

# History by Analogy: Cato the Younger and Caesar in Livy's Account of the Second Punic War

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**Abstract:** Although Livy's account of the late Republic has been lost to modern readers and with it Livy's interpretation of events surrounding the lives of Cato the Younger and Julius Caesar, whom the *Periochae* confirm figured prominently in the books covering the late Republic. Yet Cato and Caesar are not wholly absent from Livy's surviving works. The outlines of Cato's character can be seen in Hanno, the Carthaginian senator who plays a prominent role in opposing Hannibal during the Second Punic War. There are also a number of interesting parallels between Hannibal and Caesar. When placed alongside one another the similarities between each pair of senator and general reveals an analogous paradigm. Livy's construction of the relationship between Hanno and Hannibal closely resembles the contentious relationship between Cato and Caesar, suggesting that Livy used the analogous historical framework of Cato and Caesar to build his narrative of the discord between Hanno and Hannibal. Livy's history by analogy reveals the policies and behaviors that put to ruin the power of Carthage and destroyed the Roman Republic.

**Keywords:** Cato the Younger, Caesar, Livy, Hanno, Hannibal, Punic Wars

Although Livy's account of the late Republic has been lost to modern readers, Cato the Younger and Caesar no doubt figured prominently in the books covering the late Republic.<sup>1</sup> The *Periochae*, abbreviated as they are, confirm that Livy touched upon many of the moments in the lives of Caesar and Cato discussed by other writers, such as Plutarch, Dio, and Appian. Yet Cato and Caesar are not wholly absent from Livy's surviving works, as this paper shall argue. We can see the outlines of Cato's character in Hanno, the Carthaginian senator who plays a prominent role in opposing Hannibal during the Second Punic War. Just as there are a number of similarities between Hanno and Cato, there are also a number of interesting parallels between Hannibal and Caesar. When placed alongside one another the similarities between each pair of senator and general reveals an analogous paradigm. While it is hard to argue with certainty Livy's full intentions, Livy's construction of the relationship between Hanno and Hannibal closely resembles the contentious relationship between Cato and Caesar,

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<sup>1</sup> Cato is mentioned in the *Periochae* for books 104, 105, 107, 112-114, while Caesar is mentioned throughout the *Periochae* for books 103-117. For the *Periochae* generally, see Bessone 2015, 425-36.

suggesting that Livy used the analogous historical framework of Cato and Caesar to build his narrative of the discord between Hanno and Hannibal.

## I. History by Analogy

Livy's propensity to reference more recent historical figures or events in his accounts of earlier historical figures and events is well documented.<sup>2</sup> Many have seen Augustus in the figures of Romulus and Camillus.<sup>3</sup> Others have viewed episodes such as the Struggle of the Orders, and specifically Livy's account of Spurius Maelius (4.13), as alluding to the strife of the late Republic.<sup>4</sup> My intention here is not to revisit these passages, which have their own rich literature; I cite them to suggest that it is more expected than surprising that Livy should find points of contact between the Second Carthaginian War and later Roman history. The focus of this paper will be on how Cato and Caesar are prefigured in Hanno and Hannibal.

There are several important points to consider before turning to Livy's text. First, general knowledge of the lives of Cato and Caesar will form the point of comparison to Livy's account of Hanno and Hannibal. This is partly a necessity as Livy's books on the late Republic are lost to us and with them any possible points of intertextuality with his earlier books. Yet even more, the intertext is not to be found in any particular written text. The intertext is history itself. As Cynthia Damon has written in an important article, the historical past, not only the literary past, can function as the source for intertexts and analogy.<sup>5</sup> As this paper will show, the events and actions of Hanno and Hannibal, which Livy recounts, find analogies in the widely known and generally recognized events and actions of Cato and Caesar. Although there are fine distinctions, and at times these are important, the broad outlines of the lives of Cato and Caesar can be found in the works of Plutarch, Dio, and Appian, and no doubt in now lost works by historians and other writers, such as Cicero, Caesar, and Asinius Pollio. There is no need to look for allusive language to connect the analogy, as the major points of contact are widely known and referenced historical events.

The language I have chosen to describe the relationship between Cato and Caesar and Hanno and Hannibal is analogy. Livy is not simply suggesting that Hannibal is like Caesar or Hanno is like Cato. The relationship goes more broadly beyond a one to one comparison. A

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<sup>2</sup> Whatever name we may choose to give to the varieties of Livy's techniques, whether substantive imitation (Woodman 1979, 143-55), repetition (Kraus 1991, 312-25), allusion and intertexts (Levene 2010, 82-163; 2015, 205-16), cyclical patterns (Mineo 2015b, 139-51), or as here historical analogy, and whatever the fine distinctions between these terms, they all point broadly to the same inclination by Livy – to see meaningful relationships between the present and the past.

<sup>3</sup> Though there is by no means a consensus on Livy's interpretation of Augustus, there has been substantial scholarship on the question. See Mineo 2015a, 125-38; Mineo 2015b, 139-52; Gaertner 2008, 27-52; Miles 1997, 88-95, 119-134 with bibliography at 89n.36; Miles 1988, 194-204; Edwards 1996, 44-52; Ceaușescu, 1976, 79-108; Syme 1959, 27-87; Burck 1934, 109-36; Taylor 1918, 158-61.

<sup>4</sup> Generally – Briscoe 1971, 9; Spurius Maelius – Ogilvie 1965, 550-56. Examples could multiply. For instance, accounts of Romulus' death after 44 BCE share a number of similarities with the assassination of Caesar (Plut. *Rom.* 27; Val. Max. 5.3.1; Dion. Hal. 2.56.5), including Livy's (1.16); see Warrior 2006, 25-27, 421-24.

<sup>5</sup> Damon 2010, 375-86.

deeper and more meaningful consideration of how Hannibal corresponds to Caesar is possible because Hanno corresponds to Cato. To put it most plainly, Hanno is to Hannibal as Cato is to Caesar. Moreover, analogy has the power to draw broader conclusions than narrative techniques such as allusion or simile. To combine Damon's point on history as intertext with my own on analogy, Livy builds the relationship between his textual characters, Hanno and Hannibal, on the analogous relationship between historical figures, Cato and Caesar.

