have already noted above that N & K are wrong to dissociate P. 9 from the Battos legend and here again we find them, inappropriately, separating Apollo from Delphi (and thereby his close links with the Battis dynasty). Thereafter N & K turn to discuss Ioniizing dedications at Cyrene and suggest that “such dedications may have held special appeal to Cyrene’s aristocrats precisely because they were not Dorian, not Theran, not Battisid” (182-183). That may well be the case, but this is speculation, and, as N & K note, the dedications may have been offered by royal patrons (183).22

In chapter 6, the authors continue their interest in P. 5 and P. 9, and they introduce P. 4 also, suggesting that P. 4 ‘reconciles’ the ideological tensions of P. 5 and P. 9. They assert that there is a “political or ideological motive for the displacement of oracular authority” (190), being that it is not Apollo, but Cheiron, who prophesies in P.9. Thereafter, they suggest that Delphic Apollo is suppressed in P. 9 (191). Their concepts of ‘displacement’ and ‘suppression’ are, I find, tendentious. Thereafter, they create a chart of ‘oppositions’ between P. 9 and P. 5 (193); but they do not provide compelling argumentation as to why their oppositions are valid. I, for example, do not believe that Pindar opposes intermarriage/exogamy (P. 9) against xenia (P. 5), and the authors do not provide argument in favor of such a supposed opposition. In order for the suggestion to be attractive, for example, the authors would need to provide comparanda, either from Greek literature in general or, better yet, from Pindar, to show us that there is a system of thought in Greek literature such that intermarriage/exogamy is played against xenia.23 N & K turn thereafter to P. 4, and we are told that “Pythian 4 forges a rapprochement between the two sides [i.e. those supposedly represented in P. 9 and i. 5], reconciling various ideological tensions that the other two odes pose more starkly” (193). As I have already noted, the stark ideological tensions that N & K find in the odes are not obvious, and P. 5 and P. 9, in fact, provide evidence against N & K’s thesis. Furthermore, the authors will have to construct a performance scenario that will suit their hypothesis (although we have no evidence for the order of performance of P. 5 relative to P. 4), and that they do. But, even if we were to countenance the authors the performance scenario that they require, we do not know


22 One more note: N & K suggest (188) that a reference made by Theotimos of Cyrene to Arkesilas ‘crowning his homeland’ suggests an offering of the victor’s crown to the poliadic deity. However, recent scholarship has noted that there is no evidence for the dedication of crowns in the home communities of the victor (B. Currie, Pindar and the Cult of Heroes [Oxford, 2005], 58). In the passage of Theotimos to which N & K refer, the reference to Arkesilas crowning his home is metaphorical. One cannot take the passage literally, pace N & K. With ‘crowning,’ Theotimos seems to mean that Arkesilas brought glory to Cyrene. On this topic, see too C. Eckerman “I Weave a Variegated Headband: Metaphors for Song and Communication in Pindar’s Odes,” Harvard Studies in Classical Philology 110 (2019) 59-95, at 88.

23 And we should want to know why Pindar in P. 5 would want to degrade the concepts of intermarriage and exogamy, present in the earlier-composed P. 9.
that the odes’ performances would have had the same audiences, or, supposing that the audiences of P. 5 and P. 4 were the same, that the audiences would have known P. 9 such that they would have been able to recognize N & K’s hypothesized rapprochement. And why would Damophilos, presumed patron of P. 4, care to respond to Telesikrates’ poem, P. 9? After all, Damophilos is not responsible for P. 9. Such questions, at least, need to be addressed. Moreover, I do not find their argument for reconciliation compelling. For example, one of N & K’s supposed oppositions (193) is chôra (P. 9) vs. urban center (P. 5), and they suggest that P. 4. 259-262 is constructed so as to represent the Battiaid dynasty as having power over both the chôra and the urban core and that P. 4 thereby reconciles the tensions of P. 5 and P. 9. In making this suggestion, however, they misinterpret Pindar’s Greek and add a gratuitous ‘and’ in brackets (198) to allow for a separation between chôra and urban center. They then suggest that there are intertextual echoes that support their ideological interpretation; I do not find these compelling.

In the second half of chapter 6, they provide a reading of P. 5. They begin by referring to references to topography and monument in P. 5 as ‘cues’ (203). The introduction of the concept of cues, however, is unwarranted since it presumes performative markers that cannot be assumed. N & K assert, moreover, that P. 5 feels processional (204), but I do not share their feeling, and they should provide argument in favor for a processional ‘feel’ for the poem, rather than suggest that it is a given. Thereafter, N & K suggest that P. 5 “fuses or merges the layout of the city [Cyrene] with the very body, or bodies, of the kings” (205), and they turn to the proem of the ode to support this assertion. They reference the terms ‘leads it forth’ (3) and ‘attendant’ (4) and assert, “these terms focus on the body of the king metaphorically moving through space” (206). This is not true. The terms ‘leads it forth’ and ‘attendant’ are used in a generalizing temporal clause that is not linked with the body of the king. Accordingly, there is no reason to countenance their argument, developed throughout this section, namely that “the body of king Arkesilas...seems to infuse the city and entire territory of Cyrene” (217). And I believe that N & K are incorrect to interpret the kômos referenced at line 22 as a group of men having returned from Delphi to Cyrene; the kômos, I contend, is the immediate victory celebration at which Pindar’s ode is being performed. Toward the end of the chapter, the authors return to consider P. 4.254-262, the passage discussed above in reference to a gratuitous ‘and’. They reprint the passage (214) and, on this occasion, remove the brackets from the ‘and’ in their translation. This is unethical—the ‘and’ should remain bracketed, particularly since they have added it into their translation in support of their argument.