Lastly, from at least the writings of Sallust, historians readily adopted the practice of contrasting Cato and Caesar. In Sallust's case, this opposition put into greater relief the virtues of both men and presented a view of the totality of Roman virtue (BC 51-54).<sup>6</sup> Around the same time, numerous *Catos* and *Anti-Catos* were circulating, written by partisans on both sides beginning with Cicero and Caesar and continuing even down to Augustus, who wrote a response to Brutus' pamphlet (Suet. Aug. 85). Thus by the time Livy composed his history, there was an established literary and historiographical tradition of opposing Cato and Caesar, a ready to hand comparison of a military commander willing to press the limits of his authority and a senator willing to stand in opposition in allegiance to the traditional rule of law. Although some have argued convincingly that Livy thinks in terms of cyclical patterns,<sup>7</sup> in composing his account of Hanno and Hannibal on the analogy of Cato and Caesar, Livy is not so much looking to emphasize the cyclical nature of history as much as trying to formulate a facet of political behavior. The formulation goes roughly as follows: ambitious and successful generals, when permitted to operate without restraint and when voices of opposition go unheeded, can be as destructive to their own societies as to their foreign enemies.

## II. Hanno and Cato

I shall begin by looking at Livy's portrayal of Hanno and then sketching the points of contact between Hanno and Cato. In books 21 and 23, Livy records three speeches of Hanno, all in protest to Hannibal's aggressive military command. This is a substantial number for any particular individual in two books, and even more so because Hanno's opposition lacks confirmation from outside sources, so that some even doubt its historicity.<sup>8</sup> In Polybius, Hanno appears only in the narrative of the Carthaginian Mercenary War, as a military commander (Poly. 1.67-88) and occasional enemy of Hamilcar (1.82, 87); he then disappears from the text and is wholly absent from his account of the Second Punic War.<sup>9</sup> Polybius's approach of course is in great contrast to Livy, who, in addition to depicting Hanno as a figure of dissent, grants him considerable *auctoritas* in the Carthaginian senate as an opponent of Hannibal (Livy 21.3, 10, 23.12-13). It would be easy to view Hanno as a recalcitrant malcontent

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<sup>6</sup> Feldherr 2012, 95-112; Kapust 2011, 65-77; Batstone 1988, 1-29.

<sup>7</sup> Mineo 2015b, 140-41; Mineo 2006, *passim*.

<sup>8</sup> MacDonald 2015, 264n.80; Clauss 1997, 165-185; Lenschau 1912, col. 2356 1.61. cols. 2355-57.

<sup>9</sup> Apart from Livy, our primary sources for Hanno are Polybius, Appian, and Zonaras. From Polybius (1.67-88) we learn a lot about Hanno's significant commands early in his career, but not of his opposition to Hannibal in his later career. Appian makes occasional mention of him as part of the faction seeking peace with Rome, which meshes with Livy's depiction of Hanno (*Hisp.* 1.4-5; *Pun.* 34, 49, 68). Zonaras, very likely using Livy as a source, does make mention of Hanno's opposition to Hannibal (8.22, 26; 9.2).

out to thwart the successes of the Barcids, but Hanno consistently pursued a policy of shoring up Carthage's African holdings rather than seeking conquest abroad, not an insensible position.<sup>10</sup>

Hanno first appears in Livy early in book 21 when the Carthaginian senate debated the request of Hasdrubal, Hannibal's brother-in-law, that Carthage send Hannibal to join him in Spain (21.3). Although the pro-Barcid faction won that debate and sent Hannibal to Spain where he was met with the great enthusiasm of the soldiers, there was a powerful voice of dissent in the Carthaginian senate.<sup>11</sup> The dissenting voice belonged to Hanno.

Livy introduces Hanno by describing him as the leader of the opposition party (21.3.2, *alterius factionis princeps*).<sup>12</sup> We should note that although Hanno is the voice of dissent that Livy highlights, he is the leader of a faction in Carthage. He does not stand alone as a voice in the wilderness, but as a political actor within the political community of Carthage and its senate. In the heart of his speech, Hanno opposes the extraordinary and monarch-like power of a military commander, and Livy seems to agree with this assessment.

[21.3.5] "an hoc timemus ne Hamilcaris filius nimis sero imperia immodica et regni paterni speciem videat et, cuius regis genero hereditarii sint relictis exercitus nostri, eius filio parum mature serviamus? [3.6] ego istum iuvenem domi tenendum sub legibus, sub magistratibus, docendum vivere aequo iure cum ceteris censeo, ne quandoque parvus hic ignis incendium ingens exsuscitet."<sup>13</sup>

"Are we afraid that the son of Hamilcar may see too late the excessive powers and the form of his father's rule and are we too slow to be servants to the son of that king whose son-in-law inherited our armies? I propose that this young man be kept at home under the laws and magistrates and learn to live in equal law with others, lest at some point this small fire may light a large conflagration."

Hanno opposed the request on the grounds that Hannibal should not get to witness the excessive power that his father Hamilcar had, which Hanno compared to the power of a monarch (21.3.5, *imperia immodica et regni paterni speciem*). In the very next clause, Hanno called Hamilcar a king (*regis*), adding that the Carthaginians should not rush into servitude to Hamilcar's son (*eius filio parum mature serviamus*). Hanno recommended instead that Hannibal be kept at home to learn under the laws and magistrates (21.3.6, *sub legibus, sub magistratibus*).

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<sup>10</sup> MacDonald 2015, 51-63; Brizzi, 2009, 49-74; Hoyos 2007, 13-24; Fariselli 2006; 105-11.

<sup>11</sup> For Livy's source on the Carthaginian senate (Coelius Antipater, Silenus of Kaleakte, or another), see Burck 1971, 27.

<sup>12</sup> Here, as elsewhere, Livy generally uses Roman terminology for Carthaginian institutions.

<sup>13</sup> The Latin text for Livy is from Livy, *Ab urbe condita libri XXI-XXV*, ed. Robert Seymour Conway and Charles Flamstead Walters, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1929.

Hanno thus puts Hannibal's command in the context of liberty and servitude; the potential war with Rome is not simply a military concern, but a matter of Carthaginian civic freedom.

Hanno's words were in vain; as history well records, Hannibal was sent to Spain. Hanno's position, however, was quite clear: he was apprehensive to permit one man so much authority for fear he would act tyrannically, an issue very familiar to the Roman senate of the late Republic. Right from the start, Livy depicts Hanno in terms of late republican political rhetoric.<sup>14</sup> Livy describes Hanno as the leader of the opposition party, the party of the *optimates*, writing that he had the support of the best men, *pauci ac ferme optimus quisque Hannoni adsentiebantur* (21.4.1) – Hanno was an *optimas*. Earlier Livy wrote that Hanno was the leader (*princeps*) of the opposition faction and now he identifies them as *optimates* (*optimus quisque*). In his own authorial voice, Livy seems to endorse Hanno's take on the abuse of military power when he writes that the majority party prevailed over the better one, as often happens (21.4.1, *sed ut plerumque fit, maior pars meliorem vicit*).<sup>15</sup>

Livy next records Hanno addressing the senate a second time during the Carthaginian siege of Saguntum, in a remarkably lengthy speech (21.10.3-13). Roman envoys, who were denied a hearing with Hannibal, travelled on to Carthage to present their case that Carthage was in violation of its treaty with Rome (21.9). Hanno alone of all the senate spoke in defense of the treaty as the Romans understood it, relying on his *auctoritas* in the face of opposition (21.10.2, *Hanno unus adversus senatum causam foederis magno silentio propter auctoritatem suam, non cum adsensu audientium egit*).

Hanno began by reminding the Carthaginian senate that he had correctly warned Carthage that sending Hannibal to Spain would bring problems (21.10.3, *monuisse, praedixisse se ne Hamilcaris progeniem ad exercitum mitterent*). Echoing his earlier fiery imagery (21.3.6), Hanno argued that Hannibal was burning with the desire for the power of a king and saw the way to it through means of perpetual wars surrounded by arms and legions (21.10.4, *iuvenem flagrantem cupidine regni viamque unam ad id cernentem si ex bellis bella serendo succinctus armis legionibusque vivat*). He then added a new warning – “Your armies are besieging Saguntum where they are prohibited by treaty; soon Roman legions will besiege Carthage” (21.10.5, *Saguntum vestri circumsedent exercitus unde arcentur foedere; mox Carthaginem circumsedebunt Romanae legiones*).

Hanno even supported the demands of the Roman envoys, whom Hannibal had rebuffed in violation of the law of nations (*ius gentium sustulit*), specifically that Hannibal be surrendered to the Romans for breach of the treaty, undoubtedly a highly controversial statement for a member of the Carthaginian senate (21.10.6, *auctorem culpa et reum criminis deposcunt*). He even referred sarcastically to Hannibal as *bonus imperator vester*. In warning that it was against Carthage which Hannibal ultimately led his siege engines, Hanno assumed the mantle of the ignored prophet (21.10.9-10):

[9] Carthagini nunc Hannibal vineas turresque admovet: [10] Carthaginis moenia quatit ariete. Sagunti ruinae – falsus utinam vates sim – nostris capitibus

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<sup>14</sup> Arena 2012, 244-57; Claus 1997, 175; Dunkle 1967, 151-171.

<sup>15</sup> Stocks 2014, 38-39.

incident, susceptumque cum Saguntinis bellum habendum cum Romanis est. dedemus ergo Hannibalem?

[9] Now Hannibal moves his siege towers against Carthage. [10] He batters the walls of Carthage. The ruins of Saguntum – would that I were a false prophet – will fall on our heads, and the war we took up against Saguntum will need to be fought with Rome. Therefore, shall we surrender Hannibal?

Hanno's vehement assertion was that Hannibal should hand over his armies and go into exile, or rather, he should be handed over to the Romans by the Carthaginians as a sign of reconciliation (21.10.12-13, *ipsumque Hannibalem ex foedere Romanis dedant*). Hanno consistently emphasized this message that Hannibal broke the treaty with Rome (21.10.5, 9; 30.31.5). Needless to say, the Carthaginian senate did not take Hanno's counsel.

Hanno continued to be an important voice through the early years of the war, and his behavior remained consistent with his earlier actions. After the battle of Cannae in 216 BCE, Hannibal sent Mago back to Carthage to report on his remarkable string of successes against Roman armies (23.11-12). After Mago's triumphant report, a fellow senator, Himilco, used this opportunity to taunt Hanno for his earlier opposition to the war (23.12.6-7). When questioned by the pro-Barcid Himilco, Hanno responded with a lengthy speech, advising the Carthaginians to use their advantage to sue for peace and recall Hannibal rather than press on (23.12.8-13.5). Hanno began his response in a striking way by couching his words in liberty, saying "If I should remain silent, I would seem either arrogant and therefore forgetful of another man's liberty, or servile and therefore forgetful of my own," (23.12.9, *si reticeam, aut superbus aut obnoxius videar, quorum alterum est hominis alienae libertatis obliti, alterum suae*). Here again is evidence of Hanno's concern for liberty and servitude. He refused to recognize the achievements of Hannibal and reiterated his argument that there should be a return to peace (23.12.10). Hanno saw Hannibal's victories as an opportunity for peace rather than for celebratory rejoicing (23.12.11-12). Through an interrogation of Mago, Hanno established that the Romans had made no offers of peace (23.12.15-13.2).