In chapter 7, N & K turn to O. 6 and they introduce their interest in the malleability of space, considering the manner in which the poem images a Deinomenid world. They begin by noting the remarkable amount of dedications offered by the Deinomenids and by their associates at places of prestige, such as at Olympia and Delphi. And N & K assert that “Deinomenid rule emphasized populations and mobility over bounded territory” (225). I leave it to a historian to evaluate this suggestion. Thereafter, they introduce their own, new concept,
which they refer to as ‘epichoric irony’; this, they tell us, refers to regional identity being flagged in some way so as to subordinate it to Deinomenid hegemony. I cannot say that I found any of their examples of epichoric irony compelling. Indeed, some of the evidence that they cite in favor of their concept may be read as providing evidence against it. For example, they suggest that Phormis, associated with the Deinomenids, in referencing himself as previously Arkadian and/but now Syracusan (note the ambiguous de) is thereby demoting his previous Arkadian identity (226). But Phormis may mention his origins because they are important to him and not in order to ‘supersede’ his origins with his current Syracusan identity. Similar problems arise in N & K’s discussion of Praxiteles’ dedication at Olympia. They suggest that Praxiteles’ reference to himself as Syracusan subordinates the other locales with which he associates himself in the inscription. It is noteworthy that Praxiteles mentions that he is also from Kamarina and that N & K place this reference in a parenthesis in their translation (thereby making this reference to identity seem comparably unimportant). Nothing, however, warrants their parenthesis, and they make the parenthesis for the sake of promoting their own argument. Furthermore, after Praxiteles mentions his association with Kamarina, he mentions that he was from ‘flock-rich Arkadia’; the honorific epithet ‘flock-rich’ grants prestige to Arkadia. Thus, Praxiteles does not downplay his pre-Syracusan identity by referencing his Arkadian origins. I respond only to these first two examples that N & K offer in favor of epichoric irony to show that their concept is not compelling; much the same could be said of other passages that they cite in supposed favor of epichoric irony.26

We turn to O. 6. With regard to the ode’s performance context, N & K suggest that Apollo’s telling Iamos to come ‘here’ (63) to Olympia should encourage us to see Olympia as a venue for re/performance (239-40) of O. 6. But the phrase provides no more evidence for re/performance at Olympia than would Priam telling Helen to come ‘here’ to him on the walls of Troy provide evidence for the re/performance of Homeric song at Troy. Thereafter, the authors turn to a discussion of the proem of O. 6. It seems to me that N & K either do not understand Pindar’s Greek or that they purposefully misinterpret it for the sake of their argument.27 Furthermore, the authors suggest a desire to connect the opening architectural imagery with Pindar’s ‘gates of song’ (27), but that imagery is discrete from the architectural imagery of the proem.28 And, thereafter, N & K assert “the association of the thalamos with Olympia implies sacred architecture of the sort one might encounter in the Altis” (241). This is not true. I note that

26 If epichoric irony were a phenomenon that subtended Greek spatial thought, as N & K suggest, we would not expect to find Pindar placing non-Deinomenid locales on equal standing with Deinomenid Syracuse. But, in O. 6, Pindar uses the phrase ‘from oikos to oikos’ (99), referencing celebration for Hagesias moving from Stymphalos to Syracuse. With the key word oikos, Pindar stresses that Hagesias’ ‘home’ in Stymphalos is on equal standing with his home in Syracuse. So too, thereafter, Pindar, in a gnomonic statement, stresses that it is good for a ship to have two anchors on a stormy night (100-101). Hagesias, like a ship, is anchored equally by Stymphalos and by Syracuse. Thus, Pindar’s poetry provides evidence against N & K’s concept of ‘epichoric irony.’

27 They place in brackets a phrase that should not be placed in brackets, and their syntactic interpretation of said phrase muddles the relationship between aorist participle (πορέωντος), main verb (πάζωμεν), and the verb that must be understood in the temporal clause (cf. e.g. G. Kirkwood, Selections from Pindar [Chico, CA, 1982], 85; Kirkwood also discusses the analogous ὡς ὤτε construction of the proem of I. 6 at 291). Furthermore, a key term (θαλάμου, 1) gets dropped from N & K’s translation.