When Hanno stressed that Rome's allies remained loyal (23.12.16), he echoed Livy's own authorial statement made a book earlier (22.13.11). Livy's interpretation of the way in which the war began resembles Hanno's language as well. Unlike Fabius Pictor and Polybius (3.8-12), Livy assigns the responsibility for the war, particularly its unjust origins, to Hannibal and the Carthaginian senate that enabled him (21.1, 4-5), both of which are the target of Hanno's protests.<sup>16</sup> Livy describes Hannibal as the cause of the war most explicitly at 21.21.1 (*non dux solum, sed etiam causa belli*). In essence, Livy uses Hanno as his mouthpiece to attribute this responsibility for beginning the war. By putting these ideas into the voice of a Carthaginian, Livy asserts that the Carthaginians should have known where events would lead, and if they had listened to their fellow Carthaginian they could have been spared the suffering that came at the end of the war. The alignment of Hanno's opinions, both here and those mentioned

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<sup>16</sup> Burck 1971, 28-31.



previously, with Livy's authorial voice is illuminating for understanding how Livy may have interpreted events at the end of the Republic.

Hanno closed his speech with warnings from the previous war and repeated his belief that Carthage's fortunes could change (23.13.3-5). Livy writes that Hanno's words were largely ignored because his quarrel with the Barcids had decreased his authority (23.13.6, *haud multos movit Hannonis oratio; nam et simultas cum familia Barcina leviolem auctorem faciebat*), and further the Carthaginians were too joyously caught up in the news from Italy to heed a voice of caution.

Following this scene in the Carthaginian senate, Hanno disappears from Livy's narrative until book 30 in the year 203 BCE. Hanno seems to have died by this point and he appears only in the references of others. Although Livy does not mention the death of Hanno who is absent in books 24-29, Hanno's return in book 30 suggests a kind of ring composition to Livy's narrative. So when Hannibal received the formal call to return to Carthage, he attributed his failures in Italy to neither Roman armies nor Scipio, but to Hanno, who was willing to ruin Carthage so long as it ruined Hannibal and his family too (30.20.3-4). Hannibal falsely asserted that the Carthaginian senate refused him reinforcements and supplies; Hanno had indeed favored this course of action, but he had been ignored (23.13.6-8). Livy, however, provides Hannibal's private thoughts as he sailed away from Italy, in which he recriminated himself for not pressing his advantage following the victory at Cannae (30.20.7-9). Livy also refers to Hanno in the words of Hasdrubal Haedus, who was another leader of the opposition party (30.42.12, *pacis semper auctor adversusque factioni Barcinae*). Hasdrubal Haedus reminded the Carthaginians that if they had listened to him and Hanno they could have had peace with the Romans (30.42.15, *si se atque Hannonem audissent Carthaginenses et tempore uti voluissent, duros fuisse pacis condiciones quas tunc peterent*). Here again we see that Hanno is the leader of a party, not a simple stand-alone voice. The references to Hanno by both Hannibal and Hasdrubal Haedus so late in the third decade help to round off some central themes to the decade: Hannibal's responsibility in starting an unjust war by breaking the treaty with Rome and Hanno's role in expressing the dangers of unchecked military power.<sup>17</sup>

Given the prominence of Hanno in both the beginning and ending of Livy's account of the Second Punic War, scholars have sought to understand how Livy has characterized him. In his paper arguing for the similar portrayal of Hannibal and Catiline in Livy and Sallust, Clauss compares Hanno to a Cicero figure.<sup>18</sup> Cipriani likewise sees Cicero in Livy's depiction of Hanno but aligns Hannibal with Antony more than Catiline.<sup>19</sup> These are attractive arguments in some ways, but by comparing Hanno with Cicero, we are compelled to look to Cicero's political enemies – Catiline and Antony foremost among them, perhaps Clodius could be added – yet none of these have the military heft to balance Hanno's Hannibal. So Cicero, although compelling, is not the best point of comparison for Hanno. Cato the Younger, rather, most convincingly fulfills that role. First of all, Cato, not Cicero was the most recognizable leader of

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<sup>17</sup> Levene 2010, 17, 111.

<sup>18</sup> Clauss (1997, 174-177) bases his argument on the accusations of immoral behavior against Catiline and Hannibal, the rhetorical characteristics of Hanno and Cicero, and their role as leaders of the best men - *optimus quisque*.

<sup>19</sup> Cipriani 1984, 67.

the *optimates* in the late Republic. Further, in the aforementioned passages, Livy has established a clear relationship between Hanno as the senatorial voice of caution and Hannibal as the ambitious general. Such an association is not without parallel in Roman history; the relationship of Cato the Younger and Caesar in the last days of the Republic is remarkably similar.

Some have viewed Hanno here as playing the role of a wise (or tragic) warner, familiar to ancient historiography since the writings of Herodotus.<sup>20</sup> As a warner, Hanno's words are recognizable as truth to Livy's reading audience, but as false or overly cautious to Hanno's listening audience. An important distinction, however, between Hanno and warners from Greek historiography is whom they warn and their purpose for doing so.<sup>21</sup> In Herodotus, tragic warners are often trying to educate a monarch, usually in a military setting, who is unwilling to listen. For Romans of the late Republic and early Principate, Livy's portrayal of Hanno resonates more with the actions and reputation of Cato the Younger, who since his youth had been cautioning against the extraordinary powers of military commanders. Perhaps the most prominent example occurred when Pompey supported extending Caesar's command in Gaul, and Cato cautioned him that he was bringing destruction to Rome and himself by enabling Caesar (Plut. *Cato Min.* 43.5-6). Similar to Hanno's repeated warnings, in the senatorial debate on March 1, 50 BCE, Cato reminded Pompey and the senate of his earlier admonitions, proclaiming that those things he had warned about were now coming to pass (Plut. *Cato Min.* 51.5). Unlike the warners of Greek historiography, Cato and Hanno stand most starkly in opposition to the military commander, Caesar and Hannibal, and are advising a third party, the Roman or Carthaginian senate in order to thwart or rein in the military commander. While not completely invalidating the wise/tragic warner paradigm, Livy's emphasis here is on the connection between Hanno and Cato and Roman politics of the late Republic more than on any model from Greek historiography.

Like Hanno (21.10.2), Cato the Younger held significant *auctoritas* in the senate, not so much from success in office or battle as from moral authority. He was the primary voice of resistance to both Caesar and Pompey's accumulation of powers.<sup>22</sup> We know primarily from Plutarch's *Life of Cato*, Dio, and Appian that he was vehemently opposed to all extraordinary commands, and he made a career of opposing them. He forcefully protested the proposal that Pompey, returning from Asia in 62, should have authority to protect the city from Catiline, after the threat had been essentially suppressed (Plut. *Cato* 26-29). At the same time, he opposed the granting of other favors to Pompey, such as wearing the laurel wreath and triumphal cloak in public (Dio 37.22).

Cato's opposition to Caesar, however, is most significant. The sources for this period well attest to the conflict between Cato and Caesar, including Plutarch, Caesar, Dio, Appian, and even the *Periochae* of Livy. The broad witness to this conflict suggests not that Livy is simply practicing intertextuality with his own text or that of others, such as Asinius Pollio, but that he is primarily engaged in intertextuality with the historical events themselves. Hanno's

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<sup>20</sup> Mader 1993, 209-216; Chaplin 2000, 78-85. For the tragic warner in Greek historiography, Croesus, Artabanus and Nicias leap most readily to mind as examples; for these, see Marinatos 1980, 305-310; Lattimore 1939, 24-35; Bischoff 1932.

<sup>21</sup> Mader 1993, 212.

<sup>22</sup> Drogula 2019, *passim*, esp. 120-27.



opposition to Hannibal was rooted in the language of liberty and servitude (21.3.5, 23.12.9); Cato's chief rallying cry in opposition to Caesar was *libertas*. Just as Hanno marked Hannibal as *cupidine regni* (21.10.4), Cato opposed Caesar's provincial appointment in 59, claiming that the people by their votes were establishing a tyrant in the city (Plut. *Cato* 33.3, *Caes.* 14), which is very similar to Hanno's description of the power granted to Hannibal (Livy 21.3.5-6). Again in 55 BCE, Cato resisted the distribution of provinces, in which Pompey was to receive Spain, Crassus Syria, and Caesar Gaul for another five years (*Per.* 105; Plut. *Cato Min.* 43.5-6, *Crassus* 15, *Pomp.* 52; Dio 39.33-34). Cato warned Pompey that he was carrying Caesar upon his shoulders and that one day the burden would overcome him and the city (Plut. *Cato Min.* 43.5-6).

Hanno's opposition to the extraordinary military command of Hannibal, as well as his support for handing Hannibal over to the enemy for his violation of a treaty are mirrored in Cato the Younger's opposition to Caesar's campaigns in Gaul. In 55 BCE, Caesar's attack and subsequent massacre of the Tencteri and Usipetes, German tribes with whom Rome had a treaty, provoked direct opposition from Cato (Plut. *Cato Min.* 51, *Caes.* 22; Caesar *Bell. Gall.* 4.12-15; App. *Gall.* 18).<sup>23</sup> Just as Livy's Hanno, Cato favored handing Caesar over to the enemy as a *deditio*, a form of redress for a violation of *fides*, so that Rome would not pay the penalty for his trespasses (Plut. *Cato Min.* 51).<sup>24</sup> Short of that, Cato advocated recalling Caesar from Gaul and removing his *imperium* (Plut. *Cato Min.* 51), just as Hanno sought the return of Hannibal (Livy 21.10.6). For this victory, the senate debated whether Caesar should be granted a *supplicatio*; Cato fiercely opposed the idea. Cato's response was taken seriously, as the number of our sources who reference it make clear; Suetonius suggests that Cato was not alone in his opposition to Caesar's violation (*Iul.* 24.3, *nonnulli dedendum eum hostibus censuerint*). Undoubtedly, Cato was not surprised that the senate did not agree to hand over Caesar to the enemy; Cato's actions, however, do confirm that some in Rome viewed Caesar's action as illegitimate and raised questions about it. Despite their lack of success, Hanno and Cato similarly challenged the violation of established treaties. Cato argued with the same principle in mind as Hanno: one individual should not acquire too great a command or else the state would fall victim to tyranny. If the commander failed in war, then the state would be forced to bear the consequences; if the commander succeeded, then the state would be compelled to bear the victorious commander.

The *Periochae* provide a glimpse of how Livy portrayed Cato during the last years of the Republic, and his character seems to be congruent with the descriptions of him in Plutarch, Appian, and Dio. In addition to Cato's administration of Cyprus (*Per.* 104) and opposition to assigning Caesar, Pompey, and Crassus extraordinary commands in the provinces, as mentioned above (*Per.* 105), Cato fought against the law enabling Caesar to stand for the consulship while still in Gaul (*Per.* 107, *invito et contra dicente M. Catone*). The *Periochae* also indicate that Livy maintained an interest in Cato throughout the civil wars including his march across Libya, his defense of Utica, and his suicide there in 46 BCE (*Per.* 112-114). Livy clearly

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<sup>23</sup> The number of dead cited is around 400,000; to what extent this is an exaggeration is uncertain. Plutarch writes at *Cato Min.* 51.1 that it was around 300,000; at *Caes.* 22, he puts the number at 400,000, with which Appian (*Gall.* 1.4, 18) agrees. Caesar gives the number of the enemy at 430,000 and suggests few survived (*BC* 4.15.1-5).

<sup>24</sup> For a good discussion of this entire episode, see Morrell 2015, 73-93, especially 75-78; also Drogula 2019, 199-200; Gelzer 1961, 46-53.

considered Cato's suicide and the controversy surrounding his death worthy topics of discussion. Indeed, Cato seems to have figured rather prominently in Livy's account of the late republic, a fact that makes the analogy between Hanno and Cato all the more plausible. It is not wild speculation to imagine that in Livy's narrative Cato could have played for the Romans a role similar to Hanno.