Pindar’s thalamos has no association with Olympia;\(^\text{29}\) and the altar of Zeus is mentioned three lines later, after an intervening gnomic statement. Thereafter, they try to link Pindar’s opening architectural imagery with the treasury of the Geloans at Olympia, and a further example of the authors purposefully misleading their readers comes when they say that “Pindar envisions multiple columns, not just two” (243): Pindar’s plural adjective (χρυσέας, 1) could reference two columns. But, frankly, to even point this out is to give N & K too much credit and to suggest that one should take their suggestion seriously. There is no treasury. Thereafter, N & K provide discussion of the Geloan treasury in particular and treasuries in general and turn to discuss the structure and further subject matter of O. 6. Their discussion of 64-70 is marred: N & K link Pindar’s ‘twofold treasury’ with Gela’s and Syracuse’s treasuries, although Pindar clarifies that Iamos’ ‘two-fold treasury’ is one of prophecy and thereafter explicates his reference (66-70) in relation to Iamos’ prophetic perquisites. Remarkably, they say, “we get an elaborate description of Herakles’ foundation of the games” (253), when, in fact, Pindar offers no description of Herakles’ foundation of the games. And, despite their declaration otherwise, nothing in the passage references the stadium (253) nor, despite their ruminations, does Pindar do anything to locate an audience within a theatron in the Altis (253).

In chapter 8, N & K further develop their interest in Deinomenid placemaking, continuing to use O. 6 as a case study. They remind us that Pindar links places through related deities (256-7) and, hereafter, suggest that Pindar brings about transport to Olympia by phrases such as ‘if someone should be an Olympic victor’ (O. 6, 4-5). Frankly, I do not feel transported to Olympia by this phrase, and N & K should do more to explicate their interpretation of Pindar’s use of vicarious transport. They also suggest that Pindar’s mention of cult locales in O. 6 ‘links’ these locales together (259). But N & K offer no argument for that suggestion. I note that Pindar’s mention of multiple places does not mean that he is purposefully linking them. Thereafter, N & K suggest that, “at the end of the ode, Hieron himself becomes the center … around whom all the poem’s spaces organize themselves” (261). And, turning to O. 1 and Bacchylides 3, N & K comment on the manner in which Pindar and Bacchylides link Hieron’s Syracuse, Olympia, and Delphi, particularly through light, sound, and narration.\(^\text{30}\) And they say, “the workings of [O. 1 and B. 3] suggest that Hieron had a particular interest in the imagined merging of a vast if discontinuous supra-polis space to register the extent of his power and influence” (264). This is an interesting suggestion, but more evidence would need to be supplied to move the argument from the realm of the plausible to the realm of the credible. Thereafter, N & K return to O. 6 and note its language of splendor (265-6). Here I appreciated their discussion of ‘tactile viewing’ whereby Pindar conjures the feel of objects.

In the final section of the book, the authors turn to looping imagery in O. 6 and suggest that it is pervasive. They speak of Aineas (ll. 90-91) as chorodidaskalos, but we do not know that Aineas was a chorodidaskalos. Thus, any argument built on the assumption of Aineas being chorodidaskalos may well be wrong. The authors find purposeful analogies in the looping of the skutale (message stick) and Pindar’s narrative turns around the Greek world. Thereafter, they

---

\textsuperscript{29} As noted above, the authors make a similar misleading argument when suggesting that the generalizing imagery at the beginning of P. 5 references the body of Arkesilas.

\textsuperscript{30} Herein, N & K assert, “commentators consistently assume that [B 3.15-16] represent the civic celebration of victory back in Syracuse” (264); when we turn to read their related footnote, however, we learn that their statement is not true.
discuss Pindar's image of the 'sweet mixing bowl of loud-sounding songs' (l. 91) and suggest that we are to understand the 'vertical of the ladle' as the cause of the krater being loud sounding. But Pindar does not say that the krater is loud sounding. It is song that is loud-sounding, and song is loud-sounding because Pindar regularly constructs his 'loud-sounding' songs as various liquids, such as he does here.\textsuperscript{31} There is no ladle. Thereafter, N & K express interest in the verticality of Amphitrite's spindle (l. 104) and link the skutale, supposed ladle, spindle, and the columns of the proem together. And N & K suggest that O. 6 achieves a collapse of the two categories artifact/architecture and roads or journeys (273). I think that the concept of collapse would need to be addressed. For example, what would we be looking for to decide whether Pindar achieves collapse of imagery? And how do we recognize that Pindar affects collapse of imagery in this ode while he does not do so in others? N & K do not address such questions.

The book ends with a brief chapter summary, referred to as a coda, and an appendix wherein the authors suggest that the porch of the treasury of the Geloans should be dated to the 470s. I leave it to scholars with greater competency in archaeology and material culture to evaluate the value of N & K's appendix.\textsuperscript{32}

\textbf{CHRIS ECKERMAN}

\textit{Univrsity of Oregon}

\texttt{eckerman@uoregon.edu}

\textsuperscript{31} For Pindar's songs as liquids, see, with reference to further bibliography, C. Eckerman "Pindar's \textit{Olympian} 1.1-7 and its relation to Bacchylides 3.85-87," \textit{Wiener Studien} 130 (2017) 7-32, at 9-14.

\textsuperscript{32} I thank David Counter, Britt Duer, and Aidan Kolar for reading and discussing this book with me.