### III. Hannibal and Caesar

The similarities between Hannibal and Caesar are more readily discernible in the ancient literature than those between Hanno and Cato, but delineating them here highlights the analogous relationship between Cato and Caesar on the one hand, and Hanno and Hannibal on the other. While Hannibal functions as Rome's primary antagonist in Livy's account of the Second Punic War, Livy's use of Hannibal goes far beyond a simple historical figure. As Stocks points out, Hannibal became for the Romans a character with whom they could reflect on their own understanding of themselves.<sup>25</sup> Nonetheless, modern scholars have devoted little attention to comparisons between Caesar and Livy's Hannibal.<sup>26</sup>

Unsurprisingly, Hannibal was remembered by the Romans as a consummate villain, however formidable his military mind; Cicero refers to him as *crudelis Hannibal* (*Off.* 1.38) and Horace calls him *dirus Hannibal* (*Carm.* 2.12.2, 3.6.36) and *perfidus Hannibal* (*Carm.* 4.4.49). Yet Horace went so far as to say that Hannibal was less of a threat to Rome than the civil strife of his own day (*Epod.* 16.1-10, *parentibusque abominatus Hannibal: / impia perdemus devoti sanguinis aetas / ferisque rursus occupabitur solum:* [8-10]). Hannibal became a shorthand for any Roman politician who endangered Rome for his own gain. For example, Cicero portrays Antony in the *Philippics* as a Hannibal figure (*Phil.* 5.25, *Ergo Hannibal hostis, civis Antonius? Quid ille fecit hostiliter quod hic non aut fecerit aut faciat aut moliatur et cogitet?* 6.4, 14.9). Scholars have also reasonably argued that Livy's Hannibal was himself modeled on Sallust's Catiline and Jugurtha.<sup>27</sup> Livy's use of allusion to later figures forecasts the decline of the late Republic and the destruction of its civil wars. Yet Hannibal is not simply prefiguring men like Catiline or Jugurtha; he is also heralding Caesar, the military commander whose pursuit of glory brings destruction to his own country.

Hannibal, as much as Hanno, served as a lesson for the Romans. Latin authors, before and after Livy, did not hesitate to draw comparisons between Caesar and Hannibal. Hearing of Caesar's march across the Alps into Italy, Cicero in a letter to Atticus did not miss the opportunity to liken Caesar to Hannibal (*Att.* 7.11.1, *utrum de imperatore populi Romani an de Hannibale loquimur?*). Later authors saw similar parallels. In the *Bellum Civile*, Lucan portrays Caesar in Hannibalic terms most notably in book one (1.31, 254-57, 466-71), but also

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<sup>25</sup> Stocks 2014, 9.

<sup>26</sup> For example, Levene's excellent and extensive studies of sources and intertexts mention neither Cato nor Caesar (2015, 205-16; 2010, 82-163). The work of Devillers (2010) on Caesar cited below is the exception.

<sup>27</sup> Levene 2015, 205; Levene 2010, 99-104; Clauss 1997, 169-82; Walsh 1982, 1067-68; Hoyos (2015, 372) offers a dissenting view of this interpretation.

throughout the epic (3.349-50, 4.790, 6.789-90, 7.794-801, 8.286).<sup>28</sup> As Caesar prepares to cross the Rubicon, Lucan compares him to a Libyan lion crouching for the attack (1.205-212); the Rubicon itself is *puniceus* – blood-red/Punic (1.214). About a hundred lines later, Lucan's Caesar notices that his invasion of Italy draws a response similar to Hannibal's assault (1.303-305, *quam si Poenus transcenderit Alpes / Hannibal*).<sup>29</sup>

The general ease with which authors compared Caesar and Hannibal suggest that Livy too could readily make use of the apparent parallels between the two commanders. Throughout book 21, Livy's Hannibal shares several fundamental characteristics with Caesar: a willingness (1) to break treaties to advance his own military agenda, (2) to transgress political norms as represented by physical boundaries, (3) and to endanger his own society in pursuit of his own military and personal glory.

Both Hannibal and Caesar were notorious treaty breakers, which drew the ire of Hanno and Cato. Much can be said about Livy's account of the outbreak of the Second Punic War, but it is clear that he squarely puts the responsibility for renewed hostilities on Hannibal as the aggressor by attacking Saguntum and crossing the Ebro in violation of the treaty with Rome (21.2.7, 5.1-2). Unlike Polybius, Livy is little concerned with legalistic arguments or the greater question of Roman and Carthaginian political relations. As was discussed above, Hanno plays a key role in this portrayal. Livy's use of Hanno is rather effective, since he could be a vehicle to express the Roman argument with the voice of an ostensibly unbiased Carthaginian (21.10). When Cornelius Scipio refers to Hannibal as *foederum ruptore duce* (21.40.11) before the battle at the Ticinus River in 218 BCE, as an enemy commander his words do not carry the same moral weight as Hanno's, Hannibal's fellow-citizen. Of course, before the battle of Zama, Scipio reiterated the point to Hannibal that Carthage was responsible for both the previous war and the current one by breaking their treaties with Rome (30.31).

Similar to Hannibal, the legitimacy of Caesar's war in Gaul, although immensely popular back in Rome, was contested.<sup>30</sup> The Romans saw no threat from the Gauls at the time that Caesar took up his command, and while the senate's initial decision to appoint the consuls of 59 to the hills and forests of Italy (Suet. *Iul.* 19.2, *silvae collesque*) was politically motivated, it also indicates that there was not a need for a large military campaign on the northern frontier. This is not the space to litigate in full the legitimacy of Caesar's campaigns in Gaul, Britain, and Germany, but several episodes are worth highlighting to demonstrate that just as Hannibal's campaign against Rome was contentious, so was Caesar's in Gaul. Caesar's advance against Ariovistus in 58 raised questions from his own men who panicked nearly to the point of mutiny (Caes. *BG* 1.39-41; Dio 38.34-47).<sup>31</sup> One of the points of controversy for Caesar's soldiers, and later Ariovistus himself, was that Ariovistus and his people had been enlisted among the friends and allies of the Roman people by none other than Caesar himself while consul (Dio 38.34.3, Caes. *BG* 1.40.2, 43.4, 44.5). That Caesar provided a justification of his campaign against Ariovistus hints at the controversy it caused back in Rome. Caesar's version

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<sup>28</sup> Ash 1999, 39n.7, 69; Ahl 1976, 82-84, 96, 100-112.

<sup>29</sup> Not to be outdone by his epic predecessor, Silius Italicus too depicts Hannibal in ways that allude to Caesar; see Stocks 2014, 67-70 with bibliography at 67n.32.

<sup>30</sup> For a succinct discussion of some of the factors at play, see Gruen 2017, 33-39.

<sup>31</sup> Hagendahl 1944, 1-40.

of Ariovistus' speech includes demands that no Roman would expect Caesar to agree to. For example, Ariovistus stated that he would be doing Caesar's political enemies back in Rome a favor if he killed Caesar, a clever tactic by Caesar to suggest that the aims of his political enemies in Rome were allied with Rome's external enemies (1.44.11-13). Dio is explicit that Caesar was looking for a pretext to start the war (38.34.3) and that his soldiers were uncertain whether the undertaking was simply for Caesar's ambition (38.35.3).

When Caesar attacked the Tencteri and Usipetes in 55 BCE, Cato objected, as mentioned earlier. In this episode too, Caesar seems compelled to offer a justification for his military actions, which resulted in hundreds of thousands killed including non-combatants (BC 4.7-15). In the end, Cato's appeals failed and Caesar was granted an unprecedented 20-day *supplicatio* for his various victories, which Caesar does not hesitate to highlight in the concluding sentence to book four (BG 4.38.5). Nonetheless, Livy's portrayal of Hannibal as acting with disregard for existing treaties finds an analogue in Caesar's willful indifference towards Rome's earlier agreements.

Another similarity between Hannibal and Caesar was their willingness to transgress physical boundaries that also marked political boundaries. The best demonstration of this is their crossing of the Ebro and the Rubicon. Violation of boundaries is frequently an indicator of hubris and a harbinger of the destruction to come for the individual and the community.<sup>32</sup> For the Carthaginians and Romans, the Ebro marked the boundary between the two spheres of influence; any transgression by either party would be seen as an act of war. While Hannibal remained south of the Ebro, there was opportunity for peace, but once he was north of the river, war was essentially declared. The same held true for Caesar; the Rubicon marked the boundary between Rome and Cisalpine Gaul, the limit of his legitimate authority. Negotiations for peace were held between Caesar and Pompey, and a vote of the senate overwhelmingly favored that both Pompey and Caesar should lay down their arms (Plut. *Caes.* 30-31), but after Caesar entered Italy, Pompey and a large contingent of the senate fled, and civil war ensued.

Reflecting the important political implications that these river-crossings represented, both instances witnessed supernatural phenomena. Hannibal had a dream foretelling the devastation of Italy. Romans were clearly struck by this dream as several accounts preserve the basic outline of the story, which can be traced back from Cicero through Coelius Antipater to Silenus (Cic. *Div.* 1.49); Valerius Maximus (1.7.ext. 1), and Zonaras (8.22) also provide versions of the dream.<sup>33</sup> Polybius, in addition to omitting mention of the dream, provides hardly any details on Hannibal's crossing of the Ebro.<sup>34</sup> Of course, Livy does mention the dream, following the broad outlines of Silenus' account: a youth sent by Jupiter arrives to guide Hannibal to Italy; Hannibal is asked to keep his eyes on the guide; overcome by curiosity Hannibal takes his eyes off the guide and looks behind him; he sees a monstrous snake bringing ruin in its path attended by storm clouds; upon asking the meaning of this, Hannibal receives the answer that it is the devastation of Italy and that he must proceed without further questioning (21.22.6-9).

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<sup>32</sup> Mader 1993, 216-17.

<sup>33</sup> For the sources of the dream, see Devillers and Krings 2006, 337-346; Levene 2015, 207-208.

<sup>34</sup> Polybius seems to nod at the story of Hannibal's dream when he criticizes those who believe some "hero" led Hannibal through the Alps (3.48).

Livy differs from the other accounts in one crucial way – Hannibal’s location at the time of the dream. Silenus puts the dream after the fall of Saguntum (*cum cepisset Saguntum*); Valerius Maximus does not provide a place or time, just stating that Hannibal thought a youth had been sent to guide his invasion of Italy (*existimavitque missum sibi ab Iove mortali specie excelsiorem iuvenem invadendae Italiae ducem*). Livy situates Hannibal’s dream precisely at the Ebro, writing that Hannibal, having been encouraged by the dream, then proceeded across the river (21.23.1, *hoc visu laetus tripertito Hiberum copias traiecit*).<sup>35</sup>

Livy’s placement of the dream at a river is significant because of its resonance with the supernatural figures frequently associated with Caesar’s crossing of the Rubicon. Lucan writes that an image of the fatherland appeared to Caesar and urged him to halt his advance (1.183-333). According to Suetonius (*Div. Iul.* 32), Caesar was visited at the Rubicon by an apparition playing a reed, who then rushed across the river, and seizing a war trumpet, changed his piping to a battle-call.<sup>36</sup> While Lucan and Suetonius provide distinct accounts, Devillers notes that Livy and Suetonius converge in several respects: the crossing of a river, the presence of a masculine figure, and an invitation to follow.<sup>37</sup> In contrast to the supernatural figures in the accounts of Lucan and Suetonius, Plutarch writes that the night before Caesar crossed the Rubicon he experienced an unnatural dream in which he had intercourse with his mother (*Caes.* 32).<sup>38</sup> Like Livy with Hannibal’s dream, Plutarch deliberately places Caesar’s dream at a river crossing; Dio (37.52.2) and Suet. (*Iul.* 7.2) date it to Caesar’s quaestorship in Spain in 69 BCE and give the dream a positive interpretation – his mother is the earth.<sup>39</sup> The purpose of these phenomena was to demonstrate that a fateful step was being taken; a fundamental change was about to take place. Both Caesar and Hannibal had reasons to view their dreams unfavorably; their unwillingness to entertain such thoughts demonstrates their limitations to see beyond their own ambitions.

Lastly, Hannibal and Caesar brought destruction to their own society. Hannibal’s dream raises an interesting question of interpretation – destruction followed in Hannibal’s wake, likely portending devastation for Italy. But could he be certain that it would be contained there? Livy includes the portentous statement that Hannibal was told to leave fate hidden (21.22.9).<sup>40</sup> Although his readers all know the end for Hannibal and Carthage, Livy is content to leave everything uncertain in book 21 to heighten the dramatic tension, but by book 30 there is no doubt that Hannibal’s ambitions have been the ruin of Carthage.

In the assembly for the consular elections of 213, Q. Fabius Maximus spoke about the advantages Hannibal possessed as a *perpetuus imperator* (Livy 24.8.7-8). Fabius then of course argued for his continued service as consul, and in the controversial vote that ensued, Fabius was returned as consul (24.9). As effective as Fabius words were for getting himself reelected,

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<sup>35</sup> Pelling 1997, 202-203.

<sup>36</sup> For the different versions of Caesar’s crossing of the Rubicon, see Devillers 2010, 303-312.

<sup>37</sup> Devillers 2010, 304-305.

<sup>38</sup> It may be worth noting that neither Caesar nor Cicero ever directly mention Caesar’s crossing of the Rubicon.

<sup>39</sup> Pelling 1997, 200-201. As Pelling notes, (1997, 201n.22), Artemidorus (1.79) also viewed dreams of mother-intercourse as auspicious based on the same interpretation.

<sup>40</sup> Pelling 1997, 203.



he and his audience could not know their full meaning; Livy's readers, however, can pick up on their deeper resonance. Hannibal as a *perpetuus imperator* sounds a lot like Caesar as *perpetuus dictator*, and while Hannibal the perpetual commander was difficult for the Romans to defeat, Hanno and a few other Carthaginians correctly recognized the threat he posed to Carthaginian society. Hannibal's fifteen years in Italy are analogous to Caesar's eight years in Gaul; the return of both men to their respective homelands brought death and destruction.

Livy brings this point full circle. When the Carthaginians were forced to pay the first installment of the war indemnity, Hannibal responded to the weeping and lamentations of the Carthaginians by stating that the time to weep was when the Romans had stripped Carthage of its means to wage war abroad (30.44.6-7). He added that unless a country has a foreign enemy, it will find one at home and be burdened by its own strength (30.44.8, *nulla magna civitas diu quiescere potest; si foris hostem non habet, domi invenit, ut praevalida corpora ab externis causis tuta videntur, suis ipsa viribus onerantur*). This restates the adage that with the Carthaginian threat removed the Romans fell to internecine strife. As Reeve and Levene point out, Livy's Hannibal was presciently alluding to the destruction to come from the Roman civil wars.<sup>41</sup> Even further, Hannibal's words link him to Caesar whose march on Rome sounded the death knell to its republic, just as Hannibal's costly war had done for Carthage. In the end, the similarities between Hannibal's crossing of the Ebro and Caesar's crossing of the Rubicon mark Caesar as behaving like a *hostis*, which has the further impact of marking Caesar as a tyrant, for only tyrants treat their fellow-citizens like a hostile enemy.<sup>42</sup> The Romans, who had joined together in the face of great adversity to defeat Hannibal, had by Livy's day accomplished what the Carthaginian could never do – the destruction of the Roman Republic.

#### IV. Conclusion

All that has been mentioned so far suggests that in the matter of Hanno and Hannibal, Livy seems to be relying on an analogy with Cato and Caesar to construct parts of his narrative. One could argue that Livy is making use of substantive imitation, as outlined by Tony Woodman, who defines it as "the technique of giving substance to a poorly documented incident by the imitating of one which is much better documented."<sup>43</sup> As compelling as this paradigm is, I do not think it best describes what Livy is doing with Hanno and Hannibal. Certainly, the last days of the Republic (the years of Livy's youth) were more illuminated than events in the senate of Carthage during the Second Punic War, but Hanno was a rather well documented historical individual. Just as other historians did not record Hanno's opposition to Hannibal, there is also no need for Livy to record it either. Livy is not simply re-using material; he is making a statement about political power and military adventures. Rather than stressing the cyclical nature of historical events, Livy is establishing a "law" of sorts: an ambitious general

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<sup>41</sup> Levene 2010, 11-13; Reeve 1987, 321.

<sup>42</sup> For Caesar as a *hostis*, see Devillers 2010, 306. For the idea of the tyrannical ruler treating his citizens as a hostile enemy, see Aristotle *Politics* 1313a34-1315b10 and Livy 1.49, 56.1-3.

<sup>43</sup> Woodman 1979, 152, 153. If Livy's entire history remained, we could then see whether Livy followed Woodman's paradigm of substantive self-imitation. For such an example in Tacitus see Woodman, and also Keenan and Thomas 1988, 113-117.



who has received excessive powers brings ruin to his country if the admonitions of a conscientious and wise individual go unheeded. Thus he sets up the analogy Cato is to Caesar as Hanno is to Hannibal.

Indeed, the events are remarkably analogous. An ambitious man seeks a provincial military appointment with extensive powers; a senator opposes the appointment and vainly warns of the consequences. Once in the province, the general attacks a foreign nation with which there is presently a treaty. The senator protests against such action and suggests that the commander be handed over to the enemy as compensation for the crime and absolution of guilt from the gods. When this plea fails, the senator supports the recall of the general and the stripping of his command. This advice, however, goes unheeded, only to see the general march across a river with the accompaniment of supernatural figures. War ensues, and despite, or perhaps because of, the great military successes of the transgressive commander, great destruction results for their own country. We see all these points of connection in Livy's Hannibal and Hanno and the actions of Caesar and Cato in the late Republic.

If the Second Punic War was the height of glory for the Republic and the civil wars the depths of its decay, then perhaps Livy sought to frame his narration with these personalities. On the one hand, Cato the Younger resisted the power of Caesar to save the Republic, just as Hanno opposed granting excessive military powers to one man. On the other hand, Hannibal and Caesar brought great destruction to their individual countries and themselves in pursuing their own ambitions over the good of their country. Livy thus sets up an analogous historical framework to reveal the policies and behaviors that put to ruin the power of Carthage and destroyed the Roman Republic.

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